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Background: Challenges in attracting new health workers and poor motivation of 
existing staff have been cited as key reasons for underperformance of health systems. In 
the summer of 2010, Afghanistan launched a performance-based payments (PBP) 
program in 11 of its 34 provinces. The goal of this dissertation research is to examine the 
effect of PBP on health worker motivation and quality of care in Afghanistan.  
Methods: In 11 provinces of Afghanistan, 442 facilities, stratified by type of facility and 
matched on the average number of outpatient visits per month, were randomly assigned 
to an intervention or a comparison arm. Because of the study design, masking of the 
participants was not feasible. The main data source for all three papers is a cross-
sectional health facility survey conducted 23 months after the start of the program as part 
of the annual National Health Services Performance Assessment (NHSPA) conducted in 
all 34 provinces of Afghanistan. In Paper #1, a four-subscale 15-item scale was 
developed and tested among 2,413 health workers drawn from 775 health facilities across 
34 provinces, including Dari and Pashto speakers. Reliability of the scale was assessed 
using ordinal alpha. Construct validity of the scale was assessed using intention to quit, 
performance assessment and feedback, staff voice, equity of rewards, and general 
motivation. The generalizability of the scale was tested on a sample of Pashto speakers. 
Standard error computations used a sandwich estimator to account for non-independence 
of observations as a result of cluster sampling. Paper#2 and Paper#3 were limited to the 
11 provinces implementing the PBP program. Paper #2 was based on a random sample of 
805 health workers from 256 facilities. In Paper #2, the outcome was measured using the 




was used to estimate the effect of performance-based payments on four motivation 
factors. A robust variance estimator was used to adjust for correlation of the data within 
health facilities. The effect of treatment was estimated using intention-to-treat analysis. 
Given the high rate of non-compliance, complier-average causal effect approach was also 
examined. Paper #3 is based on a random sample of 2,180 patients and 255 health 
workers from 233 facilities. The outcome, quality of care, was measured using a 
standardized checklist designed to measure clinical quality of care. The main analysis 
approach was a linear mixed effects model using maximum likelihood estimator.  
Results: The work motivation scale developed as part of this thesis demonstrated good 
psychometric properties. Three out of four subscales had ordinal alpha of 0.70 or higher. 
The introjection subscale with the lowest internal consistency coefficient among the four 
subscales (0.64) still demonstrated higher reliability than subscales on comparable 
measures. The results of the multiple group analysis demonstrating the difference in 
factor means for amotivation between respondents intending to quit and those intending 
to stay provided evidence for construct validity of the scale. As hypothesized, staff voice 
had statistically significant (p-value<0.05) and positive association with identified and 
introjected regulation factors. Equity of rewards appeared to be a strong predictor of 
external regulation and introjection (p-value<0.05). Based on the intention-to-treat 
analysis, no statistically significant changes were observed in health worker motivation in 
the intervention group as compared to the control group (p-value>0.05). Using a 
complier-average causal effects approach, it appeared that PBP were negatively 
associated with motivation factors (p-value<0.05), except amotivation. Comparing 




score for quality of care was 0.23 (p-value<0.05). Other covariates were added to the 
model. Together, they explained 15% of the total variance in quality of care, while the 
proportion of level-2 variance explained by the covariates was 26%.   
Conclusions: The study produced a valid and reliable measure of worker motivation in 
Afghanistan. It demonstrated that while PBP program had a significant positive effect on 
quality of care, there was no effect on motivation. When comparing those health workers 
who reported having received PBP in the treatment group with similar health workers the 
control group, the study showed a negative effect of PBP on different types of 
motivation, including external regulation. At the same time, holding treatment constant, 
identified regulation was statistically significantly associated with quality of care (p-
value<0.05). Thus, it appears that health workers who are more intrinsically motivated do 
provide higher quality of care, but their motivation was not affected by PBP. Moreover, 
while treatment, i.e. PBP program participation, appears to be a significant predictor of 
quality of care, it explains only a small proportion of observed variance in quality of care 
between as well as within health workers. Factors such as presence of functioning 
equipment, timely payment of salaries, and type of health worker or level of training 
seem to be more important predictors of quality of care than PBP program participation, 
as they explain higher proportion of total variation observed in quality of care. This 
suggests that PBP should be paired with other complementary quality improvement 
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1 Chapter 1: Introduction and background 
1.1 Introduction  
After nearly three decades of conflict and the rule by the Taliban regime, Afghanistan 
faced enormous challenges in education, health, infrastructure and other basic services. In 
2001, net school enrollment was estimated at 43% for boys and at 3% for girls [1]. 
According to the World Bank estimates, there was a desperate shortage of qualified 
teachers with about 21,000 teachers for a school-age population of more than 5 million (a 
ratio of 240 students per teacher) [1]. The infant mortality rate (IMR) in 2001 was 
estimated at 91.6 per 1,000 live births (uncertainty bound 84.9 – 99.3), and the under five 
mortality rate  (U5MR) for the same year was estimated at 131.0 per 1,000 live births 
(uncertainty bound 120.4 – 143.1)
1
 [2]. The country had the highest maternal mortality 
ratio in the world: In 2000, it had the estimated MMR of 1,957 per 100,000 live births 
with the uncertainty interval 729–4356 [3]. To address these enormous challenges, 
beginning in 2002, international donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
have provided large amounts of financial and human resources to Afghanistan. To date, 
the World Bank has committed more than $2.7 billion for development projects in 
Afghanistan [1].  
 
Since then, the country has made a significant progress in improving access to health and 
education services leading to improvements in education levels and health outcomes [1, 
4-6]. While the exact figures vary by source, it appears that IMR, U5MR and MMR have 
all declined over the past decade. However, despite this progress according to The State 
                                                 
1 These estimates are lower than the estimates provided by UNICEF (2012), The State of the World's 




of the World’s Children 2012 report [7], among 193 countries ranked from highest to 
lowest, Afghanistan is ranked number eleven in under-five mortality rate. It also has the 
highest MMR of 1,575 maternal deaths per 100 000 live births (uncertainty interval 594–
3,396), which is about 394 times higher than Italy, the country with the lowest MMR of 4 
(3–5)
2
.  Moreover, it is one of the countries with the slowest yearly rate of decline in 
MMR [3]. Thus, the government and its development partners have been in search of new 
approaches to improve access to and quality of maternal and child health services.  
 
Results-based financing in health (RBF), specifically performance-based payments (PBP) 
for health care providers, showed promise as growing evidence from countries such as 
Rwanda and Haiti seemed to suggest its effectiveness in increasing utilization and quality 
of health services for women and children [8, 9]. Thus, in the summer of 2010, 
Afghanistan launched an RBF project in purposefully selected 11 of its 34 provinces. The 
primary objective of the project was "to increase key maternal and child health outputs, to 
improve quality of health services and to ensure higher patient satisfaction with health 
service delivery" [10]. It was hypothesized that improved financial incentives in the form 
of PBP would improve health worker motivation and satisfaction. This, in turn, would 
lead to better health system performance, resulting in improved health outcomes. This 
doctoral dissertation examines the effect of PBP on health worker motivation and quality 
of care.  
 
  
                                                 
2 The data for MMR are for 2008. These are the latest figures that have been accepted by the government 




1.2 Literature review 
1.2.1 Definitions and measures of motivation 
There are a number of different definitions of motivation in general and work motivation 
specifically, and all of them define it in terms of intent to act or engage in a particular 
type of behavior, which is separate from the actual performance of the task [11-13]. As 
Shortell & Kaluzny [11] state, “Motivation should not be confused with performance. 
People can be highly motivated but still perform poorly.” It cannot be assumed that 
motivated workers are more productive, because performance depends not just on 
motivation but also on ability and a number of other factors such as the availability of 
resources needed to perform a job well [14]. Also, while highly interrelated and often 
used interchangeably, job satisfaction and motivation are distinct constructs [15-17]. Job 
satisfaction is more affective in nature, and it is expressed in attitudes and emotional 
state; while motivation is directed by particular goals and is “the reason why workers 
behave as they do towards achievement of personal and organizational goals”[16]. 
 
According to Shortell & Kaluzny [11], and originally proposed by Campbell and 
Pritchard [13], theories of work motivation can be divided into two basic types of 
theories: content and process. Content theories focus on different types of needs and 
desire for satisfaction of these needs as the basis for motivation; whereas process theories 
attempt to describe how motivation is created and maintained (Table 1.1). 
 
The Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET) was the first theory to clearly describe 




something that arises from within the individual. According to Latham and Pinder [18], 
work motivation is “a set of energetic forces that originates both within as well as beyond 
an individual’s being, to initiate work-related behavior, and to determine its form, 
direction, intensity and duration”.  However, the CET was not well equipped to describe 
the work motivation, particularly as it relates to financial rewards [19]. It incited a debate 
on whether and how external rewards in general, but financial rewards in particular, had 
negative consequences on motivation. According to DeCharms [20], such rewards shifted 
the locus of causality and people became either controlled by contingencies or de-
motivated.  
 
Like CET, the Self-Determination Theory (SDT), described by Deci and Ryan [21], 
distinguishes between intrinsic motivation (i.e., doing an activity for its own sake) and 
extrinsic motivation (i.e., doing an activity for an instrumental reason). People do not 
require external reasons or rewards to do activities that that they find interesting or 
“aesthetically pleasing”, whereas they need extrinsic motivation for doing other activities 
[21]. However, according to SDT, extrinsic motivation is more complex than this simple 
definition. There are different types of extrinsic motivation, depending on the extent to 
which it is controlled by external factors. These types of motivation can be aligned along 
a continuum (Figure 1.1), “representing the degree to which goals or values have been 
internalized” [21]. The key distinction between SDT and most other work motivation 
theories is that it emphasizes the multidimensional aspect of motivation as a construct 




According to Gagne and Deci [19], different types of motivation are associated with 
different behavioral outcomes. 
 
According to Levesque et al [22], amotivation is the absence of intent to act in a 
particular way. External regulation describes behavior that is driven only by an 
expectation of a reward or fear of negative consequences. Introjected regulation is like a 
bridge between controlled and autonomous motivation. The regulation comes from 
within but it is controlled by external forces. Examples of this type of regulation include 
“contingent self-esteem, which pressures people to behave in order to feel worthy, and 
ego involvement, which pressures people to behave in order to buttress their fragile egos” 
[19]. Identified regulation describes behavior in which people act because the activity is 
congruent with their personal goals and beliefs. Gagne and Deci [19] give an example of 
a nurse who performs uninteresting and not necessarily pleasant tasks such as bathing 
patients because she values her patients’ health and understands the importance of these 
activities for their well-being. Finally, with integrated regulation, individual intention to 
act comes from their sense of self, and a given behavior is part of who they feel they are: 
In the example with the nurse, it means that the nursing profession is central to her 
identity, and she “would be more likely to act in ways that are consistent with caring for 
people more generally” [19]. According to Tremblay et al [23], these types of extrinsic 
motivation are not like developmental stages which everyone has to go through. The type 
of motivation one has at any given moment depends on particular organizational context 
and personal experience. As Tremblay et al describe it [23], SDT focuses on the “nature” 





Work motivation is influenced by type of management, system of rewards and other 
organizational factors, or what is often called organizational structure and culture. 
Organizational structure is “the formal system of task and authority relationships that 
control how people coordinate their actions and use resources to achieve organizational 
goals” [24]. Organizational culture is “the set of shared values and norms that control 
organizational members’ interactions with each other and with suppliers, customers, and 
other people outside the organization” [24]. Thus, the principal purpose of organizational 
culture and structure is to shape behavior and to “control the means used to motivate 
people to achieve [organizational] goals” [24]. Organizations differ in their values and 
norms as well as formal systems of authority and task relationships, and differences in 
these can be summarized by differences in organizational design, which is the process 
through which managers select and use different elements of structure and culture. 
According to Jones [24], studies have shown that, for example, all else being equal, the 
more hierarchical the organization is – the less motivated individual workers are, because 
the relative authority and the area of responsibility decrease. 
 
An important cautionary note is appropriate here regarding the concept of motivation and 
factors that support its different dimensions. Up and until now the discussion has largely 
ignored the fact that the motivation theories reviewed here have been developed in 
cultures that value autonomy and individualism [25]. For example, Jones’ [24] assertion 
that hierarchical organizations are negatively associated with worker motivation may not 




where the person is viewed as “embedded in a collectivity” and the feeling of autonomy 
is not strongly valued.  According to Kao and Sek-Hong [25], in the Chinese enterprise, 
consciousness about moral obligation is central to work motivation and thus, introjected 
regulation – viewed as a controlled form of motivation far away from intrinsic motivation 
by Deci and Gagne [19] – may be predominant and considered to be intrinsic in settings 
where feelings of duty before one’s family and community are far more important than 
the desire for autonomy.  
 
As described above, SDT conceptualizes motivation as a multidimensional construct. 
Based on this theory, a number of scales have been developed that ask participants why 
they do particular things. Different types of motivation are reflected in different reasons 
for behavior, which are organized into different subscales. According to Gagne and Deci 
[19], based on the research conducted so far in education, sports and health behavior 
changes, each subscale correlates most positively with the subscales closest to it and 
negatively with subscales that are conceptually on the other end of the continuum (Figure 
1.1), which is consistent with the SDT. Subscales can be used individually to predict 
outcomes such as performance, or they can be combined algebraically to form a summary 
measure [27].  The Self-Regulation Questionnaires (SRQ) and Intrinsic Motivation 
Inventory (IMI) have been developed at the University of Rochester based on these 
principles [27].  
 
The SRQs are a series of scales originally introduced by Ryan and Connell [28]. The 




these have been designed or validated in an organizational setting [22, 28]. A Work 
Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation Scale (WEIMS) is a scale based on the SDT but 
developed specifically to measure work motivation. It has been tested among the 
Canadian forces [23]. The Motivation at Work Scale is another scale based on SDT to 
measure work motivation [29]. Unlike WEIMS, it has been tested and validated among a 
more diverse group that included workers in sectors such as sales and services, technical 
and manual, managerial and professional, and health and education. It has also been 
cross-validated in two languages, French and English. However, it is still limited to 
Canada. Thus, the context for which it was developed and in which it was tested was very 
different from the focus of this study. As described in the previous section, the cultural 
context of the theories that serve as a basis for these instruments is very different than the 
one proposed in this study. Instruments developed and tested in countries such as France, 
Canada and USA have to be significantly revised to be appropriate for settings such as 
Afghanistan. 
 
1.2.2 Quality of care theory and measurement 
According to the Institute of Medicine [30], quality of care is “the degree to which health 
services for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired health 
outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge.” It has six key 
characteristics. It is safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient, and equitable [30]. 
For the assessment of quality of care Donabedian’s three-part framework has been widely 




1. Structure, defined as material and human resources as well as organizational 
structure of the facility; 
2. Process, defined as actions taken by the provider in making a diagnosis or treating 
the patient; and  
3. Outcome, reflecting effects of care on health status, behavior and satisfaction of 
the individuals and the population.  
 
As Basinga et al [32] noted in their study on PBP in Rwanda, the most significant effects 
were observed for those services over which providers had the most control. Individual 
health worker efforts are unlikely to result in substantial changes in structure or outcome 
measures of quality. Outcome measures, particularly changes in the health status of 
patients, depend on a complex set of factors, including those outside of health provider’s 
control. The effect of PBP schemes on the structural aspect of quality of care depends on 
the design of the program. In many PBP schemes, including Rwanda, part of the bonus 
payments was spent on improving structural aspect of quality of care, such as purchase of 
new equipment and repairs of the overall facility infrastructure. In Afghanistan, however, 
while the recipients of PBP were facilities, the entire amount of bonus payments was 
distributed among individual health workers as salary top-ups. Thus, in Afghanistan no 
direct investments were made into facility-level improvements from PBP. Also, while a 
team of motivated workers in an organization could influence structural changes, by for 
example, introducing innovations to improve drug availability or increase their own 
qualifications, many aspects of structure typically depend on the managing NGO or 




result of PBP, they would first of all be in processes of care. Thus, the main focus on this 
study was on the second element of Donabedian’s framework, i.e. performance of the 
practitioner, specifically technical and interpersonal processes of care [31]. 
 
As described in Franco et al [33], there are six main methods for measuring quality of 
provider performance: 
1. Exit interviews with patients or caretakers about provider performance, 
2. Standardized simulated patients,  
3. Review of medical records,  
4. Direct observation of actual care using a structured checklist, 
5. Simulation/demonstration, and 
6. Clinical vignettes or other types of knowledge assessments.  
 
Review of medical records is probably the least intrusive and expensive method, but it is 
limited by the quality of records, which maybe particularly weak in developing country 
settings [33]. Also, many procedures go unrecorded and some measures of quality, such 
as friendliness of the provider, cannot be recorded at all. Exit interviews measure reliably 
only certain aspects of process of care, such as interpersonal characteristics, while 
technical aspects of care might be less well understood, particularly by largely illiterate 
population [34, 35].  Using standardized simulated patients is resource-intensive and is 
rarely feasible in large scale evaluations [34]. Also, it is not usable for assessing care for 
children under-five. Clinical vignettes or other types of knowledge assessments as well as 
simulations aimed at assessing practical skills are not good measures of performance 




and what they actually do. Although providers are likely to modify their behavior under 
observation [36], direct observation using a checklist is generally considered to be a gold 
standard for other assessment methods [33], and in the context of developing countries 
with largely illiterate populations it has demonstrated the highest overall sensitivity and 
specificity [38]. In Afghanistan, direct observation for measuring quality of care has been 
used as the gold standard for measuring clinical quality of care, although it is 
supplemented by exit interviews to provide patient perspective on quality of care  [34, 
39]. It has been used for several years now as part of the National Health Services 
Performance Assessment (NHSPA) [40]. 
 
1.2.3 Theory and evidence on the impact of performance-based financing on 
work motivation, utilization and quality of health care services 
As Eldridge and Palmer [41] noted in their review there was some inconsistency in the 
use of terms such as performance-based payments, or pay-for performance. Performance-
based payments (PBP), also referred to as performance-based financing (PBF) can be 
defined as a mechanism “by which health providers are, at least partially, funded on the 
basis of their performance” [8]. Musgrove provides a more narrow definition and puts 
PBF in a larger context of results-based financing (RBF). According to the definition 
provided in Musgrove’s glossary of terms [42], RBF refers to any program that rewards 
the delivery of one or more outputs or outcomes by one or more incentives, financial or 
otherwise, upon verification that the agreed-upon result has actually been delivered. 
Incentives may be directed at service providers (supply-side), program beneficiaries 




 Incentives are directed only at providers, not beneficiaries;  
 Awards are purely financial – payment is by fee-for-service for specified services; 
and  
 Payment is made only if those services are of approved quality, as specified by 
protocols for processes or outcomes. 
 
PBP is often framed in terms of principal-agent theory [43]. A principal-agent 
relationship arises whenever one actor (the principal), which can be a person or 
organization, contracts, either explicitly or implicitly, another actor (the agent) to perform 
services or supply goods. However, because the agent has a utility function that differs 
from the utility function of the principal, the agent does not always act in the best interest 
of the principal. Moreover, since the principal cannot always observe the agent, resulting 
in information asymmetry between the two parties, the issue of moral hazard arises. Thus, 
the central problem for the principal is how to ensure that the agent acts in the way that is 
desired by the principal [44]. PBP is seen as one of the approaches to resolving the 
principal–agent problem by designing such contracts where the agent will be motivated to 
act in the best interest of the principal because their objectives are fully aligned [41, 43]. 
This approach is based on the assumption that financial gains are chief motivational 
forces for the agents [41].  
 
The assumption of overarching importance of financial incentives has not been 
thoroughly investigated yet in cultures where it is a matter of pride to be a health worker 




respected ones [45-47]. Social status was a recurring theme in interviews with clinical 
officers in Tanzania for example, although in this case it seemed that social status was 
closely connected to salaries because low salaries undermined the status of these health 
workers in their communities [48]. As Franco et al [33] point out in their study of 
motivation among health workers in Georgia and Jordan, providing adequate salary is an 
important factor but there are a number of potential non-financial mechanisms for 
improving work motivation.  
 
The literature coming from the field of organizational psychology is not as uniform in its 
opinion of financial incentives as a means of motivating employees and thus, improving 
their performance. According to the theory of reinforcement or operant conditioning, 
employees should be rewarded for behaviors that are desirable by their management 
(reinforcers) and punished, or at least not rewarded, for undesirable behaviors 
(punishments) [49].  The two main types of reinforcers used to elicit the desirable 
behavior are financial or verbal. However, in opposition to reinforcement theory, 
DeCharms showed that an extrinsic reinforcer could actually diminish motivation [50]. 
His theory was further expanded by Deci and Ryan in the cognitive evaluation theory 
(CET) that challenged the role of financial incentives in motivation, focusing on the 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic types of motivation [51].  
 
A further refinement of this hypothesis came with self-determination theory (SDT) that 
distinguished among different types of extrinsic motivation and hence, different effect of 




effect of external (material, tangible not verbal) rewards on work motivation depends on 
the type of extrinsic motivation, the context and the nature within which such rewards are 
provided. External rewards are expected to undermine not only intrinsic motivation, but 
also extrinsic types of autonomous motivation (integrated and identified regulation) when 
they are perceived as “controllers” of individual’s autonomy [52]. However, it appears 
that the relationship between external tangible rewards and motivation depends vitally on 
a context in which it is provided. According to the results of the field experiment 
conducted by Lawler and Hackman, the success of a particular pay plan depended on the 
process of its introduction, specifically participation by the employees [53]. As Lawler 
and Hackman [53]  explain, when employees participate in development and 
implementation of such programs they understand them better, are more likely to accept 
them as being fair, and have stronger commitment to them. Thus, the first key element for 
designing using financial incentives to increase employee motivation seems to be staff 
participation.   
 
Theory of goal-setting also provides insights on how to design PBP programs without 
undermining intrinsic motivation. First of all, PBP program may increase work 
motivation because it is accompanied by specific indicators or performance goals for the 
organization or individual. According to the goal-setting theory, people work harder 
when they have goals than when they do not have them [54]. Secondly, specific and 
difficult goals were found to be more motivating than general and easy goals [54]. 
However, use of very specific goals that were attached to bonuses and setting of 





SDT [19] also points to possible ways to use rewards without having detrimental effects. 
According to them, rewards have a positive influence on autonomous motivation if they 
are provided in organizations where employees experience managerial autonomy support, 
which is defined as “managers’ acknowledging their subordinates’ perspectives, 
providing relevant information in a non-controlling way, offering choice, and 
encouraging self-initiation rather than pressuring subordinates to behave in specified 
ways”. In laboratory experiments cited by the study [56, 57], financial rewards 
administered in an autonomy-supportive environment were associated with higher 
intrinsic motivation and vice versa.  
 
Another element that seems to determine whether financial rewards have detrimental or 
positive effect on motivation is whether payments are made contingent upon performance 
or not.  Based on the evidence from laboratory studies, it appeared that when payments 
were made conditional on performance, they reduced intrinsic motivation of the 
participants, while the same was not true with unconditional payments – they left intrinsic 
motivation unchanged.  Given these 
results, Deci came to the conclusion that the effect of financial rewards on intrinsic 
motivation came not from monetary payments as such but from the way they were 
administered [58]. It seemed that contingent financial rewards were perceived as 





This seems counterintuitive as pointed out by Locke [59] because this would mean that 
those employed under a civil service system were more intrinsically motivated than 
employees of systems based on merit. This also goes against the tenants of principal-
agent theory discussed above. However, these results may reconcile findings of studies in 
developing countries where, on the one hand, low salaries are associated with low 
motivation and satisfaction among health workers, but on the other hand, there is only 
weak evidence at best of the positive effect of PBP programs on work motivation and 
satisfaction.  
 
One last important comment on the potentially negative effects of PBP on health worker 
motivation in the context of developing countries with often severely underfunded health 
systems is the difference between “will do” and “can do” factors of motivational 
processes [47].  As a recent anthropological study points out [43], the PBP programs are 
based on assumption that the lack of “will do” component of motivation is the primary 
reason for poor performance. This puts health providers in “double binds” because they 
often lack resources such as basic infrastructure and medical supplies without which it 
may be impossible to provide good quality care and achieve the performance targets [43]. 
This can further undermine already weakened motivation.  
 
In countries such as USA and UK, PBP as a mechanism to improve provider performance 
has been in existence for quite some time [60]. However, Rosenthal and Frank [60] in 
their review of PBP programs in USA found little empirical evidence of the impact of 




could have been due to the following reasons: (a) small sample sizes characterizing most 
of the studies on PBP in USA, (b) the small magnitude of the bonuses relative to the 
effort required to improve quality, (c) lack of awareness among many participating 
physicians while the programs were under way, and (d) providing awards only to top few 
performing medical groups, which made the likelihood of receiving bonuses rather low 
[60].  
 
A more recent review focusing explicitly on the effectiveness of PBF in improving 
quality of primary healthcare services conducted by the Cochrane Collaboration 
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support or not to support PBF programs 
[61]. The authors of this review concluded that more rigorous study designs and analytic 
methods were needed, particularly to account for the selection bias that seemed to be 
widely present in PBF evaluations.  This review included studies from USA, UK and 
Germany [61]. The 2013 Cochrane review focusing on PBF in low- and middle-income 
countries, specifically Vietnam, China, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, DRC, Burundi and 
Philippines, also failed to find strong evidence on the association between PBF and 
improvements in utilization or quality of health care services [62].  
 
One of the most well-known studies on the success of the PBF in improving use and 
quality of health care services in a developing country context is the study by Basinga et 
al on Rwanda [32]. In this study, 166 facilities were randomly assigned to either 
treatment or control group. To isolate the effect of incentives from the effect of increased 




by the average amount of PBP made to the treatment facilities. It appears that on average, 
the share of additional funds spent on increased compensation for health workers in both 
treatment and control groups was very similar: facilities in the treatment group allocated 
77% of the PBP funds for personnel compensation, while facilities in the control group 
allocated 73% of the additional input-based funds to increase staff salaries [32]. Note, 
that the principles of intra-facility distribution of payments are not described for the 
control group. The remaining funds facilities spent on facility-level needs such as 
infrastructure, medical supplies etc. Providers were paid on a quarterly basis. Payments 
were based on fourteen maternal and child health-care services indicators discounted by 
the quality of care index.  
 
Basinga et al [32] found statistically significant differences between treatment and 
control groups in four out of eight impact indicators. According to the conclusions of the 
study, significant effects were observed for those services for which providers received 
highest payments or over which they had the greatest control [32]. In short, it seems that 
there was an increase in services that needed the least efforts from the service provider 
but provided the highest rewards.  
 
Haiti had a very different study design (see [9] for details) but it also demonstrated 
positive association between PBP and coverage by key MCH services. Unlike the 
findings in Rwanda, in Haiti there was a significant and large increase in immunization 
coverage rates [9]. However, these findings are based on the results of a non-




perceived to be ready to graduate into the new payment regime. Moreover, NGOs in 
treatment arm “aggressively” negotiated for what they perceived to be feasible baselines 
and targets, while those in the control group tended to accept targets set for them [9]. As 
Eldridge and Palmer note in their review [41], these achievements may be due to other 
factors such as technical assistance, capacity strengthening, and overall increase in 
expenditure by the NGOs. It seems that the effects of PBP were not isolated from the 
effects of other processes as no data were collected from the control areas [41]. While 
authors of the study acknowledge a number of reasons why findings from Haiti could be 
biased, they claim to have used a number of analytical methods to minimize those 
potential biases and hence, suggest that PBP did have a positive impact on key MCH 
services, including immunization coverage [9]. However, as Eldridge and Palmer note 
further in their review, it remains unclear to what extent bonus payments to NGOs 
reached the actual providers [41].  
 
1.3 Health services in Afghanistan  
Public services in Afghanistan have been virtually destroyed by the years of war. Up to 
2003, delivery of basic health care services in Afghanistan depended on NGOs with little 
stewardship from the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH). While NGOs filled an 
important gap in provision of at least basic health services, health system of the country 
was fragmented and provision of services was uncoordinated [6]. Most importantly, they 
were unable to reach large parts of the population: According to the results of the MICS 
conducted in 2003 [63], skilled birth attendance was at 14.3%, current use of 





However, since then the Afghan health system has made a strong progress. MOPH has 
assumed a strong leadership and implemented innovative service delivery models such as 
performance-based contracting (PBC) accompanied by independent monitoring and 
evaluation [64]. According to the rules of PBC, in case of poor performance, NGOs may 
lose their contracts, and MOPH did actually terminate several contracts of 
underperforming NGOs [6]. At the same time, the Government introduced the Basic 
Package of Health Services (BPHS) that includes a set of simple cost-effective services 
delivered mostly at primary care level with a focus on maternal and child health [65].  
According to MOPH [66], BPHS is a guaranteed minimum package of services that is to 
be provided to all citizens regardless of their ability to pay.  
 
These efforts have led to visible improvements in access, financial protection, and 
utilization of health care services [5, 67]. There has also been some improvement in 
health outcomes [5]. However, security is still a challenge and is one of the main factors 
hampering further progress in delivery of health services [65]. Moreover, similar to other 
developing countries, as described earlier, issues related to health workforce (such as 
attraction, retention, and performance) further undermine already weak health system and 
impede progress in health outcomes.  
 
There are three levels of health care services classified in the following way: 1) Primary 
care provided at the community or village level consists of health posts (HP), sub-health 




care provided at the district level includes comprehensive health centers (CHC) and 
district hospitals; and 3) Tertiary care provided at the provincial and national levels 
consists of national, provincial, and specialty hospitals [66].  
 
At the community level, basic health services are delivered by CHWs from their own 
homes, which function as community health posts (HP). A HP covers a catchment area of 
1,000– 1,500 people, which is equivalent to approximately 100–150 families [66]. Sub-
health centers (SC) form a link between HPs and other BPHS levels of service delivery. 
They were established in remote areas with small pockets of population that could not 
meet the criteria recommended for BHCs. A SC is intended to cover a population of 
about 3,000-7,000 with the maximum walking distance of two hours. The SCs provide 
most of the BPHS services that are available in BHCs including immunization, antenatal 
care, and family planning. According to the BPHS Guidelines, SCs must have a male 
nurse and a female community midwife, plus a cleaner/guard [66]. A BHC offers primary 
outpatient care, including newborn care, antenatal, delivery, and postpartum care, routine 
immunization, integrated management of childhood illnesses (IMCI), and treatment of 
malaria and tuberculosis, including DOTS. BHCs are responsible for supervision of HPs 
in their catchment areas. BHCs cover a population of 15,000–30,000. The minimal 
staffing requirements for a BHC are a nurse, a community midwife, and two vaccinators. 
It must have at least one female health worker. CHCs provide a wider range of services 
as compared to BHCs, including laboratory services and limited inpatient care. In 
addition to normal deliveries, the CHCs can handle certain complications and provide 




childhood illness and malaria. Each CHC covers a catchment area of about 30,000–
60,000 people. A CHC is required to have a male and a female doctor, a male and a 
female nurse, two midwives, two vaccinators, one CHW supervisor, one laboratory and 
one pharmacy technician [66].  
 
According to the latest HMIS census [66], there are 59 DH, 395 CHC, 778 BHC, 260 SC, 
and 10,000 HP. The Basic Package of Health Services is offered at six standard types of 
health facilities, ranging from community outreach provided by CHWs at health posts to 
inpatient services at secondary care facilities [66]. 
 
1.4 Results-based financing project in Afghanistan 
The RBF for Afghanistan has been approved in 2009 and launched in the summer of 
2010. Its main goal is "to impact MDGs 4 and 5 by improving coverage of maternal and 
child health services within the existing health system and without creating unnecessary 
parallel processes" [10]. Its primary objective is "to increase key maternal and child 
health outputs, to improve quality of health services and to ensure higher patient 
satisfaction with health service delivery" [10].  
 
The intervention, which is performance-based payments, was assigned at random where a 
health facility was the unit of randomization (Figure 1.2). Due to the nature of the 
intervention there was no blinding of the participants, i.e. facilities and health workers. 
All facilities have been stratified by type and matched on utilization (average number of 




months) prior to randomization.  The evaluation of the intervention was based on two 
main sources of data: (a) the household survey at baseline and follow-up, and (b) health 
facility assessment conducted as part of the existing annual national health facility survey 
described in more detail in the section on data source.  
 
Performance indicators were divided in the following way:  
1. Primary care level, plus basic health services at secondary care level provided by 
CHC: 12 indicators = 9 specific MCH indicators (ANC, SBA, PNC, DPT3, CPR) 
+ TB case detection rate + Equity of care + Quality; and  
2. Hospital level: 7 indicators. 
RBF scheme included only BPHS facilities and district and provincial hospitals. It did not 
explicitly include CHWs and the sharing of earned bonuses with CHWs was left at the 
discretion of NGOs and higher level facilities [68]. 
 
The performance payments were allocated in the following way:  
1. BPHS facilities (Sub-centers, BHCs, CHCs, outpatient departments of DHs) were 
to receive $7.7 million (83.7% of the total program funds): 
a. 80% of $7.7 million were to be disbursed at HF level, and  
b. The remaining 20% of the funds were to be disbursed at NGO level and 
earmarked specifically for the indicator on contraceptive prevalence rate,  
2. District and provincial hospitals, the national hospital and Kabul District Hospital 





Unit costs differed by type of services, ranging at BPHS level from $1.5 (per one 
antenatal care visit to $12 per skilled birth attendance) [68]. However, the original unit 
costs were increased one year after the start of the program and put into effect in the last 
quarter of 2011 [69]. Each facility in the treatment group was likely to earn some amount 
of bonus payments because improved performance was defined according to each 
facility’s own baseline. According to the MoPH [70], regardless of facility performance 
relative to others if it did not exceed its own baseline value, it would not receive the 
bonus. For example, if facility A in Quarter 1 reported 10 skilled birth attendance cases 
and in Quarter 2 it reached 20, while facility B in Quarter 1 had 20 skilled birth 
attendance cases and in Quarter 2 it stayed at that level, facility A would receive bonus 
payments while facility B would not. Also, the payment would be “discounted” by the 
quality of care (0 - 1) as measured by a quarterly score on the national monitoring 
checklist (NMC) that focused on structural indicators of quality and was jointly carried 
out by supervisors from the implementing organization and members of the provincial 
health office.  
  
An important element of the program design that was likely to influence motivation and, 
consequently, performance, was the distribution of incentives within facilities. The 
distribution of incentives was left at the discretion of health facility staff through a 
consultative process with NGO field managers [71, 72]. This meant the implementing 
NGO would sign a contract with the health facility about the principles of distribution of 
performance incentives within the facility.  There were three major mechanisms on the 




 Amount of individual incentive proportional to salary amount;  
 Amount of individual incentive distributed equally regardless of staff position or 
performance; and  
 Amount of individual incentive based on contribution to performance indicators. 
However, the NGOs were free to come up with some other mechanisms if the three 
described above were not acceptable to them.   
 
Most of the indicators and payments against them were to be made on a quarterly basis. 
Routine health information collected and aggregated on a quarterly basis was used for 
performance monitoring. NMC was used to monitor quality of care, which was also 
collected on a quarterly basis. The equity and Balanced Scorecard (BSC) indicators (for 
more details on BSC see [40]), however, were collected on an annual basis through the 
existing health facility assessment. For the quarterly indicators submitted through HMIS, 
there was a two-step system of verification. First, there was verification of data submitted 
to HMIS against facility records. Second, verification of facility records was done 
through household interviews by community-based organizations. The process of 
collection and verification of data from health facilities and up resulted in significant 
delays of payments, particularly at the start of the program. 
 
1.5 Baseline 
As described in the section above, this is a cluster randomized trial. The unit of 
randomization was a health facility. In accordance with principles of randomization, it is 




and unmeasured variables, except the treatment itself [73]. This assumption is likely to be 
violated in small sample studies, and baseline study can be used to confirm whether 
randomization process was a success or not. However, given the size of the current trial 
(442 clusters in 11 provinces), randomization process was expected to produce equivalent 
groups [73, 74].   
 
The methods and results of the baseline survey, described in detail in the “Impact 
Evaluation of the Results-Based Financing Intervention in Afghanistan” [75], are 
summarized below. The data was collected between 2009 and 2010 as part of the 
NHSPA. Thus, the overall sampling strategy and sample size have been determined 
outside of the study, i.e. by the parent study. A primary sampling unit was a health 
facility. The baseline study sample was 53 matched pairs, or 106 facilities. This included 
362 health workers and 1,013 patients.       
 
The study was based on intention-to-treat analysis at cluster level [76].  The test of 
normality was conducted on cluster-level means. The intervention effect was estimated 
using difference in means, and 95% CI for the difference in means were calculated on an 
original scale for variables with normal distribution and on logarithmic scale for variables 
with skewed distribution. Paired t-test and the signed rank test of cluster means at 5% 
significance level were used to test the intervention effect. 
 
The indicators measured at baseline were part of the national health sector Balanced 




groups (Table 1.2). No statistically significant differences were found among the 18 
indicators in four domains: (a) Patients and community, (b) Staff, (c) Physical capacity, 
and (d) Service provision. 
 
1.6 Thesis research objectives and conceptual framework 
The goal of this dissertation research is to examine the effect of performance-based 
payments on health worker motivation and quality of care in Afghanistan. The research 
objectives are as follows: 
1. To develop a multidimensional work motivation scale and assess its psychometric 
properties in Afghanistan (Paper 1); 
2. To assess motivation among health workers in facilities assigned to performance-
based payments program as compared to health workers in facilities assigned to 
control in Afghanistan (Paper 2); and 
3. To assess quality of care for patients observed in health facilities allocated to 
performance-based payments program as compared to those observed in health 
facilities allocated to control in Afghanistan (Paper 3). 
The conceptual framework for this dissertation is presented in Figure 1.3, at the end of 
this chapter. The framework is adopted from Franco et al [47] study of the health worker 
motivation in Jordan and Georgia. It is drawn using structural equation modeling notation 
to distinguish latent variables such as motivation drawn as circles from observed 
variables drawn as squares. As Franco et al [47] note, there are broader factors (outside 
the organization and individual) that impact worker motivation. Organizations do not 




example, in Afghanistan religion plays a very strong role in society and influences 
organizational culture and individual motivation. While the framework presented by 
Franco et al [47] shows only direct arrow from social factors to motivation, it seems more 
reasonable to also assume that these broader contextual factors directly influence the 
individual performance as well motivation. For example, widespread insecurity in 
Afghanistan is likely to have a direct effect on performance as well as an indirect effect 
through motivation.  
 
Organizational factors that define the work environment include structures, resource 
availability and culture. Structural factors include formal scope of work for each 
employee and department, promotion rules, procedures for hiring and firing and other 
rules that constitute the formal system of task and authority [24].  Cultural factors include 
values and norms of the organization [24]. For example, in a setting such as Afghanistan, 
a formally flat organization can be very hierarchical in reality due to cultural norms. 
There is a double headed arrow between organizational factors and performance-based 
payments. As described in earlier sections, in some countries, such as Rwanda, part of the 
PBP earned by the facilities were allocated for facility-wide investments such as 
infrastructure, equipment and medical supplies, thus influencing resource availability in 
an organization (arrow from PBP to organizational factors). In Afghanistan the entire 
amount earned by the facility was divided among health workers; however, conceptually 
this link exists. The arrow from organizational factors to PBP is drawn to show that 
organizational structural and cultural factors influence the way PBP are distributed (intra-




payments. As discussed in the section on RBF in Afghanistan, different organizations 
there chose to distribute PBP differently (equal amount to every staff member, in 
proportion to existing salary, or only to those staff members who contributed directly to 
performance indicators). This decision is a result of a complex set of organizational 
factors.   
 
Individual worker characteristics such as gender, health worker type (doctor, nurse etc) or 
level of training, and individual capability (knowledge and skills) are important 
determinants of motivation and performance at the individual level [37, 47]. Motivation 
influences health worker performance and two otherwise similar doctors will perform 
differently, depending on their level and type of motivation [77]. Worker capability also 
has direct influence on worker performance, not just through motivation. There are 
different consequences of worker performance, depending on the type of financing 
system and organizational structure. In systems where workers are paid monthly salaries 
based on their level of training and years of experience, individual performance is 
unlikely to have significant consequences. There is a dashed arrow back from the 
consequences of worker behavior to worker motivation demonstrating the link between 
motivation in period two and consequences of one’s performance in period one. The 
dashed arrow is used to show that the study of this feedback mechanism requires 





1.7 Relationship between thesis papers and the project from which the 
data derive 
The data used in the three papers that comprise this thesis derive from data collected as 
part of the Monitoring and Evaluation Technical Assistance for Strengthening Health 
Activities for the Rural Poor (METASHARP) Project implemented by the Johns Hopkins 
Bloomberg School of Public Health (JHSPH, referred to as JHU in Kabul) in 
collaboration with the Indian Institute of Health Management Research (IIHMR). The 
project began in 2009 and closed in 2013. The core activity of the project was the 
National Health System Performance Assessment (NHSPA) that focused on the 
development and use of the Balanced Scorecards based on the annual health facility 
surveys.  In addition, JHSPH and IIHMR consortium provided technical assistance to 
MOPH in conducting and analyzing national household surveys.  The consortium also 
built technical capacity of the Ministry staff to analyze and interpret health data. 
Moreover, as part of the METASHARP, JHSPH and IIHMR were required to conduct 
community verification activities of the HMIS data and the evaluation of the RBF project 
based on health facility and household surveys at baseline and follow-up.  
 
I started working on the project in the spring of 2009 when I contributed to the analysis 
of the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) household survey.  In June 
2010, I joined the team in Kabul and took the lead in designing the household survey 
instrument and training materials for the RBF baseline evaluation.  In 2011, following the 
data collection, I led the analysis of the RBF baseline household survey.  I also 




focusing on the health worker questionnaire (form F5). In February 2012, I returned to 
Kabul as a core member of the field team to assist with data collection and analysis of the 
NHSPA 2012 – 2013 round, a main data source for this study. Upon return from Kabul, I 
continued my involvement with the project and assisted in the analysis of the NHSPA 
data, contributing to the write-up of the national Balanced Scorecard Report 2012 – 2013 






1.8 Organization of this document 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: 
 Chapter 2 describes the data sources used, including sampling and data collections 
methods 
 Chapter 3 assesses the reliability and validity of the newly developed work 
motivation scale in Afghanistan (Paper 1)  
 Chapter 4 examines the effect of performance-based payments on health worker 
motivation in Afghanistan (Paper 2)  
 Chapter 5 examines the impact of performance-based payments on quality of care 
in Afghanistan (Paper 3) 
 Chapter 6 summarizes the findings and draws conclusions and recommendations 
The main tables and figures for each chapter appear at the end of the chapter. Additional 
















Figure 1.2  Study design of the Results-Based Financing Project in Afghanistan, BPHS facilities 
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Figure 1.3 Conceptual framework 
 




Table 1.1 Overview of motivation theories 
Content theories  
 The Need Hierarchy Maslow, 1943 
 ERG Theory: Existence, Relatedness, Growth Alderfer, 1972 
 Two-Factor Theory: Motivators vs. Hygiene 
Factors 
Hertzberg, 1959 
 Learned Need Theory: Need for Achievement, 
Need for Power, and Need for Affiliation 
McClelland, 1976 
Process theories  
 Equity Theory  Adams, 1965 
 Expectancy Theory: Job Outcomes, Valences, 
Instrumentality, and Expectancy 
Vroom, 1964 
 Reinforcement Theory or Operant Conditioning: 
Stimulus, Response and Consequence 
Skinner, 1969 
 Cognitive Evaluation Theory: Intrinsic and 
Extrinsic Motivation  
Porter and Lawler, 1968; deCharms, 
1968 
 Goal Setting Theory Locke and Latham, 1984 
 Social Cognitive Theory (self-efficacy) Bandura, 1977 
 Self-Determination Theory Deci and Ryan, 2002 
 





Table 1.2 Baseline characteristics, cluster-level analysis 
 
 
Note: The overall sample size is 53 pairs. P-values are calculated with Wilcoxon matched pairs signed 
ranks test for non-normally distributed continuous or binary outcomes and with paired t-test for normal 
continuous outcomes.  Confidence interval estimates are calculated with paired t-test. Laboratory 
functionality index applies to CHCs only; the sample size for this indicator is 12 pairs. 
Source: JHSPH/IIHMR, 2013 
  
Domain A Patients and Community Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI p-value
1 Overall Patient Satisfaction 76.4 73.53; 79.32 77.8 75.19; 80.49 0.42
2 Patient Perceived Quality of Care Index 76.2 74.01; 78.37 76.9 74.65; 79.20 0.60
3 Community Involvement and Decision Making Index 98.1 95.46; 100.76 92.5 86.17; 98.73 0.15
Domain B Staff
4 Health Worker Satisfaction Index 70.8 68.87; 72.77 69.9 67.71; 72.08 0.41
5 Salary Payment Current 58.8 46.95; 70.66 63.7 53.39; 73.97 0.30
Domain C Physical Capacity
6 Equipment Functionality Index 87.7 83.91; 91.41 85.4 82.09; 88.76 0.24
7 Drug Availability Index 84.9 78.43; 91.38 84.9 79.40; 90.41 0.57
8 Family Planning Methods Availability Index 94.3 90.60; 98.08 96.2 91.87; 100.58 0.27
9 Laboratory Functionality Index 69.7  57.80; 81.59 61.4 46.56; 76.17 0.27
10 Minimum Staffing Index 81.1 70.24; 92.02 77.4 65.71; 89.00 0.56
11 Staff Received Training (in the past 12 months) 14.8 10.94; 18.65 12.1 9.00; 15.28 0.35
12 HMIS Index 78.6 71.85; 85.38 78.0 71.50; 84.47 0.56
13 Clinical Guidelines Index 78.9 73.13; 84.58 83.0 77.73; 88.31 0.20
14 Infrastructure Index 59.7 52.80; 66.59 60.2 53.38; 67.01 0.75
15 Patient Record Index 63.1 59.41; 66.77 63.9 61.40; 66.33 0.51
Domain D Service Provision
16 Patient History and Physical Exam Index 68.3 65.08; 71.51 67.8 64.60; 70.93 0.78
17 Patient Counselling Index 30.1 26.25; 33.97 32.8 29.40; 36.27 0.21
18 Time Spent with Client 12.9 8.50; 17.37 8.3 4.81; 11.83 0.10




2 Chapter 2: Data sources used 
The data for this study was derived from the annual National Health Services 
Performance Assessment (NHSPA) health facility survey implemented in Afghanistan 
over the period of nine months between 2012 and 2013 [40]. The survey was based on a 
multi-stage stratified probability sampling approach where primary sampling unit was a 
health facility: 
 Stratification by province, 
 Stratification by type of health facility within each province, 
 Selection of facilities,  
 Selection of individual health workers, and 
 Selection of patients.  
 
Individual health workers and patients were secondary sampling units. Within each 
facility four health workers classified as clinical staff (doctors, nurses, assistant doctors, 
midwives, community midwives, and vaccinators) present at the day of the survey were 
randomly selected for the survey. If fewer than four clinical staff were present at the 
facility, then other facility staff members, including community health supervisors, 
pharmacists, cleaners and others, were interviewed for the survey.  However, all non-
clinical workers with the exception of community health supervisors were excluded from 





Patients were selected independently of health workers. Within each sampled facility, 
patients were stratified by age group (less than five years of age and five years of age or 
older) and selected based on a systematic random sampling approach as described below:  
 If less than 10 new patients were expected in a day in each age stratum, then each 
eligible patient was selected until 5 observations of consultations involving 
patients in that age stratum were completed; 
 
 If 11 to 15 new patients were expected in a day in each age stratum, then every 
second eligible patient was selected; 
 If 16 to 20 new patients were expected in a day in each age stratum, then every 
third eligible patient was selected; 
 If more than 20 new patients were expected in a day in each age stratum, then 
every fourth eligible patient was selected. 
 
According to NHSPA sampling methodology, at provincial level there was equal 
allocation with twenty five facilities selected per each province. Within each province, 
allocation was in proportion to stratum size (where stratum is the facility type) with 
fifteen BHCs, five CHCs and five SCs [40]. This sampling methodology was followed in 
2009 – 2010 for the baseline study and resulted in 213 facilities across eleven RBF pilot 
provinces. Of these, only 106 facilities were selected together with their matched pairs 
(resulting in 53 pairs) as the NHSPA survey had to start before the RBF matching and 





As the RBF evaluation was done within NHSPA, the 2012 – 2013 survey was also based 
on the above sampling methodology. Thus, following the allocation procedure per 
stratum described in the previous paragraph, 25 facilities per province were randomly 
selected. Once these were selected, 106 facilities which were randomly selected at 
baseline in 2009 – 2010 were purposefully added to the sample for the follow-up survey, 
i.e. 2012 – 2013. This was done to ensure that same 53 pairs surveyed at baseline were 
also surveyed at follow-up, as required by the project evaluation design. This addition 
impacted four out of eleven pilot provinces. These are the following: Parwan (36 
facilities), Takhar (26 facilities), Kunduz (31 facilities), and Saripul (27 facilities). The 
thesis is based on 2012 – 2013 data and thus includes all 256 facilities, i.e. facilities 
randomly selected for the 2012 – 2013 NHSPA round and those selected randomly in 
2009 – 2010 but purposefully added in 2012 – 2013. Also, it should be noted that in 
Kandahar, due to security concerns only eight facilities were selected for RBF pilot. 
Thus, while under NHSPA 25 facilities were surveyed in Kandahar, only eight of these 
were included in this study.   Facility weights were used when estimating means and 
proportions to adjust for the unequal probability of selection, resulting from this sampling 
methodology.  
 
The NHSPA survey of BPHS facilities consists of seven instruments, plus a separate 
instrument for health posts. F1 – F2 are instruments used for patient observations. F3 – 
F4 are used for exit interviews with patients or their caretakers. F5 is the health worker 
questionnaire. F6 is a special short questionnaire for community health workers (CHWs). 




medical supplies, and staffing levels. Data used for Papers #1 and #2 are derived from 
forms F5 and F7. Data used for Paper #3 are derived from forms F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, and 
F7.  Thus, for Papers #1 and #2, facility data from F7 were matched with health worker 
data from F5. This resulted in a sample of 256 health facilities with 805 health workers, 
or 3.1 health workers per facility.  
 
For Paper #3, the data set created for Paper #2 was further matched with the data derived 
from F1 – F4 forms.  This resulted in a sample of 233 health facilities with 255 health 
workers, and 2,180 patients. On average, there were 1.1 health workers per facility, 8.5 
patients per health worker, and 9.4 patients per facility. Given that not all those health 
workers that were selected for health worker questionnaires were also observed, and not 
all those health workers who were observed were selected for health worker 
questionnaires, the sample of health workers for Paper #3 (n=255) was substantially 
smaller than the sample for the study in Paper #2 (n=805). 
 
More than 90% of the data was collected by survey teams that have been conducting 
surveys for the NHSPA project for several years. Moreover, all members of these teams 
had medical degrees. A small portion (6%) of data was collected through community 
survey teams due to security considerations. These were almost exclusively in non-RBF 
pilot provinces. The community survey teams received a short training but they did not 





3 Chapter 3: Reliability and validity of the newly developed work 





Background: Access to health services depends to a large extent on availability of the 
health workforce. Shortage and low performance of individual health workers are often 
linked to low motivation. At the same time, it seems that intrinsically motivated health 
workers can make a positive difference in access to and quality of health services, even in 
settings with few resources. However, there has been some difficulty in producing strong 
evidence on the impact of motivation on health workers’ performance. To a large extent 
this is due to measurement challenges as latent constructs such as motivation cannot be 
directly observed or measured.    
 
Method: Based on the Self-Determination Theory of motivation, a four-subscale 15-item 
scale was developed and tested as part of the National Health Services Performance 
Assessment in Afghanistan. The sample (n=2,413), including speakers of two main 
languages of Afghanistan, Dari and Pashto, was split into four parts. Exploratory factor 
analysis was performed on sample one, which contained only Dari speakers (n=431). 
Based on these results, confirmatory factor analysis was performed on sample two 
(n=439), which also contained only Dari speakers. This model was cross-validated using 
CFA on a third sample of Dari speakers (n=805). Finally, the generalizability of the scale 
was tested on Pashto speakers (n=738). Reliability of the scale was assessed using ordinal 
alpha based on polychoric correlation matrix. Construct validity of the scale was assessed 




staff voice and equity of rewards, and general motivation. Standard error computations 
used a sandwich estimator to account for non-independence of observations as a result of 
cluster sampling. 
 
Results: The scale demonstrated good psychometric properties. Three out of four 
subscales had ordinal alpha of 0.70 or higher. The results of the multiple group analysis 
demonstrating the difference in factor means for amotivation between respondents 
intending to quit and those intending to stay provided evidence for construct validity of 
the scale. The factor mean for amotivation was significantly lower (p-value<0.05) in the 
group that was intending to stay, as compared to the group that was intending to quit. 
Staff voice had statistically significant (p-value<0.05) and positive association with 
identified, external and introjected regulation factors. Equity of rewards appeared to be a 
strong predictor of external regulation and introjection (p-value<0.05). Amotivation had a 
negative correlation (-0.30) with the question on general motivation, providing evidence 
of discriminant validity of the scale. 
 
Conclusion: The work motivation scale developed in this study demonstrated good 
psychometric properties. The scale developed using the Dari language showed 
generalizability to Pashto language as well. Availability of a short (15-item) scale 
validated in non-Western context using a large representative sample is an important step 
in improving our understanding of health worker motivation and designing more nuanced 






Access to health services depends to a large extent on availability of health workforce. 
There is strong evidence that links staffing levels to both service delivery and health 
outcomes [78]. As the WHO paper on “Priorities and Strategies in Human Resources for 
Health” has put it, “The single most important determinant of the performance of health 
services delivery systems is the performance of health workers” [79]. A wide range 
factors (see Figure 1.3 Conceptual framework), such as the overall security situation in 
the country, infrastructure of the facility, its organizational culture, training of individual 
health workers and their motivation, have been identified as determinants of performance 
[36, 39, 77, 80]. On the one hand, there is some evidence suggesting that low motivation 
contributes to shortage and low performance of individual health workers,  weakening the 
entire health system [45, 81]. On the other hand, it seems that intrinsically motivated 
health workers can make a positive difference in access to and quality of health services 
even in settings with hard resource-constraints [77, 82].  
 
However, in contrast to more easily measurable factors such as training or infrastructure, 
there has been some difficulty in producing strong evidence on the impact of motivation 
on health workers’ performance. To a large extent this is due to challenges posed by 
constructs such as motivation, when it comes to measuring them [83].  While errors in 
measurement are widely present even in physical attributes such as weight and length, 
they can be measured directly and their measures can be replicated to provide confidence 
in their accuracy. Motivation is a latent construct, and this implies that it is not directly 





The primary objective of this study was to develop a multidimensional work motivation 
scale and assess its psychometric properties in Afghanistan. The immediate application of 
the instrument is for the assessment of the impact of a performance-based financing 
project on health worker motivation in Afghanistan (see Chapter 4). Based on the review 
of the literature on motivation, as described in Chapter 1, it was hypothesized that work 
motivation is a construct that consists of five factors, indicating the degree of 
internalization of goals and values of an organization. The hypothesized factors were: 
integrated regulation, identified regulation, introjected regulation, external regulation, and 
amotivation (see Table 3.1 for more explanation of these terms).  These factors reflect the 
degree to which the intent to act is autonomous (factors 1 and 2) controlled (factors 2 and 
3), or lacking completely (factor 5). 
 
While theoretical understanding and empirical measurements of motivation in general 
and work motivation in particular have been growing, they have been largely limited to 
North American and Western European settings. In developing countries, there is a 
scarcity of rigorous quantitative studies on work motivation based on clear theoretical 
framework [48, 85]. Not rarely, studies, while distinguishing constructs such as 
“motivation” and “satisfaction” in their theoretical review, appear to combine them in 
their measurement scales where some items seem to ask about motivation (“Only do this 
job to get paid”) and other items ask about satisfaction (“I am satisfied that I accomplish 
something worthwhile in this job”) [83, 86]. They are also often limited by one or more 




response rate, or statistical methods of analysis that do not take the full advantage of new 
developments in psychometrics [83, 86-89]. A systematic review of motivation in 
developing countries by Willis-Shattuck et al [81] uncovered only eighteen studies that 
focused on health worker motivation and intervention(s) linked to it that met their quality 
criteria, including use of primary data. Many excellent studies are based on qualitative 
methods [45, 46, 90-92], which are necessary in developing initial understanding of 
motivation and related to it constructs from the perspective of health workers in a given 
setting, but have limited generalizability and cannot test hypotheses with large 
representative samples [90, 93]. 
 
Studies focusing on motivation and satisfaction of health workers in Afghanistan or 
Central Asia in general are almost non-existent. Using key words such as “work 
motivation” and “scales”, PsycINFO – a primary database for obtaining access to scales 
and studies on their application – was searched.  No language limitations were imposed. 
The only limitation applied to the search was “published between 2000 and 2013”. This 
resulted in forty-seven publications. None of these had Afghanistan or any other Central 
Asian country in either title or abstract. There were two publications on Pakistan, one on 
teachers and one on banking sector employees, and three publications on India, published 
in Indian journals. Searches using terms such as “motivation”, “satisfaction”, “work 
motivation” in PubMed also did not result in studies on work motivation in Afghanistan 
or other Central Asian country, although there were a few studies on Pakistan and India 
[16, 91, 94]. While this quick search was limited to only two databases, it indicates the 




motivation in developing countries by Willis-Shattuck et al [81] also points to a shortage 
of rigorous studies of motivation in this region. Out of eighteen studies included in the 
review, only one was from Central Asia or Afghanistan. At the same time, large 
resources are currently being spent in this region through projects such as Results-Based 
Financing in health (RBF), which aim at improving health worker motivation through 
financial incentives (see Chapter 1 for more details on the project in Afghanistan) [95]. 
Thus, improving our understanding of motivation and developing more rigorous methods 
to measure it are important tasks for researchers and practitioners working on improving 
health in this region.  
 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Data source 
The data for this study was derived from the annual National Health Services 
Performance Assessment (NHSPA) health facility survey implemented in Afghanistan 
over the period of nine months between 2012 and 2013 [40]. The survey was based on a 
multi-stage stratified probability sampling approach where a primary sampling unit was a 
health facility (Figure 3.1): 
 Stratification by province, 
 Stratification by type of health facility within each province, 
 Selection of facilities,  





Individual health workers were secondary sampling units. Within each facility four health 
workers classified as clinical staff (doctors, nurses, assistant doctors, midwives, 
community midwives, and vaccinators) present at the day of the survey were randomly 
selected for the survey. If fewer than four clinical staff were present at the facility, then 
other facility staff members, including community health supervisors, pharmacists, 
cleaners and others, were interviewed for the survey.  However, all non-clinical workers 
with the exception of community health supervisors were excluded from this analysis. 
This resulted in a sample of 775 health facilities with 2,413 health workers, or 3.1 health 
workers per facility. The unit of analysis is a health worker. 
 
3.3 Measures / Variable construction 
Work motivation scale 
The main steps in the construction of the scale are described in Figure 3.2. Using existing 
literature on motivation, the construct of motivation was defined. Self-Determination 
Theory of motivation (SDT) formed the theoretical framework for the proposed 
instrument.  Motivation was hypothesized as a multi-dimensional construct with five 
distinct factors, each forming a separate subscale (Table 3.1).  
 
Content and face validity 
Having defined the construct, a search was done for reviews and applications of existing 
scales on motivation, focusing on studies conducted in similar social and economic 
context. At this stage, given that the terms “satisfaction” and “motivation” have been 




as well. Next, main domains from different instruments were pooled together and mapped 
to identify duplications, common themes, and new areas. Following this, a very broad 
pool of items was collected and then grouped under the identified domains. Many of the 
items were very similar and hence, only one of them was retained. As a result, a pool of 
items was developed from other measures that met the minimum criterion of face validity 
given the adopted theoretical framework.  
 
These items were then grouped into five categories reflecting the hypothesized 
dimensions of motivation as a construct.  Several items, particularly for external 
regulation subscale, had to be introduced for the first time to reflect the existing external 
rewards structure in Afghanistan. In consultation with an Afghan advisor, the author 
conducted close review of the items in the initial pool. It was found that (a) many of the 
items from different instruments were very similar in content and thus, using one of them 
would be sufficient; (b) several items were worded in ways that did not seem appropriate 
for the given context. For example, the Work Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation Scale 
(WEIMS) asked a question “Why do you do your work?” and offered a series of 
responses, including items such as “Because I want to be a “winner” in life” and “I ask 
myself this question, I don’t seem to be able to manage the important tasks related to this 
work”  [23]. First item did not seem appropriate because calling oneself a “winner” and 
stating that as one’s goal for choosing a certain type of work seemed to be a rather 
foreign idea in Afghanistan. Second item had a very complex structure. Based on this 




experts. Finally, 20 items were selected for translation and pretesting of the scale (see 
Appendix A, Table 7.1).  
 
This preliminary scale was then translated into the local languages. Following this, the 
instrument was tested with 50 health workers as part of a larger field-testing exercise for 
the NHSPA instruments in a hospital in Kabul. The items were checked for missing 
values and correct direction of responses. The scale was then translated back into 
English, and some items were reworded to achieve simpler sentences. This scale was then 
piloted as part of the NHSPA 2011. In this preliminary scale (see Appendix A, Table 
7.1), items 251, 253, 261, 266, and 267 were adopted from the motivation scale 
developed and applied among Kenyan health workers [86]; items 254, 255, 265, and 269 
were derived from the original Job Diagnostic Survey [96]; and item 258 was taken from 
the Job Satisfaction Survey [97]. The remaining 10 items, mainly on self-worth 
contingencies and external rewards, were newly introduced, although several of them 
were based on items such as those tested among physicians in Pakistan [91]. Item 268 
was completely new and specifically introduced to measure the importance of 
performance-based payments (PBP) in externally regulated motivation, because as 
described in the introduction, PBP were being introduced in Afghanistan to improve 
health worker motivation.  
 
The respondent was provided with a statement that referred to their current job and she 
was asked to indicate the level of her agreement with that statement.  The response scale 




To maximize the readability of the scale, items were assessed using the Flesch reading 
ease formula [98]. This was done using Microsoft Office Word Program that provides 
readability statistics as part of the spelling and grammar check. The Flesch reading ease 
score for all of the items taken together was 71.7 and the Flesch-Kincaid grade level was 
estimated as being equal to the 7th grade. In addition, given the literacy levels in the 
population the reading and comprehension of the tool was tested with actual health 
workers as described below.  
 
In parallel, two focus group discussions with seven health workers in each from two 
different facilities in Kabul were conducted. The guide for the focus group discussions is 
attached (Table 7.2). These discussions showed that all health workers understood work 
motivation as something that causes a worker to act in a certain way. However, for the 
majority it was something that was externally determined and was often equated with 
encouragement, financial rewards, promotion and support. This is very similar to findings 
of the qualitative study in Kenya and Benin [45], according to which over 50% of health 
workers in Benin equated motivation with prospective "encouragement" with one fourth 
of these explicitly mentioning financial encouragement, while another 40% considered 
"being motivated" as having the necessary means to work and get recognition. As the 
authors of this study put it, the majority understood motivation as “an incentive, and not 
as a state of mind” [45]. This is very similar to results of the focus group discussions with 
Afghan health workers. Moreover, it seemed that the word “tashweeq”
3
 that was 
                                                 
3 Tashweeq means "evocation of shauq", shauq being a word for desire, zeal, inclination etc. Especially 
combined with the verb "kardan" (to do), tashweeq kardan, it means to encourage. Combined with the verb 
"shodan" (to become), tashweeq shodan, it might acquire an intrinsic aspect. However, in Persian, the word 




frequently used in these discussions and seemed to be used in daily language in Dari was 
the word for encouragement, while a more accurate word for motivation, “angize”, was 
used more rarely, although it seemed to be understood by all health workers [99].  
 
At the same time, there were several participants who viewed motivation as “an 
independent desire to perform” that came from understanding consequences of one’s 
actions and desire to do something meaningful. Religion proved to be one of the 
important motivating factors, along with the desire to help people or family, respect in the 
community, verbal appreciation from superiors, the fairness and competence of the 
superiors, and financial rewards. Interestingly, financial rewards were connected to 
religion: Several participants said that being able to earn “Halal” or lawful money was 
one of the motivating factors. Thus, these discussions show that motivation is viewed as 
both intrinsically and extrinsically determined, although it seems that extrinsic factors are 
more dominant.  
 
In addition to the focus group discussions, the questionnaire was tested in a small group 
of 7 different types of health professionals through the following steps: 
1. The interviewer read out each question and asked them to repeat it back. This was 
recorded in the column next to the corresponding question.  
2. Each health worker filled out a clean questionnaire form. 
3. The interviewer then reviewed the answers and asked the respondent to explain 





Overall, it appeared that items were well understood by the respondents. However, three 
out of seven respondents seem to have understood item 257 on opportunities for 
promotion as opportunities for improvement or training. Having reviewed the back 
translation, it became apparent that “promotion” had been translated as “improvement” 
and thus, while some respondents understood it correctly, others did not. Item 265 (“It is 
hard for me to care very much about whether or not the work gets done right”), which 
was intended to measure amotivation, seemed to have been misunderstood by all of the 
respondents. This item was subsequently dropped. 
 
Pilot study 
 As described above the 20-item scale was piloted as part of the NHSPA 2011 (Figure 
3.2). Using the data from 11 RBF pilot provinces (n=811), direction and response 
distribution of each item of the scale was examined. After examining overall distribution, 
exploratory factor analysis accounting for clustering through robust standard errors with 
GEOMIN oblique rotation was used to uncover the underlying dimensions of the scale. 
Given that it was clustered ordinal data, WLSMV was used as an estimator. Based on the 
magnitude of eigenvalues, it seemed that four factors should be retained (eigenvalue>1). 
Together, they accounted for 52.3% of the total variance. Based on the chi-square test of 
model fit the null hypothesis of a single-factor was rejected. However, the chi-square test 
is sensitive to sample size and can lead to rejection of a model that may be only trivially 
misspecified. Thus, other global fit indices were examined. Based on the global fit 
indices, it appeared that there was no significant improvement in the model after a two-




four-factor model was finally selected. The internal consistency of the subscales was 
assessed using Cronbach's alpha for ordinal data [100]. While the factor on identified 
regulation performed well (alpha coefficient of 0.79) and the factor on external regulation 
was satisfactory (alpha coefficient of 0.68), the factor on amotivation was below the 
desired standard (alpha coefficient of 0.57) and the factor on introjected regulation with 
only two items required additional items [101].  
 
This scale was then reviewed by an external Dari to English translator with a graduate 
education in psychology [102]. Based on his review, findings of the focus group 
discussions, and the results of the EFA, it was determined that questions not performing 
as expected would be reworded for clarity and several new items would be introduced 
into the scale. Also, items originally designed to measure integrated and identified 
regulation factors were combined into one factor based on the results of the factor 
analysis as described above. A similar approach was taken in the Motivation At Work 
Scale [29]. As Gagne et al [29] point out, distinction between these two factor has been 
difficult based on psychometric properties of SDT-based scales. Thus, a 21-item scale 
based on four subscales was finally developed.  
 
The scale is designed to be self-administered. There is no summary score for the entire 
scale, because each hypothesized factor is viewed as a distinct type of motivation. 
Moreover, according to the SDT, when predicting different outcomes it is not the overall 




subscales, based on the respective factor, can have its own score which is an arithmetic 
average of the items in that subscale. 
 
Validation variables 
Validation variables were constructed only for the RBF pilot sample (n=805) as they 
were used only at the final validation stage of the scale (see the last level of boxes in 
Figure 3.2).  
 
Intention to quit was constructed based on the originally continuous variable. Given the 
binary nature of the decision (stay or quit) it appeared that a binary variable would be 
more appropriate than a continuous one. Health workers were asked how long they 
intended to stay in this facility and had to mark years, months or days. The original 
continuous variable ranged from 0 days to 60 years. However, it had clear outliers, first 
identified using box plots and more formally with “lv” function in STATA [103]. Values 
above or below the inner fences are considered to be mild outliers and values above or 
below the outer fences are considered to be severe outliers. Thirteen severe outliers 
identified in this way were assigned the value of the inner fence, which was 22 years. Of 
the 796 health workers that answered this question, it appeared that the majority (65%) 
intended to stay in one facility for 5 years or less, of which 35% intended to stay 1 year or 
less. Based on this, we redefined the variable as a binary variable where those who 





The performance assessment and feedback variable was constructed based on two 
variables. Health workers were first asked whether or not they had received a formal 
employee performance assessment in the past 12 months, to which they could answer 
“Yes”, “No”, “Don’t know”. Of the 804 health workers who responded to this question, 
6% said “Don’t know”. These were combined with those who said “No” (12%) because 
(a) it seems that the intended benefits of having a performance assessment disappear if 
the employee is not aware of it, and (b) both groups, those who said “No” and those who 
said “Don’t know”, were instructed to skip the following question regarding the 
feedback. Those who responded “Yes” to the question on assessment were asked whether 
or not they had feedback from that assessment. Of the 648 health workers who answered 
this question, 76% said “Yes”, while 24% said “No”. These two variables were combined 
into one binary variable as it was regular feedback that was hypothesized to have a 
positive impact on motivation. Thus, the new variable was coded as “1” if a health 
worker received assessment and feedback, and “0” if she received assessment but not 
feedback, or did not receive assessment at all. Of the 804 health workers, 494 (61%) 
received assessment and feedback.  
 
Staff voice or participation was measured through a question: “Staff in this facility have 
opportunities to express their opinions”. Fairness of the supervisor was measured through 
a question: “My supervisor is unfair to me”. Equity of rewards was measured through a 
question: “I feel like I am rewarded fairly for the work I do”.  Responses to all three 
questions were measured on a four-point Likert scale (1=”Strongly disagree”, 




for the motivation scale.  Of the 804 health workers that responded to the question on 
opportunities for staff to express their opinion only 6% said “Strongly disagree”, while 
46% said “Strongly agree”. Of the 803 health workers that responded to the question on 
fairness of the supervisor, 12% marked “Strongly agree”, while 46% expressed the 
opposite opinion. Of the 803 health workers that responded to question on equity of 
rewards, 12% marked “Strongly disagree”, while 28% marked “Strongly agree”. All three 
questions were part of the satisfaction scale administered to health workers together with 
the motivation scale. However, as the psychometric properties of the satisfaction scale 
were not assessed yet, these three items were used separately for the validation of the 
current scale.   
 
General motivation was constructed based on one item “Overall, I feel very motivated to 
do my job”, measured on a four-point Likert scale similar to items on the work 
motivation scale. It was treated as an observed categorical variable. Of the 797 health 
workers that answered this question, less than 1% expressed a strong disagreement with 
the statement. Almost 98% of the respondents marked either “Agree” or “Strongly 
agree”.  
 
3.4 Data analysis 
3.4.1 Missing data 
None of the items in the work motivation scale had more than 0.5% missing values.  The 
variable on general motivation had 5.3% missing values. The missing values for the 




community survey method was used due to security considerations (92.2%) and in 
provinces outside of the RBF pilot (93.8%).  None of the other variables, except intention 
to quit, had more than 5% missing values. Intention to quit had 6.2% missing values. 
Similar to general motivation variable, 78.7% of these were from facilities that were 
surveyed through community survey method (see Chapter 2). Moreover, they were 
almost exclusively restricted to provinces outside of the RBF pilot (94%).  These 
variables were used for validation only with the RBF pilot sample; thus, the proportion of 
missing values relevant for the purposes of the study was less than 2%.  
 
Given that scale items were measured on ordinal scale, a robust weighted least squares 
estimator was used for model estimation. With the WLSMV estimator without covariates 
in the model, the pairwise present method is used in MPlus [104]. As the name implies, 
in pairwise present analysis missing data is looked at for pairs of variables. For example, 
if 100 respondents have non-missing values for y1 and y2, 100 observations are used to 
compute the correlation between y1 and y2. If 90 respondents have non-missing values 
for y1 and y3, 90 observations will be used to compute the correlation between y1 and 
y3. As proportion of missingness was less than 2% on observed covariates that were used 
as validation variables in this study and missingness is not allowed for the observed 
covariates [104], observations with missing data on covariates were deleted. 
 
3.4.2 General approach 
The data analysis proceeded in several distinct stages. First, direction of response for 




correct understanding of items by the respondents. Next, mean and median scores, 
proportion of missing values, and frequency distributions of responses to individual 
questions were examined. In RBF pilot facilities only 4.8% used Pashto forms, while in 
facilities outside of the RBF pilot 45.9% used Pashto forms. Given that reliability and 
validity of the scale can differ by language, the analysis of non-RBF data sets was 
restricted to Dari forms only. Thus, Pashto forms in non-RBF pilot facilities were 
excluded from the EFA and CFA conducted on non-RBF data sets. The Pashto data set 
was kept separately and used at the final stage for assessing the scale for generalizability 
in order to ensure that it would be useful for measuring motivation not only among Dari 
speakers, but also among the Pashto speakers (Figure 3.2).  
 
According to Raykov and Marcoulides [84], CFA is a method of testing well-developed 
hypotheses about the latent variable structure as the number of factors is stated in 
advance, and for each indicator it is pre-determined which of its loadings will be 0 on 
which factor.  Although in this study we had an initial hypothesis according to which 
motivation was a multi-dimensional construct, it was determined that exploratory 
analysis would be more appropriate as the first step, as the theory underlying the 
construct and existing instruments was derived from a very different social context.  
 
According to Raykov and Marcoulides [84], a “highly beneficial application of CFA is as 
a follow-up to EFA” on the same set of observed variables but using a different data set 
derived from the same studied population. Thus, we split our sample into three parts. The 




two parts (further referred to as Group 1 non-RBF and Group 2 non-RBF).  Exploratory 
factor analysis was performed on Group 1. Based on these results, confirmatory factor 
analysis was performed on Group 2 data [101]. Finally, RBF facility data was analyzed 
using the CFA model that resulted from Group 2 non-RBF sample.  
 
Reliability and validity measures were assessed on the final subscales. Standard error 
computations used a sandwich estimator to account for non-independence of observations 
as a result of cluster sampling. No sampling weights were applied. All data were analyzed 
using STATA 12 [105] and MPlus v7 [104].  
 
3.4.3 Factor analyses 
An exploratory factor analysis using the oblique GEOMIN rotation was conducted on the 
21 items of the work motivation scale on Group 1 non-RBF sample. The factors are 
correlated under the oblique GEOMIN rotation, which is in line with our theoretical 
understanding of motivation factors.  Given that responses were measured on ordinal 
scale, the model was fit to a polychoric correlation matrix using the method of robust 
weighted least squares [104].  Standard error computations used a sandwich estimator in 
order to account for non-independence of observations due to cluster sampling by 
specifying TYPE=COMPLEX in the ANALYSIS command of the input file [104].  
 
As the preliminary step to EFA the model was checked for specification errors, 
identification problems and input errors by examining the results for negative error 




To determine the appropriate number of factors to retain several criteria were used. First, 
Kaiser-Guttman criterion was used (eigenvalues>1). This was coupled with evaluation of 
the proportion of total variance that was explained by given factors. Parallel analysis was 
not applicable as the data was measured on an ordinal scale [104].  
 
Next, model fit statistics, factor loadings, communalities, and factor structure were 
examined. Given the sensitivity of the chi-square test to sample size, the comparative fit 
index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), the root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA), and the standardized root mean residual (SRMR) were used to evaluate the 
global fit of the model. Use of several indices to judge the model fit is recommended as 
each of them has its strengths and weaknesses [107-109]. CFI ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 
indicating a very good fit. Typically, CFI>0.9 indicates acceptable fit [110], although Hu 
and Bentler suggest 0.95 as a cutoff [108]. TLI is usually lower than CFI, but it has 
similar cutoff level where an index<0.9 indicates that a model needs to be re-specified 
[110]. RMSEA <0.08 indicates a reasonable fit, although <0.05 is desirable [111]. 
Similar to RMSEA, smaller value for SRMR (0.08) indicates that a model may be 
considered to provide a good fit for the data [108].  
 
Items with factor loadings higher than 0.30 were retained if they loaded clearly on one of 
the factors [84].  As Raykov and Marcoulides explain [84], when loading is less than 
0.30, one particular factor explains less than 10% of the observed variance in the item. 
Thus, measures with loadings higher than 0.30 are “considered as generally contributing 




Modification indices are useful in evaluating assumptions such as non-correlated residual 
errors by giving the researcher a sense of what happens when those assumptions are 
relaxed [112]. Ideally, the MI values should be less than 3.84 (the critical value under a 
chi-square distribution with 1 df), but 10 is still considered to be a conservative value and 
is a default option in MPlus [104]. Anything above 10 is the evidence that the underlying 
factor does not explain all the covariance between items that have high residual 
correlation, so there may be a need for additional factors or these particular items do not 
work. 
 
Based on the results of the EFA, CFA was fit on Group 2 non-RBF sample.  As described 
in the case of EFA, given that responses were measured on ordinal scale, the model was 
fit to a polychoric correlation matrix using the method of robust weighted least squares 
[104].  Standard error computations used a sandwich estimator in order to account for 
non-independence of observations due to cluster sampling by specifying 
TYPE=COMPLEX in the ANALYSIS command of the input file [104].  All factor 
loadings were freed, and thus, the metric of the factors was defined by fixing the factor 
variances at one. 
 
All of the above described fit indices, except SRMR (not provided for CFA models with 
complex data), were used to evaluate the global fit of the CFA model. Values of the 
standardized factor loadings as well as their statistical significance were examined. In 
addition, factor correlations were examined for consistency with theoretical predictions 




variance explained in the latent response variable underlying the categorical variable 
were examined to determine quality of the items in the model. The final CFA model was 
then tested on RBF pilot data set.  
 
3.4.4 Reliability 
According to DeVellis [113], scale reliability is “the proportion of variance attributable to 
the true score of the latent variable”. Item-total correlation omitting the item in question 
from the total as described by Raykov and Marcoulides [84] is a basic useful measure of 
reliability that was applied in this study.  
 
Internal consistency based on Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is one of the key measures of 
reliability. In simple terms, items should be correlated with each other and the total score. 
While Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is a convenient and relatively simple measure of 
reliability, it is vulnerable to outliers, non-normality of data, small number of items in the 
scale, and low variability in total scores [114, 115].  As the current scale used a four-
point Likert scale, reliability for each subscale was estimated using ordinal alpha based 
on polychoric correlation matrix as per Gadermann, Guhn & Zumbo [100].  Internal 
consistency coefficients such as Cronbach’s alpha can be modified and estimated using 
polychoric correlation matrix [100, 116].  
  
3.4.5 Validity 
Validity concerns the extent to which the proposed scale measures the true construct. 




constructed, its ability to predict specific events, or its relationship to measures of other 
constructs”. Several types of validity measures were used in this study. The summary of 
the variables used for construct validity, hypotheses and rationale are provided in Table 
3.14. 
 
First of all, an indication of content validity is the process of scale construction, including 
thorough review of the theory of motivation and existing scales, described earlier.  The 
focus group discussions conducted as part of field testing of the instrument also support 
the content validity of the scale. Second, cross-validation of the model is considered as 
one of the important measures of validity [106]. Following Bagozzi and Yi [106], as part 
of the cross-validation process, parameters of our model were estimated  in one sample 
(Group 2 non-RBF), and the predictive effectiveness of the model was subsequently 
determined on a separate, independent sample drawn from the same population as the 
first (RBF sample). The model with the best fit to one data set may capitalize on chance 
or specific characteristics of that data set, but a valid model should fit a new sample as 
well [106]. 
 
Construct validity was measured through the differentiation between groups [84]. The 
variable used for this analysis was intention to quit. It was hypothesized that there would 
be differences in factor means between those intending to stay and those intending to quit 
[117, 118]. Specifically, it was expected that the factor on amotivation would have a 




those intending to quit.  The analysis was conducted using the mixture modeling with 
known classes approach as described in MPlus User’s Guide [104].  
 
Performance assessment and feedback was used as predictor of motivation factors. 
According to SDT, individuals have three innate psychological needs, one of which is the 
need for competence [119], and meaningful performance feedback promotes a sense of 
competence and autonomy when people feel responsible for their successful performance 
[19, 120]. A positive association was expected between this variable and identified 
regulation factor, indicating that health workers who received regular performance 
assessment and feedback would have higher identified regulation, as predicted by the 
theory.  The analysis was conducted using structural equation modeling where outcome 
variables were continuous factors measured through observed categorical indicators 
[104].  
 
Variables on staff voice and equity were used to test construct validity through the latent 
variable modeling framework where staff voice and equity variables were predictors of 
motivation factors.  Staff voice was expected to have a positive association with 
identified regulation as it would help the staff feel that their managers care about their 
point of view and acknowledge their perspectives, which would increase the sense of 
competence and autonomy among employees [120, 121]. SDT is not as clear about the 
role of staff voice in introjected motivation. However, to the extent that staff voice as 
ability to express opinions increases one’s self-esteem and promotes the feeling of self-




was predicted to have a negative association with identified regulation and a positive 
association with amotivation as predicted by the theory of motivation focusing on 
organizational justice as well as SDT [19, 54, 122]. Equity of rewards, one of the main 
elements of organizational justice, was expected to have a positive association with 
identified regulation, external regulation and introjected motivation factors [122].  
 
Construct validity was further evaluated using the question on general motivation. 
Hansen [39] in his dissertation proposed that validity of a scale on patient satisfaction can 
be measured by assessing the association between the scale and a related variable, such as 
the overall patient satisfaction. Using this approach, this study measured construct 
validity by examining the strength of association between the proposed scale and the item 
on overall motivation. The formula provided by Raykov [123] for continuous factor 
indicators was modified to fit the case of data measured on ordinal scale. Thus, we used 
ordinal alpha estimates for reliability instead of the reliability estimation process 
described in Raykov to correct the correlation between the criterion and the factors [123].  
Polychoric correlation coefficients of the summed scores for each factor and general 
motivation were also applied as an additional check.   
 
3.4.6 Measurement invariance for assessing generalizability to Pashto 
language 
Measurement invariance is an important characteristic, particularly when the scale is 
intended to be used in different linguistic or cultural groups. If the measurement 




comparisons between the two groups, as it is unclear whether the interpretation of the 
scale items is the same [124, 125].  The test of the measurement invariance of the work 
motivation scale between Pashto and Dari languages was conducted using the following 
three step procedure [104, 106, 124]: 
1. Configural invariance was assessed using CFA based on the factorial structure 
of the final RBF model; 
2. Metric equivalence was assessed by imposing equality constraints on factor 
loadings; 
3. Invariance of thresholds was assessed while holding factor loadings and 
thresholds constant across groups. 
Satisfactory model fit indices for the three models with sequentially imposed constraints, 
beginning with the least restrict one, would provide evidence to the generalizability of the 
scale developed based on Dari language speakers to Pashto speakers in Afghanistan. 
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Study population 
A total of 2,413 health workers drawn from 775 facilities (clusters), covering 34 
provinces of Afghanistan, were surveyed in this study.  Of these, 94% were surveyed 
using professional survey teams, while 6% were surveyed using community surveyors 
(Table 3.2). Community survey method was used in the most insecure areas and largely 
restricted to areas outside of the RBF pilot provinces. More than 50% of the sample came 
from BHCs. The majority of surveyed health workers came from facilities either 




NGOs only (42%), and only a small portion (5%) came from facilities managed by 
MOPH only.   
Approximately two-thirds of the sample used Dari as their main language. Given the 
reality of gender distribution of health workers in Afghanistan, 64% of surveyed health 
workers were male.  Vaccinators made the largest group of health workers in our sample 
(29%), followed by nurses (24%), and then doctors (14%) (Table 3.2).  Almost 60% of 
the sample could be considered to be fairly new employees as they had worked in their 
current facility for three years or less. Only 6% of surveyed health workers reported that 
they had worked in the same facility for more than 10 years. When asked about their 
intention to stay in the current facility, 28% stated that they intended to leave the facility 
within a year.   
 
The majority of health workers stated that they received supervisory visits 30 days 
preceding the survey (80%) and formal employee assessment in the past 12 months 
(83%). Of those who received employee assessment, 82% received feedback from it. 
Only two-thirds of the respondents received their salaries on time over the past year, and 
slightly more than one-third received a salary increase over the same period (Table 3.2). 
Eighteen percent stated that they received performance-based payments. Eighty percent 
were estimated to have a second job. One third of the sample or 805 health workers 
drawn from 256 facilities, covering 11 provinces, were part of the RBF pilot program.   
 
3.5.2 Descriptive results for work motivation scale 
Means, standard deviations, and sample sizes for each individual item of the original 




(Appendix A, Table 7.3).  It also presents marginal frequency distributions for each item 
by validation group. Items that were selected for the final scale are bolded. Four items on 
amotivation are negatively worded items and they were not re-coded because leaving 
them in the original scale made the interpretation of loadings and regression coefficients 
more intuitive.  
 
The means for items for all three groups were generally high, above 3.0 on a 4-point 
scale, except the four items on amotivation described in further detail below. For non-
RBF Group 1 and Group 2 samples, only three items (items No. 9, 12, 16) had a mean 
below 3.0: family, pay, and benefits. In addition to these, the RBF sample had one more 
item with a mean below 3.0 (item No. 10), respect in the community. Looking at 
frequencies of endorsement, out of 21 items of the scale, only three items had more than 
10% of respondents who marked “Strongly disagree” to positively worded questions in 
non-RBF Group 1 and Group 2. These are the same items that had means below 3.0. In 
the RBF sample, in addition to these three items, item No. 10 (respect in the community) 
and No. 14 (sufficient resources) showed more than 10% of respondents expressing 
strong disagreement with the statement. These items are generally considered to be strong 
items.  
 
On the opposite end, for all three samples item on God’s grace as the motivating factor 
had the highest frequency of endorsement with less than 5% of respondents marking 
either “Strongly disagree” or “Disagree”. Moreover, this was the only item that had an 




Norman [126] in their practical guide to the development and use of scales advise against 
items with frequency of endorsement above 95% or below 5%. Even keeping items with 
frequency of endorsement between 5% and 95% will lead to highly skewed items. At the 
same time, it is recommended not to throw out items simply based on this criterion [126]. 
Thus, the item on God’s grace that was introduced into the scale based on the results of 
the focus group discussions and further analysis of Afghan culture where religion plays 
an important role in daily life was not eliminated from the scale.  
 
In general, satisfaction and motivation data tend to be skewed in a positive direction. For 
example, in the Patient perception of quality and satisfaction scale developed and used in 
Afghanistan [39], none of the items had a mean below 3.0. Moreover, the frequency of 
endorsement for category 1(“Strongly disagree”) was less than 5% for all items, except 
one item on the cost of the visit. The scale was measured on a four-point Likert scale and 
thus comparable to the response scale in this study.  
 
3.5.3 Exploratory factor analysis 
Results from the initial exploratory factor analysis conducted on 21 items indicated that 
one factor explained only 25% of the total variance. Four factors explained 52% of the 
total variance, which increased slightly to 58% with five factors (Table 3.3). Kaiser-
Guttmann Criterion suggested retention of five factors, as the eigenvalue of the fifth 
factor was 1.1. However, this criterion has been criticized, as it often overestimates the 
number of factors to be retained [127]. As the next step, the global fit indices were 
examined. Based on these, one- and two-factor models were rejected (Table 3.4). A 




total variance. Together, these three criteria suggested that models with four or five 
factors would provide the best fit to the data. Factor loadings, unique variance estimates 
and modification indices of the four- and five-factor models were examined next. 
 
In a four-factor, model items “I work in this job because I have a chance to help other 
people through my work” (intr1), “I feel I should personally take the credit or blame for 
the results of my work on this job” (intr3), “I feel a very high degree of personal 
responsibility for the work I do on this job (intr7)”, “I work in this job to gain God’s 
grace” (intrj4) loaded clearly together on one factor with positive loadings of 0.50 or 
higher and significant at 5% level. This factor could be termed an identified regulation 
factor (Table 3.5).  
 
Items “I work in this job because it allows me to use my skills” (intr5), “I work here 
because of opportunities for promotion” (extrg2), “I work in this facility because it has 
sufficient resources I need to do my job (medicine, equipment, infrastructure)” (extrg3), 
“I work here because it is located in a safe area” (extrg4), “I work here because of good 
benefits  I receive (Note: all benefits – housing, transportation, anything else you receive 
– think overall)” (extrg5), “I work here because it provides long term security for me” 
(extrg6) – all loaded clearly on one factor with positive loadings ranging from 0.43 to 
0.71. While loadings varied in size, they were all above 0.30 and were statistically 





Items “I work here because it makes me feel important” (intrj1), “I do this job because 
my family would be disappointed if I quit” (intrj2), “I do this job because it gives me 
respect in the community” (intrj3) – all loaded together with positive loadings (p-value 
<0.05) ranging from 0.40 to 0.80. Item “I only work here to get paid” (extrg1) had a 
positive statistically significant loading on this factor but it was marginally acceptable as 
the common criterion for acceptable loadings as described in the Methods section was 
higher than 0.30. Looking at factor structure (Table 3.6), this item did not seem to have 
an observably high correlation (positive or negative) with any of the four factors. The 
highest correlation was with factor 3 (0.37), but it was still below correlations of other 
items in this factor. Also, it had the highest residual variance of 0.77 in the entire scale. 
Finally, it was conceived as an external regulation factor item, as it focused on pay but 
seemed to load with items conceived as introjected motivation factors (self-esteem, guilt). 
For these reasons, this item was not included in this factor.  
 
Items “I frequently think of quitting this job” (amot1), “I sometimes feel my work here is 
meaningless” (amot2), and “I don’t care much about the quality of work here” (amot3) – 
all had negative statistically significant loading coefficients on identification factor. 
These loadings ranged from -0.33 to -0.62. However, items amot1 and amot2 also loaded 
together on a separate factor with positive loadings of 0.46 (p-value<0.05). Residual 
variance for amot3 was below 0.70 and approximately equal to residual variances of 
amot1 and amot2. Moreover, amot3, as the other two items in this factor, was originally 
constructed as an amotivation item.  It also had a high, although negative, loading on 




modification indices (<3.84). Based on these multiple pieces of evidence, it seemed that 
this would be an item worth keeping, particularly as the factor on amotivation would 
otherwise have only two items.   
 
Other items in the scale “I work in this facility because it plays an important role in the 
community” (intr2), “I work in this job because it allows me to decide how my work is 
organized” (intr4), “I work in this job because I can accomplish something worthwhile in 
this job” (intr6), “I work here because I have no other choice” (amot4) had loadings of 
similar size on more than one factor, although they were above 0.30. Also, item amot4 
had one of the highest residual variances and the three highest modification indices (14.0, 
10.2 and 7.9).  
 
Many of the items that loaded together in a four-factor model continued to have 
significant loadings on the same factors with a five-factor model. Items intr1, intr3, and 
intrj4 loaded together, but item intr7, which loaded on identified regulation factor 
previously, had similar loadings on identified and external regulation factors. Items intr5, 
extrg2, extrg3, extrg4, and extrg5 loaded together on one factor. Two of the items on 
introjected motivation (intrj1 and intrj3) also loaded together, while intrj2 showed similar 
loadings on this factor and a new factor, consisting of extrg1, extrg6 (previously loading 
on external regulation factor), and amot4. This new factor however, was largely driven by 
amot4 that had a loading of 0.75, almost twice the size of other loadings in this factor. 
The factor on introjected motivation (intrj1 and intrj3) had an additional item intr2 (“I 




three items (intrj1) had an extremely high loading of 0.96. These types of extreme 
differences in the size of factor loadings in one factor should generally be avoided. For 
example, items with large differences in loadings will violate one of the assumptions for 
estimating Cronbach’s alpha [84].  
 
Also, with the exception of two items (intrj1 and amot4), communalities did not 
observably increase when the fifth factor was added to the model. Thus, it seemed that 
residual term variances provided evidence that proportion of unexplained variance for 
most of the items in the scale did not improve with the additional factor. Given these 
results, it seemed reasonable to accept a four-factor model containing the following four 
factors: identified regulation, external regulation, introjected regulation and amotivation. 
This factorial structure is in line with the initial hypothesis based on SDT, although the 
two autonomous types of motivation, integrated and identified regulation, came out as a 
single factor.  The structure of the scale reflects the view of extrinsic motivation as a 
spectrum of different types of motivation, reflecting the degree of self-determination or 
autonomy.    
 
3.5.4 Confirmatory factor analysis 
Confirmatory factor analysis on non-RBF Group 2 sample was conducted to confirm the 
hypothesized factorial structure of the scale based on the results of the EFA conducted on 
non-RBF Group 1. A 16-item four-factor model (Model A) tested using CFA on non-
RBF Group 2 sample resulted in less than satisfactory fit indices (Table 3.7): CFA of 




loadings, it appeared that item extrg5 on good benefits should be dropped from the model 
as it had the loading of 0.21, well below the standard. Having eliminated this item from 
the scale, the analysis was repeated on a 15-item four-factor model (Model B). This 
resulted in good fit indices with all standardized factor loadings above 0.30 (Table 3.7 - 
Table 3.8).  
 
Overall, factor correlations were also in the expected direction based on the theoretical 
framework underpinning the scale (Table 3.9). Identified regulation factor had significant 
positive correlations with external regulation and introjected regulation factors (0.61 and 
0.49, respectively), and a significant negative correlation with amotivation factor (-0.69). 
External regulation factor had a strong positive correlation with introjected motivation 
factor (0.68) and a negative correlation with amotivation (-0.50). However, one 
unexpected result was a lack of correlation between introjected motivation and 
amotivation factors.   
 
The four-factor model with 15 items described above (Model B) was finally tested on the 
RBF pilot sample. The global fit indices for the model were satisfactory: CFI of 0.93, TLI 
of 0.91, RMSEA of 0.05 (90% CI: 0.04, 0.06) (Table 3.10). All loadings were well above 
the cut-off of 0.30 and r-square estimates that show the variance explained in the latent 
response variable underlying the categorical variable were above 0.30 for most of the 





Similar to results of the CFA model on non-RBF Group 2, identified regulation factor 
had significant positive correlations with external and introjected regulation factors (0.68 
and 0.31, respectively), and a significant negative correlation with amotivation factor (-
0.60) (Table 3.12). It should be noted here, however, that the size of the correlation 
between identified and introjected regulation was in this case lower (0.31 vs. 0.50). 
External regulation factor had a strong positive correlation with introjected regulation 
factor (0.72) and a negative correlation with amotivation (-0.27). The negative correlation 
with amotivation factor was lower in RBF as compared to non-RBF sample. Also, 




Inter-item and item-total correlations were examined for reliability for each of the sub-
scales (Table 3.13).  For all four sub-scales, item-total correlations estimated omitting the 
item in question from the total score were generally high, well above the cut-off level of 
0.20 suggested by Streiner and Norman [126]. For identified regulation factor, they 
ranged from 0.33 to 0.45, where item intr3 (“I feel I should personally take the credit or 
blame for the results of my work on this job”) had the lowest correlation. For external 
regulation factor, the item-total correlations ranged from 0.35 to 0.46, where item extrg4 
(“I work here because it is located in a safe area”) had the lowest correlation. For 
introjected regulation factor, the correlation coefficients ranged from 0.32 to 0.47, where 




least well. The factor on amotivation had the highest item-total correlation estimates 
(0.45-0.55).  
 
Internal consistency reliability was measured separately for each of the four subscales 
formed on the basis of a final four-factor model, as described in the preceding section 
(Table 3.13). As responses were measured on a four-point Likert scale and were highly 
skewed, an ordinal alpha based on polychoric correlation matrix was used instead of 
traditional Cronbach’s alpha. Ordinal alpha coefficients for the work motivation 
subscales ranged from 0.64 for introjected regulation factor to 0.75 for identified 
regulation factor. These values can be considered satisfactory as discussed in section 3.7. 
Ordinal alpha coefficient was not estimated for the entire scale, because like Cronbach’s 
alpha, it assumes unidimensionality of the set of components of a given scale and this 
scale was specifically designed to not have this characteristic [115]. 
 
3.5.6 Validity 
Results of the cross-validation of the model as a measure of validity are discussed above 
as part of the CFA results. As described, the model was developed based on one sample 
(non-RBF Group 1). Next, the model was fit on non-RBF Group 2 sample (“calibration 
sample”) [106]. The model derived from the calibration sample was then used on a new 
sample (RBF pilot group). According to Bagozzi and Yi [106] fixing all parameters in the 
second sample, including factor loadings, to parameters derived in the calibration sample 
is a very strict requirement. Fixing factor pattern was determined to be a sufficient 




only the factor pattern is validated across calibration and validation samples [106, 125]. 
The model applied to the RBF pilot sample had good fit indices, providing evidence of 
configural equivalency. Furthermore, the magnitude of factor loadings between the two 
samples changed very little.  
 
Construct validity was measured through the differentiation in motivation factor means 
between those intending to quit with the next 12 months and those intending to stay 
(Table 3.15). Multiple group analysis was performed using MPlus mixture modeling with 
known classes approach [104]. As expected, the factor mean for amotivation was 
significantly lower (p-value<0.05) in the group that was intending to stay, as compared to 
the group that was intending to quit. In other words, amotivation was higher among those 
intending to quit within a year or less.  
 
The performance assessment and feedback variable was used as a predictor of motivation 
factors. None of the coefficients, except the coefficient on introjected motivation factor, 
was statistically significant. Moreover, they were close to zero. The variable was a simple 
binary variable that did not reflect frequency or quality of either performance assessment 
or feedback following it, which may explain these results [120].  
 
Ability of the staff to express their opinions (staff voice) had statistically significant (p-
value<0.05) and positive association with identified and introjected regulation factors 
(Table 3.16). This was in accordance with SDT and the hypotheses as described in Table 




clear about the expected relationship between external regulation and variables such as 
staff voice and participation. But if staff voice is about promoting the feelings of 
autonomy and choice, it is expected to be associated more with autonomous and less with 
controlled types of motivation [120]. The significant negative association with 
amotivation was too small (-0.09) and therefore cannot be taken as evidence of the 
relationship between staff voice and amotivation.  
 
As expected, unfairness of the supervisor had a strong negative association with 
identification (p-value<0.05), and a strong positive association with amotivation (p-
value<0.05) [122]. Equity of rewards appeared to be a strong predictor of external 
regulation and introjection (p-value<0.05), also confirming the hypothesis and providing 
evidence of the validity of the work motivation scale. Equity of rewards had no 
association with identification. While it was reasonable to expect a positive association 
between the two variables if one viewed equity of rewards as one of the components of 
organizational justice [122], this is just one of its elements and perhaps, not the most 
important one, for health workers with strong identified regulation. These health workers, 
even if they feel they are not being fully rewarded for the work that they do, might still 
feel strong motivation for their work.  
 
Construct validity was further evaluated using the question on general motivation. 
Polychoric correlation between motivation factors and the item on overall motivation 
corrected for reliability of the subscales provided further evidence of the validity of the 




(0.59), followed by external regulation factor (0.36). Amotivation had a negative 
correlation (-0.30), providing evidence of discriminant validity. The lowest correlation 
coefficient was with the introjection factor (0.11). Polychoric correlation coefficients of 
the summed scores for each factor and general motivation were also applied as an 
additional check and gave very similar in value (not shown here).  
 
3.5.7 Measurement invariance for assessing generalizability to Pashto 
language 
Measurement invariance was tested by sequentially imposing stricter constraints 
beginning with the least restrictive model. As the first step, the four-factor 15-item model 
based on non-RBF Group 2 and RBF pilot samples was fit on the non-RBF Pashto 
Group. The Model 1 (Table 3.18) had satisfactory fit indices, indicating that the first 
threshold for invariance was met and stricter constraints could be imposed. Next, the 
loadings between the two groups were constrained to be equal. The fit of the model 
remained satisfactory based on global fit indices. The invariance of thresholds while 
holding factor loadings constant across groups was tested as the final step. The fit indices 
were less than satisfactory for this model with CFI falling below 0.90. Thus, metric 
invariance based on equal factor loadings was the highest level of invariance that would 
still provide reasonable fit to the data. If the loadings are same and the factor means are 
fixed at 0 for both groups, then the true score has to be the same for both groups. In this 
case, difference in thresholds means that for the same underlying true score, respondents 




number of latent dimensions of motivation (motivation factors) and its structure (e.g., the 
factor pattern matrix) are equivalent across the two language groups.  
 
3.6 Discussion 
Health outcomes depend on the availability and performance of the health workforce, 
which is one of the six building blocks of a health system [128]. Motivated health 
workers are less likely to leave their jobs and contribute to a shortage of health workers, 
particularly in poor rural areas. Moreover, studies indicate that motivated health workers, 
specifically those with more intrinsic type of motivation, provide higher quality care, 
even in resource-poor settings and in circumstances where they are severely underpaid or 
not paid at all [77, 92]. Thus, health workforce motivation is one of the key objectives of 
health system interventions such as performance-based financing. However, it has proven 
difficult to provide evidence of the effectiveness of such interventions on improving 
health worker motivation and even harder to link that change to the change in 
performance, because of the measurement challenges related to motivation.  Therefore, 
the multidimensional work motivation scale developed and validated in this study is a 
highly relevant tool for policy-makers and practitioners, particularly in developing 
countries such as Afghanistan.  
 
The scale is based on a clear theoretical framework that provides a more subtle view of 
motivation and does not draw a sharp distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivating factors. Instead, it takes a more nuanced approach to understanding different 




different dimensions of motivation are associated with different organizational factors 
and have different consequences on performance [19]. For example, to promote more 
autonomous types of motivation, such as identified regulation, managers should 
implement interventions that would allow vertical and horizontal enlargement of the job, 
institute mechanisms for providing regular autonomy-supportive feedback for employees, 
and involve staff in decision-making processes. Motivation among employees who have 
mainly introjected regulation maybe strengthened by increasing their status within the 
organization and community perhaps by changing their job titles or providing community 
recognition for their work. These interventions do not require substantial financial 
resources unlike interventions that focus on extrinsic rewards such as bonus payments. 
This is particularly important in resource-poor settings such as Afghanistan.  
 
The scale is short with only 15 items, but at the same time, it reflects the 
multidimensional view of motivation described above. The initial hypothesis regarding 
the factorial structure was confirmed, although the items on integrated and identified 
regulation had to be combined based on the results of the initial exploratory factor 
analysis supported further through confirmatory factor analysis. This was not an unusual 
approach as described earlier in the paper as distinction between these two factors was 
problematic in other studies [29].  
 
The scale demonstrated good psychometric properties. First of all, it performed well on 
two reliability measures. It showed item-total correlations well above the rule of thumb of 




alpha of 0.70 or higher. The introjection subscale with the lowest internal consistency 
coefficient among the four (0.64) still demonstrated higher reliability than subscales on 
comparable measures. Cronbach's alpha for similar types of scales in other studies had a 
range from 0.36 to 0.92. The coefficient alpha tended to be even lower when applied to 
subscales. The General Causality Orientation Scale, using a seven-point Likert response 
scale, reported 0.77 and 0.59 for autonomy and control orientation subscales, respectively 
[129].  The Work Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation Scale (WEIMS), that also used a 
seven-point Likert scale, had alpha values ranging from 0.64 (amotivation) to 0.83 
(integration) [23]. The authors of the study argued that these values suggested adequate 
reliability, particularly since there were only three items per subscale. The original 
French WEMS alpha values ranged from 0.59 to 0.77 [23]. Subscales in the health 
worker motivation scale used in Kenya [86] had Cronbach's alphas ranging from 0.36 to 
0.64. The Scale had 3-5 questions per subscale, similar to the scale presented here. 
Systematic Review of Job Satisfaction Scales [130] reported internal consistency 
measures ranging from 0.52 - 0.92 for total scales and subscales. 
 
Several measures of validity were applied in this study. First of all, using CFA, the model 
developed in one sample was tested on a separate sample. While not all of the parameters 
remained stable across the two samples, the stability of the overall factorial structure 
provided evidence of the validity of the scale and the predictive effectiveness of the 
model. Secondly, discriminant validity was tested and supported by the significant 
negative correlation found between general motivation question and amotivation. Large 




construct validity of the scale. Correlations that were smaller in magnitude, although still 
significant, with external regulation and introjection, indicate the need for a scale with 
multiple items that measure different aspects of motivation. These findings reflect the 
multidimensional nature of motivation that is not adequately captured by a single item. 
Thus, the general question on motivation may not capture the different dimensions of a 
construct such as motivation quite as well as a scale consisting of multiple items and sub-
scales. 
 
Secondly, the results of the multiple group analysis demonstrating the difference in factor 
means for amotivation between respondents intending to quit and those intending to stay 
provided evidence of the construct validity of the scale. Health workers who were 
intending to quit within the coming year were significantly more amotivated than their 
colleagues. Association between turn-over or intention to quit and poor motivation has 
been demonstrated in other studies [29, 131, 132].  
 
Although it was expected that performance assessment and feedback would be positively 
associated with identified regulation as predicted by SDT [120, 133], this study did not 
find any association between these two variables. This may be due to the fact that the 
variable representing assessment and feedback was a simple binary variable which did 
not indicate anything about the quality of these processes. In a qualitative study on health 
provider motivation in Tanzania, the respondents appeared to attach little value to the 




assessment and feedback are provided plays a vital role in whether they have any impact 
on worker motivation [54, 120].  
 
As expected, staff voice had a positive association with identified and introjected 
regulation factors. The ability of staff to express their opinions and participate in 
decision-making is considered to be one of the determinants of staff motivation and 
commitment to organizational goals [19, 133]. As hypothesized, unfairness of the 
supervisor had a strong positive association with amotivation and a strong negative 
association with identification. According to the organizational justice theory of 
motivation and its further elaboration in SDT, perception of fairness is a key element in 
fostering autonomous types of motivation, including identification [19, 54].  
 
Equity of rewards appeared to be a significant predictor of controlled types of motivation 
(external and introjected regulation). While the expectation was that this item as it relates 
to equity would also be associated with identification, there seems to be a reasonable 
explanation as to why this part of the hypothesis was not confirmed. This variable was 
very specific and asked only about equity of external rewards. It is likely that health 
workers whose main motivation was more intrinsic were less concerned with equity of 
rewards than their colleagues who were primarily extrinsically motivated. Overall 
fairness of the supervisor seemed to be of greater importance to those who were more 





Finally, the results of the measurement invariance test provided sufficient evidence that 
the scale could be applied to Pashto speakers as well as Dari speakers in Afghanistan. 
This is an important finding given that Pashto is the second official language after Dari 
and Pashtuns make up the largest ethnic group in the country [134].  
 
There are three limitations to the present study. First of all, a more in-depth qualitative 
study would provide a richer understanding of the construct of motivation in Afghanistan 
and could improve the quality of the scale. The underlying theoretical framework is based 
on Western theories of motivation, behavior and organization. Cultures where 
maintenance of status quo, propriety, respect for tradition, familial obligations and 
respect for authority are strongly emphasized, the key assumptions of the motivation 
theories that provide the basis for the models developed for this study may not be 
appropriate [26]. However, this limitation underlies most work that is done outside of the 
USA and Europe on work motivation, although there are a few studies that have tried to 
explicitly incorporate such cultural differences [47]. Moreover, the results of the focus 
group discussions and the validity measures of the work motivation scale developed in 
this study suggest that motivation defined as a process that explains the “direction, 
amplitude, and persistence of an individual’s behavior” applies across cultures [13]. Also, 
the results of the study seem to suggest that motivation is indeed a multi-dimensional 
construct as proposed by the Self-Determination Theory.  
 
The second limitation is related to availability of strong theories supported by empirical 




SDT and validation variables available in this study. One of the ways of demonstrating 
construct validity is to illustrate its relation to other constructs and behaviors. However, 
these constructs and behaviors must have strong theoretically plausible and empirically 
justified relationships to the construct of interest. As discussed earlier, there appear to be 
few specific studies on introjected and external regulation factors and their relationships 
to constructs such as staff voice or pay inequity. This limits the potential for construct 
validation process of the scale and the results of this study.    
 
The third limitation is that responses obtained through the survey are likely to have been 
influenced by social desirability bias. Although the questionnaire forms did not contain 
any names, and while confidentiality of responses was emphasized, it is likely that health 
workers were less willing to admit to negative feelings or choose responses that would 
make them appear less concerned with helping their communities than with their own 
financial well-being. Although no formal check was made, an indication of the presence 
of this bias could be found using items of the Satisfaction scale, where items on 
satisfaction with superiors or colleagues had very high endorsement rate. This could 
partly explain the high frequency of endorsement on items such as “I work in this job 
because I have a chance to help other people through my work” or “I work in this job to 
gain God’s grace”.   
 
Overall, however, as discussed above, the work motivation scale has performed well. 
Moreover, this is the first study on work motivation based on a large probability-based 




from doctors and nurses to midwives and vaccinators. In addition, it uses multiple 
samples to test the factorial structure, validity and reliability of the scale. Lastly, this is 
the first work motivation scale that has been validated in Dari and Pashto languages in a 
highly traditional society with low literacy levels. Given the acute shortage and high 
turnover of health workers in Afghanistan and other countries in Central Asia, there is a 
high level of interest in improving health worker motivation among governments and 
international development partners. An instrument that allows policy-makers and 
researchers to understand the nuanced multi-dimensional nature of motivation and to 
accurately measure it will hopefully contribute to the development of better informed 





Figure 3.1 NHSPA 2012-2013 sampling for health worker questionnaires  
 
 
Note: *In provinces with less than 25 facilities, all facilities have been surveyed.  In the following RBF 
pilot provinces – Parwan, Takhar, Kunduz & Saripul – more than 25 facilities per province were selected to 





Figure 3.2 Key steps in the development and validation of the work motivation scale 
 
   
Review of motivation literature, identification of theoretical framework for the scale, search for existing scales 
on work motivation and satisfaction, & identification of common themes & creation of pool of items 
 
1. Selection of final 20 items from the pool & translation of the scale  
2. Field-testing of the instrument with 50 health workers as part of the field-testing of NHSPA instruments in a hospital in Kabul  
3. Basic checks of missing values & direction of responses 
4. Back translation of the instrument & revision of wording of some items 
Testing of the instrument as part of the NHSPA (2011) 
 
Focus group discussions (FGD) & health worker interviews 
 
Exploratory factor analysis of the data (EFA) Translation & analysis of FGD & interview results 
 
Revision of the scale & data collection (2012-2013) 
Data set is divided into 4 parts for validity & reliability analysis (n=2,413) 
EFA on non-RBF Dari 
group 1 (n=431) 
 
CFA on non-RBF Dari 
group 2 (n=439) 
 
CFA on RBF pilot group 
(n=805) 
 











Table 3.1 Hypothesized motivation factors and their meaning 
Dimension What it means Example 
Autonomous 
motivation 




Behavior is driven by 
inner self or self-identity, 
closest to true intrinsic 
motivation 
A doctor who feels that being a 
health worker is part of her identity. 
She acts in ways that are consistent 
with her profession even outside of 
work by for example, helping people 
or treating patients outside of clinic 
hours. 
2 Identified regulation 
Behavior driven by 
understanding of the 
importance of one's 
duties, alignment of 
organizational goals with 
personal beliefs 
A doctor who fulfills her duties 
because she understands the 
importance of providing good care 
to the patients, whose believes in 
the role of the health facility in the 
life of the community. 




Behavior driven by 
desire to maintain self-
worth, to get approval of 
others, to avoid feeling 
of guilt 
A doctor fulfilling her duties 
because being a doctor is a 
prestigious job in her community 
and it boosts her ego. 
4 External regulation 
Behavior driven by 
expectation of an 
external reward or fear 
of punishment 
A doctor who treats her patients 
because she is afraid to get fired, or 
because she expects gifts from 
satisfied patients. 
Lacking completely     
5 Amotivation Absence of intent to act 
A doctor who is often absent from 
work, avoids her duties while at 
work. 
 
Note: Autonomous and controlled motivation types represented here are all part of the 
extrinsic motivation, which is distinguished from true intrinsic motivation. However, 
integrated regulation is very close to the intrinsic type of motivation, as described by the 
Self-Determination Theory. ^The final scale contains only four dimensions. Integrated 





Table 3.2 Characteristics of the study population  
  
Note: Overall sample size is 2,413 observations.
n %
Survey Method 
Regular method 2,278 94.4
Community-based method 135 5.6




By managing agency 
MOPH, w ithout support 107 4.5
MOPH, w ith support 1,282 53.3







Health w orker type
Doctor 336 13.9
Nurse/ Assistant doctor 580 24.0
Midw ife 282 11.7
Community midw ife 301 12.5
Vaccinator 690 28.6
CHW Supervisor 224 9.3
Local resident 2,011 87.7
Duration of w ork in this facility
One year or less 643 28.1
2-3 yrs 714 31.2
4-5 yrs 326 14.2
6-10 yrs 467 20.4
More than 10 yrs 142 6.2
Intention to stay 
3 months or less 354 15.6
4-12 months 270 11.9
2-3 years 373 16.5
4-5 years 360 15.9
More than 5 years 906 40.0
Supervisor visit w ithin the past 30 days 1,940 80.4
Employee assessment in the past 12 months 1,893 82.6
Of w hich received feedback 1,527 81.6
Salary payment up-to-date 1,578 65.5
Salary increase in the past year 881 38.4
Received performance-based payments 401 17.6
Have a second job 1,933 80.1
Technical training outside of the facility 
Number of days in the past 12 months  (Mean, SD) 5.9 7.0
Technical training w ithin the facility 
Number of days in the past 12 months (Mean, SD) 1.5 5.8
Validation group
Non-RBF Pashto group 738 30.6
Non-RBF Dari group 1 431 17.9
Non-RBF Dari group 2 439 18.2




Table 3.3 Eigenvalues and proportion of variance explained  
 
Note: Overall sample size is 431 observations. Eigenvalues are shown only for the first ten factors. 
 







Factor 1 5.25 0.25 0.25
Factor 2 2.88 0.14 0.39
Factor 3 1.69 0.08 0.47
Factor 4 1.19 0.06 0.52
Factor 5 1.08 0.05 0.58
Factor 6 0.92 0.04 0.62
Factor 7 0.84 0.04 0.66
Factor 8 0.82 0.04 0.70
Factor 9 0.75 0.04 0.73
Factor 10 0.72 0.03 0.77
Model Chi-sq df CFI TLI RMSEA RMSEA C.I. SRMR
One factor 824 189 0.67 0.64 0.09 [0.082, 0.095] 0.12
Two factor 364 169 0.90 0.88 0.05 [0.044, 0.059] 0.07
Three factor 241 150 0.95 0.93 0.04 [0.028  0.046] 0.05
Four factor 176 132 0.98 0.96 0.03 [0.016  0.038] 0.04




Table 3.5 Factor loadings and residual variances for a four-factor 21-item model 
with Geomin rotation  
 
Note: Only loadings significant at 5% level or minimum value of 0.30 are presented here. 
  
F1 F2 F3 F4 Residual
Item Loading Loading Loading Loading variance
intr1
I work in this job because I have a chance to help other 
people through my work
0.67 0.45
intr2




I feel I should personally take the credit or blame for the 
results of my work on this job
0.55 0.61
intr4
I work in this job because it allows me to decide how my work 
is organized
0.37 0.46 0.57
intr5 I work in this job because it allows me to use my skills 0.35 0.67 0.38
intr6
I work in this job because I can accomplish something 
worthwhile in this job
0.46 0.39 0.57
intr7
I feel a very high degree of personal responsibility for the work 
I do on this job
0.52 0.34 0.58
intrj1 I work here because it makes me feel important 0.80 0.38
intrj2 I do this job because my family would be disappointed if I quit 0.42 0.73
intrj3 I do this job because it gives me respect in the community 0.77 -0.36 0.35
intrj4 I work in this job to gain God’s grace 0.69 0.29 0.47
extrg1 I only work here to get paid -0.28 0.30 0.77
extrg2 I work here because of opportunities for promotion 0.47 0.21 0.61
extrg3
I work in this facility because it has sufficient resources I 
need to do my job (medicine, equipment, infrastructure)
0.71 -0.34 0.59
extrg4 I work here because it is located in a safe area 0.50 -0.44 0.52
extrg5
I work here because of good benefits  I receive (Note: all 
benefits – housing, transportation, anything else you receive – 
think overall)
-0.31 0.43 0.70
extrg6 I work here because it provides long term security for me 0.50 0.67
amot1 I frequently think of quitting this job -0.33 0.19 0.46 0.58
amot2 I sometimes feel my work here is meaningless -0.45 0.46 0.56
amot3 I don’t care much about the quality of work here -0.62 0.58




Table 3.6 Factor structure for a four-factor 21-item model with Geomin rotation  
  
  
Item F1 F2 F3 F4
intr1
I work in this job because I have a chance to help 
other people through my work
0.70 0.34 0.18 -0.02
intr2
I work in this facility because it plays an important 
role in the community
0.35 0.39 0.45 -0.01
intr3
I feel I should personally take the credit or blame for 
the results of my work on this job
0.55 0.23 0.25 0.14
intr4
I work in this job because it allows me to decide how 
my work is organized
0.44 0.54 0.27 0.01
intr5
I work in this job because it allows me to use my 
skills
0.46 0.71 0.23 -0.11
intr6
I work in this job because I can accomplish something 
worthwhile in this job
0.53 0.47 0.17 -0.10
intr7
I feel a very high degree of personal responsibility for 
the work I do on this job
0.57 0.39 0.10 -0.02
intrj1 I work here because it makes me feel important 0.10 0.33 0.78 0.11
intrj2
I do this job because my family would be disappointed 
if I quit
-0.07 0.26 0.49 0.24
intrj3
I do this job because it gives me respect in the 
community
0.03 0.38 0.72 -0.23
intrj4 I work in this job to gain God’s grace 0.68 0.13 0.25 0.01
extrg1 I only work here to get paid -0.27 0.21 0.37 0.18
extrg2 I work here because of opportunities for promotion 0.24 0.58 0.41 0.01
extrg3
I work in this facility because it has sufficient 
resources I need to do my job (medicine, equipment, 
infrastructure)
0.10 0.56 -0.04 -0.11
extrg4 I work here because it is located in a safe area -0.05 0.53 0.22 -0.43
extrg5
I work here because of good benefits  I receive (Note: 
all benefits – housing, transportation, anything else 
you receive – think overall)
-0.24 0.43 0.31 0.07
extrg6
I work here because it provides long term security for 
me
0.14 0.57 0.34 -0.02
amot1 I frequently think of quitting this job -0.38 -0.06 0.24 0.52
amot2 I sometimes feel my work here is meaningless -0.48 -0.03 0.11 0.50
amot3 I don’t care much about the quality of work here -0.63 -0.07 0.04 0.21




Table 3.7 Model fit statistics, CFA of Models A and B   
  
Note: Model A is a 16-item scale. Model B is a 15-item scale. The overall sample size is 439 observations. 
Table 3.8 Factor loadings of a four-factor 15-item model (Model B)  
  
Note: All factor loadings are significant at 5% level. 
 
Table 3.9 Factor correlations (Model B) 
  
Note: **significant at 5% level.  
Model Chi-sq df CFI TLI RMSEA RMSEA C.I.
Model A 267 98 0.87 0.84 0.06 [0.05, 0.07]




I work in this job because I have a chance to help 
other people through my work
0.68 0.06 0.46
intr3
I feel I should personally take the credit or blame 
for the results of my work on this job
0.58 0.05 0.34
intr7
I feel a very high degree of personal responsibility 
for the work I do on this job
0.70 0.07 0.49
intrj4 I work in this job to gain God’s grace 0.67 0.07 0.44
External regulation F2
extrg2 I work here because of opportunities for promotion 0.58 0.05 0.33
extrg3
I work in this facility because it has sufficient 
resources I need to do my job (medicine, 
equipment, infrastructure)
0.37 0.06 0.14
extrg4 I work here because it is located in a safe area 0.32 0.06 0.10
extrg6








intrj1 I work here because it makes me feel important 0.72 0.04 0.51
intrj2
I do this job because my family would be 
disappointed if I quit
0.57 0.05 0.32
intrj3




amot1 I frequently think of quitting this job 0.54 0.05 0.29
amot2 I sometimes feel my work here is meaningless 0.69 0.06 0.48
amot3 I don’t care much about the quality of work here 0.71 0.05 0.51








Table 3.10 Model fit statistics, CFA of 15-item work motivation scale, RBF sample 
  
Note: The overall sample size is 805 observations. However, one observation is missing values on all items, 
reducing the sample size to 804 observations. 
Table 3.11 Factor loadings of a four-factor 15-item model, RBF sample  
  
Note: All factor loadings are significant at 5% level. 
Table 3.12 Factor correlations, RBF sample 
  
Note: All correlations are significant at 5% level.  
Model Chi-sq df CFI TLI RMSEA RMSEA C.I.




I work in this job because I have a chance to help 
other people through my work
0.66 0.04 0.44
intr3
I feel I should personally take the credit or blame 
for the results of my work on this job
0.58 0.04 0.33
intr7
I feel a very high degree of personal responsibility 
for the work I do on this job
0.68 0.05 0.46
intrj4 I work in this job to gain God’s grace 0.69 0.06 0.47
External regulation F2
extrg2 I work here because of opportunities for promotion 0.49 0.04 0.45
extrg3
I work in this facility because it has sufficient 
resources I need to do my job (medicine, 
equipment, infrastructure)
0.67 0.03 0.24
extrg4 I work here because it is located in a safe area 0.47 0.03 0.22
extrg6








intrj1 I work here because it makes me feel important 0.73 0.04 0.49
intrj2
I do this job because my family would be 
disappointed if I quit
0.70 0.04 0.19
intrj3




amot1 I frequently think of quitting this job 0.63 0.04 0.39
amot2 I sometimes feel my work here is meaningless 0.81 0.03 0.66
amot3 I don’t care much about the quality of work here 0.70 0.04 0.48








Table 3.13 Inter-item and item-total correlations and ordinal alpha  
  
Note: Item-total correlations are estimated ommitting the item in question from the total.  
 
  




intrj4 0.39 0.33 0.60
f1t 0.36 0.33 0.45 0.42 0.74




extrg6 0.40 0.27 0.25
intr5 0.45 0.42 0.20 0.29
f2t 0.46 0.42 0.35 0.39 0.43 0.70




f3t 0.43 0.32 0.47 0.64








Table 3.14 Construct validity variables and rationale 
  
Construct validity variable Factor Expected association direction and rationale
Intention to quit Amotivation
Positive: Amotivation as lack of intention to act is likely to be associated 
with desire to quit. Plus, literature on low motivation and staff turnover 




Positive: Meaningful performance feedback promotes a sence of 
competence and autonomy (Gagne & Deci, 2005; Deci et al, 1989)
Identified regulation
Positive: Staff feels that their managers care about their point of view and 
acknowledge their perspectives. This increases the sense of 
competence and autonomy among employees (Deci et al, 1989; Greco 
& Eisenberg, 1993) 
Introjected regulation
Positive: SDT is not clear about this association, but to the extent that 
staff voice as ability to express one's opinions increases one’s self-
esteem and promotes the feeling of self-worth, it is reasonable to expect 
a positive association. 
Identified regulation
Negative: Fairness is an important predictor of autonomous work 
motivation (Gagne & Forest, 2011). Theory on organizational justice 
predicts that consistent treatment, bias-free judgements and clear 
standards influenced organizational citizenship behaviors and were 
associated with higher commitment to the organization (Mitchell, 1997).
Amotivation
Positive: Theory on organizational justice predicts that feelings of 
unfairness & inequity were associated with withdrawal, withholding of 
effort and reduced persistence (Mitchell, 1997). 
Identified regulation
Positive: While external rewards are expected to have negative 
association with identified motivation, organizational justice, including 
distributive justice, is expected to have  a positive association with this 
type of motivation. It is reasonable to expect a positive association 
between the two variables if one  views equity of rewards as one of the 
elements of organizational justice (Gagne & Forest, 2011).
External regulation
Positive: External rewards are expected to have positive association with 
external regulation (Gagne & Deci, 2005). SDT does not seem to focus 
explicitly on organizational justice and external regulation, but it seems 
reasonable to hypothesize that if one is motivated by extrinsic rewards 
such as pay, their motivation is influenced by whether they believe they 
are being rewarded fairly for their work. Also, organizational justice 
theory that views motivation as unidimensional predicts association 
between pay inequity and low motivation (Mitchell, 1997).
Introjected regulation
Positive: SDT does not seem to focus explicitly on organizational justice 
and introjected regulation, but pay can be viewed as informational 
feedback. It seems reasonable then to hypothesize that when 
employees are motivated because they want to maintain feelings of self-









Table 3.15 Comparison of factor means between those intending to quit and those 
intending to stay  
  
Note: The overall sample size is 795 observations. BIC is sample-size adjusted.  
** significant at 5% level. 
 
 
Table 3.16 Staff voice and equity as predictors of motivation factors  
  









Identified F1 0.04 0.14
External F2 0.29 0.16
Introjected F3 0.27 0.16
Amotivation F4 -0.44** 0.15
Estimate d.f./CI Estimate d.f./CI Estimate d.f./CI
Model fit statistics
Chi-square 273 95 271 95 278 95
CFI 0.92 0.93 0.93
TLI 0.90 0.91 0.91
RMSEA 0.05 [0.04, 0.06] 0.05 [0.04, 0.06] 0.05 [0.04, 0.06]
Beta S.E. Beta S.E. Beta S.E.
Coefficients
Identified F1 0.23** 0.04 -0.21** 0.03 0.01 0.04
External F2 0.33** 0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.33** 0.03
Introjected F3 0.14** 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.21** 0.03
Amotivation F4 -0.09** 0.03 0.47** 0.03 0.02 0.03




Table 3.17 General motivation item as a measure of construct validity of the scale 
  
Note: The overall sample size is 804 observations. ** significant at 5% level. 
 















Identified F1 0.68** 0.59
External F2 0.44** 0.36
Introjected F3 0.13** 0.11
Amotivation F4 -0.35** -0.30
Model Chi-sq df CFI TLI RMSEA RMSEA C.I.
1 Invariance of factorial structure 495 168 0.92 0.90 0.05 [0.05, 0.06]
2 Invariance of factor loadings 522 179 0.92 0.91 0.05 [0.05, 0.06]





4 Chapter 4: Impact of performance-based payments on health 
worker motivation in Afghanistan (Paper 2) 
 
Abstract 
Background: Despite some progress in improving health outcomes over the past decade, 
Afghanistan still has one of the highest maternal mortality ratios in the world. It is also 
struggling with extremely high rates of infant and child mortality. Access to health 
services depends vitally on availability of health workers. To attract and retain qualified 
health workers, it is necessary to improve health worker motivation. Moreover, 
motivation also appears to be an important determinant of health worker performance. 
This study examines the effect of performance-based payments on health worker 
motivation in Afghanistan. Motivation is defined as a multi-dimensional construct 
consisting of the following four factors: identified regulation, external regulation, 
introjected regulation and amotivation. 
 
Method: In 11 provinces of Afghanistan, 442 facilities were randomly assigned to an 
intervention or a comparison arm. Because of the study design, masking of the 
participants was not feasible. The study is based on a cross-sectional survey of 805 health 
workers from 256 facilities conducted 23 months after the start of the intervention. The 
outcome, health worker motivation, was measured using a 15-item four-factor scale. A 
robust variance estimator was used to adjust for the correlation of the data within health 
facilities. A latent variable modeling framework was used to estimate the effect of 




estimated using the intention-to-treat analysis. However, given the high rate of non-
compliance, a complier-average causal effect approach was also examined. 
 
Results: No statistically significant changes were observed in health worker motivation 
in the intervention group as compared to the control group (p-value>0.05). Financial 
incentives in the form of performance-based payments did not seem to have an effect on 
health worker motivation factors. The estimated complier-average causal effects for 
identified (γ=-2.63, p-value<0.05), external (γ=-1.40, p-value<0.05), and introjected (γ=-
1.37, p-value<0.05) motivation factors were negative. It appeared that PBP were 
negatively associated with motivation. 
 
Conclusion: The negative effect of PBP on identified motivation supports the overall 
hypothesis of the study based on the Self-Determination Theory of motivation. However, 
the negative effect on external motivation was surprising. Yet, there are several design 
issues of the PBP program in Afghanistan that may explain these unexpected results. First 
of all, there were heightened expectations that were not met due to the relatively small 
size of incentive payments in proportion to total salaries and payment delays. Secondly, it 
is unclear whether health workers were able to distinguish these payments from their 
regular salaries and other financial benefits. Thirdly, a large portion of facilities 
distributed PBP earned by the facility in proportion to existing salaries, which meant that 
the most senior staff or staff with highest salary levels received the largest portion of PBP 
and not the staff most directly responsible for the achievement of the performance 




improvements in working conditions at the facility level. The study thus demonstrates the 
importance of design and implementation details of PBP programs and identifies specific 







Health system performance depends vitally on availability of health workers, and the 
growing crisis in human resources will have a high negative impact on health outcomes  
[135]. According to the World Bank Development Report, Making Services Work for 
Poor People, weak incentives for performance is one of the key reasons why health 
services, among others, fail the poor. Performance-based payments (PBP) are thought to 
be one of the mechanisms of increasing provider accountability to their patients or rather 
clients, and thus, improving quality of health care services for them [136]. PBP or 
supply-side incentive programs under the Results-Based Financing (RBF) projects in 
health have been gaining popularity in many developed and developing countries over the 
past few years [8, 43]. There are 30 countries where the RBF in health projects were 
recently completed, are currently implemented or under the preparation [95]. While RBF 
projects include demand- and supply-side incentives, this provides some indication of the 
large amount of resources that are spent on improving health system performance through 
changes in provider incentives.  
 
In the summer of 2010, Afghanistan launched an RBF project in purposefully selected 11 
of its 34 provinces (for details on RBF design see Chapter 1 and [68]). The project aimed 
"to impact MDGs 4 and 5 by improving coverage of maternal and child health services 
within the existing health system and without creating unnecessary parallel processes" 
[10]. Its primary objective was "to increase key maternal and child health outputs, to 
improve quality of health services and to ensure higher patient satisfaction with health 




of pay-for-performance would improve health worker motivation and satisfaction, which 
in turn would lead to better performance. 
 
One of the key assumptions of these programs is that providing financial incentives based 
on performance will improve motivation of health providers and consequently, their 
retention and performance. However, a review of the literature by Eldridge and Palmer 
[41] did not find strong evidence base for the success of PBP programs in developing 
countries. This view is supported by a more recent review by Eijkenaar et al [137]. The 
evidence base for the effectiveness of PBP programs has even more gaps when it comes 
to their impact on health worker motivation. The jury is still out on the role of external 
rewards, specifically financial incentives, on work motivation [19, 43, 54, 138]. The aim 
of this paper is therefore to assess health worker motivation in Afghanistan in health 
facilities allocated to performance-based payments as compared to health facilities 
allocated to control.  
 
Work motivation which is willingness to exert and maintain an effort to achieve the 
organization’s goals is defined as a multi-dimensional construct consisting of four 
factors: (1) identified regulation, (2) external regulation, (3) introjected regulation, and 
(4) amotivation. Identified regulation describes behavior in which people act because the 
activity is congruent with their personal goals and beliefs. Gagne and Deci [19] give an 
example of a nurse who performs uninteresting and not necessarily pleasant tasks such as 
bathing patients because she values her patients’ health and understands the importance 




autonomous type of motivation, while external regulation is the controlled type.  External 
regulation describes behavior that is driven only by an expectation of a reward or fear of 
negative consequences. Introjected regulation is like a bridge between controlled and 
autonomous motivation. The regulation comes from within but it is controlled by external 
forces. Examples of this type of regulation include “contingent self-esteem, which 
pressures people to behave in order to feel worthy, and ego involvement, which pressures 
people to behave in order to buttress their fragile egos” [19]. Introjected regulation lies 
between the identified and external regulation. Amotivation is defined as the absence of 
intent to act in a particular way [22]. As described in detail in Chapter 1, according to 
SDT, extrinsic contingent rewards undermine the feeling of autonomy and have a 
negative effect on more autonomous types of motivation such as identified regulation. It 
is hypothesized that external regulation has a positive association with extrinsic rewards.  
 
4.1.1 Research questions 
The study aims to answer the following research questions: 
1. What is the effect of PBP program on different types of motivation, i.e. the 
average effect comparing health workers in the treatment arm to those in the 
control arm?  
a. Are identified and introjected motivation types lower among health staff 
working in treatment facilities as compared to control?  
b. Is there a positive effect of PBP program on externally regulated 




c. Does PBP program lower amotivation in treatment group as compared to 
control?  
2. What is the efficacy of the performance-based payments, i.e. the effect of 
payments on health workers who actually received the payments? 
 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Data source 
The data for this study was derived from the cross-sectional health facility survey for the 
annual National Health Services Performance Assessment (NHSPA) implemented in 
Afghanistan over the period of nine months between 2012 and 2013.  The survey was 
based on a multi-stage stratified probability sampling approach where primary sampling 
unit was a health facility (Figure 4.1):  
 Stratification by province, 
 Stratification by type of health facility within each province, 
 Selection of facilities based on simple random sampling,  
 Stratification of health workers within facilities by gender, 
 Selection of individual health workers.  
 
Individual health workers were secondary sampling units. Within each facility four health 
workers classified as clinical staff (doctors, nurses, assistant doctors, midwives, 
community midwives, and vaccinators) present at the day of the survey were randomly 
selected for the survey. If fewer than four clinical staff were present at the facility, then 
other facility staff members, including community health supervisors, pharmacists, 




with exception of community health supervisors were excluded from this analysis. This 
resulted in a sample of 256 health facilities with 805 health workers, or 3.1 health 
workers per facility. The unit of analysis is individual health worker. 
 
4.2.2 Variables construction 
Outcome variables 
Health worker motivation  
This is a latent variable measured through a self-administered 15-item scale. As factor 
indicators were measured on a four-point Likert scale, the outcome is considered to be an 
ordinal variable, although the unobserved variable underlying each indicator is 
continuous. There are four factors in the scale: (1) identified motivation consisting of four 
items, (2) external regulation consisting of five items, (3) introjected regulation 
consisting of three items, and (4) amotivation consisting of three items. The scale is based 
on Self-Determination Theory. There is no summary score for the scale or its four sub-
scales. The details of the work motivation scale construction, its validity and reliability 





This is the main predictor variable that is measured at a cluster (facility) level. It is a 
binary variable based on a random allocation of facilities to either treatment or control at 
the start of the RBF program. Facilities were assigned to either treatment or control based 






Respondents were provided with a list of benefits and asked to check all benefits that 
applied to them (“Do you currently receive any of the following benefits?”). The list of 
benefits included usual benefits such as free housing, transportation allowance, meals at 
work, and seniority payments, but it also included pay-for-performance. Next to the 
question explanatory note was added on the meaning of pay-for-performance: “Makafat 
Naqdi is when someone gets extra money in addition to their regular salary because they 
have completed certain tasks.” This explanatory note was developed by Afghan staff 
involved in design and pilot of the questionnaire.   Those who were in treatment group 
and marked pay-for-performance among the list of their benefits were considered to be 
“compliers”, while those who did not mark it were classified as “non-compliers”. As this 
is an observed compliance status and it could not be observed in those assigned to control 
group, it has missing values for all those who were assigned to control group. 
 
Facility type 
Different types of facilities differ in staffing norms, infrastructure, and services that they 
are mandated to perform and size of the catchment population [66]. Thus, this is a good 
proxy variable for the size of the facility and level of infrastructure. As described in 
section 1.4 on RBF in Afghanistan, SC is the most basic type of health facility included 
in the program. Each SC serves about 3,000 – 7,000 people. It should have 1 male nurse 
and 1 female community midwife [66]. BHC has a catchment area of 15,000 – 30,000 




vaccinators, 1 male nurse, 1 community midwife, 1 general physician, preferably female 
[66]. CHC has a catchment area of 30,000 – 60,000 people and has the following staffing 
norms: 1 community health supervisor, 2 vaccinators, 1 male nurse, 1 female nurse, 2 
community midwives, 1 male general physician, 1 female general physician, 1 laboratory 
technician, 1 pharmacy technician, and one (male or female) psychosocial counselor [66]. 
CHC provides specialized outpatient care and basic inpatient care. Based on the original 
categorical variable, dummy variables were created for the analysis where SC was used 
as a reference group.   
 
Management type 
There are three main types of management of health facilities in Afghanistan: (1) MOPH 
only, (2) MOPH with institutional support, and (3) NGOs only. The latter is further sub-
divided by type of contracting which is not one of the study variables here. Facilities run 
by MOPH only, MOPH with support, and NGOs only differ in management structure, 
source of funding, and its levels [39].  While there are varying degrees of managerial 
autonomy within the third group, facilities in this group have the highest level of 
independence when compared to the other two groups [64]. Thus, it is an important 
variable containing information on many aspects of facility management – such as 
funding level, organizational structure and culture, ability to take timely decisions on 
things like staffing, system of rewards, infrastructure – that were not otherwise measured 






Equipment functionality index  
The equipment functionality index consists of 20 items for BHCs and SCs and 23 items 
for CHCs.  It includes items such as children’s scales, sterilizer, stethoscope and others 
that are mandated by the BPHS Guidelines[66]. The composition of the index was based 
on the methodology provided in the BSC used in Afghanistan for evaluation of health 
system performance since 2004 [40]. An item was rated as 1 if it was available and was 
in working condition, and 0 otherwise. Following this, the scores for each item were 
added together and divided by the total number of items (20 for BHCs and SCs and 23 
for CHCs). The variable was standardized as a z-score based on the overall population or 
grand mean. Due to its highly negatively skewed distribution it was transformed 
(original^3) prior to testing of differences in means between the two treatment groups 
[103].  The index was measured at the facility level. 
 
Pharmaceuticals & vaccine availability index 
This index consists of 31 items that are considered to be the essential medicines and 
vaccine that must be available at all BPHS facilities. Similar to equipment functionality 
index it was based on the methodology provided in the BSC revised by the national 
technical working group led by MOPH [40]. The item was rated as 1 if it was 
continuously available for the past 30 days, and 0 otherwise. The variable was 
standardized as a z-score based on the overall population or grand mean. Due to its highly 
negatively skewed distribution it was transformed (original^3) prior to testing of 
differences in means between the two treatment groups [103].  The index was measured 






This index consists of nine items that describe presence and condition of basic 
infrastructure in the facility, such as heat, electricity, water source, windows etc.  The 
original index used in the BSC [40]  was composed of ten items. However, one of the 
items on presence and condition of exterior walls had very high proportion of missing 
values, which resulted in 14.5% of missing values for the index as a whole. Given this 
high missingness and that this particular item seemed to indicate less about the quality of 
services at facilities than items such as reliable electricity and water supply, or presence 
of interior walls and windows, it was removed from the index [4]. The item was rated as 
1 if was present and few or no repairs were needed, and 0 otherwise. The variable was 
standardized as a z-score based on the overall population or grand mean.  It was 
approximately normally distributed.  
 
Pay-for-performance received by the facility 
Respondents were asked whether or not their facility received pay-for-performance “Has 
your facility received performance-based payments?” Unlike the treatment variable 
which was based on the MOPH information, this variable was reported by health workers 
themselves. Thus, it reflected the awareness of health workers regarding PBP in their 
facility. This question also differs from the one on benefits described above under 
Compliance variable description. It asks whether facility, not the respondent personally, 





Health worker type and gender 
The health worker questionnaire containing the Work motivation scale also contained 
questions on basic health worker characteristics. Gender is a binary variable, where 1 
means male. Health worker type is categorical variable. Health workers were asked to 
mark one of the following categories: doctor, nurse, midwife, community midwife, CHW 
supervisor, vaccinator, or other. The last category included administrator, laboratory 
technicians, pharmacists, guards, cleaners, and other non-clinical staff. These were 
excluded from the current study. The categorical variable was transformed into dummy 
variables where doctors were a reference group.   
 
Other variables used for health worker characteristics  
Duration of work in this facility was originally continuous variable that was made into a 
categorical variable with the following five categories: (1) one year or less, (2) two to 
three years, (3) four to five years, (4) six to 10 years, and (5) more than ten years. The 
original continuous variable had a very big range of values (0 days to 30 years), many 
gaps in them, and was highly skewed. For the purposes of describing the sample and 
checking comparability of two treatment arms or compliance groups, it seemed more 
useful to redefine this variable as categorical.  
 
Supervisor visit within the past 30 days is a binary variable. There were no follow-up 
questions on the purpose or content of the visit. Formal employee assessment in the past 
12 months is also a binary variable with a follow-up question on whether there was a 
feedback from the assessment. Only the question on provision of assessment was 




as related to motivation). Salary payment up-to-date is a binary variable that has been one 
of the key indicators in the BSC for assessing health system performance in Afghanistan 
[40]. Salary increase in the past year is also a binary variable. Technical training outside 
of the facility is a measured as the number of days and is continuous. It had high positive 
skew and was transformed through the square root that is often used with positively 
skewed variables [103].   
 
Given the methodology used in the study as described in the next section, there was a 
hard constraint on the number of predictors that could be used in the model. Most of the 
variables described above were used only for examining the success of randomization by 
comparing the two treatment arms. They were also used to examine differences between 
compliers and non-compliers, but only a fraction of them was selected for the actual 
model. Selection was based on the results of exploratory data analysis and theoretical 
understanding of the potentially most important covariates in the relationship between 
pay-for-performance and motivation.  
 
4.3 Analysis 
4.3.1 Missing data 
Overall, there were very few missing values for the variables used in the study. There 
were no variables that had more than 40 missing observations, which was still only 5% of 
the sample. Moreover, proportion of missing values was less than 1.5% (11 out of 805 
observations) in all but three variables. The three variables with the highest proportion of 




consists of a number of items, ranging from 9 items in Infrastructure Index to 31 in 
Pharmaceuticals and vaccines availability index (See section on variables construction for 
details). Thus, presence of even few missing values in one of the items results in high 
proportion of missingness for the index overall. While unconditional mean imputation 
can result in reduction of variance and inferences can be distorted by bias and overstated 
precision as discussed by Little [139], for scales with multiple items use of the item mean 
and individual mean are acceptable methods [140, 141]. Studies on missing values in 
multi-item scales recommend imputing the individual's mean as robust and simple 
method of imputation and as an alternative to multiple imputation method [140, 141].  
However, these studies examine cases with 10% - 30% missing values. Given the low 
proportion of missingness in the current case (≤ 5%), we used mean values for treatment 
and control groups respectively to impute the missing values for these three indices. For 
all other variables, given the small proportion of missingness, no imputations were 
performed. 
 
Self-reported pay-for performance or Compliance variable (Do you currently receive any 
of the following benefits?”) had eight missing values originally (1.0%). However, five of 
these were in health facilities that did not receive pay-for-performance according to the 
same respondents and in addition, were part of the control group. Thus, as it was assumed 
that health workers could not receive performance-based payments in facilities where 
none existed, these were corrected from missing to zero (“No”). After this correction, 





4.3.2 Analysis approach 
First, all study variables were checked for consistency. The variable on whether a health 
worker personally received pay-for-performance (Compliance) was checked for 
consistency with the variable on whether a facility received pay-for-performance, also 
reported by health workers in the same questionnaire. It was also cross-checked with 
whether facility was assigned to treatment or control. Only ten observations assigned to 
control reported receiving pay-for-performance. These were not concentrated by facility, 
i.e. one out of four health workers surveyed in a given facility reported receiving pay-for-
performance. Based on this, it appeared that these ten observations were likely to be 
errors in recording and were corrected to zero (“No”).  
 
Pay-for-performance received by facility as reported by health workers (as opposed to 
treatment variables based on MOPH data) was largely consistent with treatment variable. 
Only 7% of those in the control group (n=375) reported that their facility received pay-
for-performance. A portion of these could be errors in recording or misunderstanding on 
the part of these twenty-seven health workers. However, two thirds of these health 
workers were concentrated by facility:  They came from seven facilities where more than 
one health worker reported that their facility received pay-for-performance. These were 
likely to come from facilities that may have pay-for-performance outside of RBF as 
MOPH, according to the National Salary Policy [142], encourages implementing 
agencies managing facilities to experiment with performance-based payments.  Thus, 





Gender values were corrected based on health worker position – all midwives and 
community midwives were coded as females because according to BPHS Guidelines 
these positions must be filled by female staff [66].  
 
All categorical variables were examined using frequency distribution tables and bar 
graphs. Distribution of each item of the work motivation scale was examined separately. 
Simple summary statistics (means, medians, standard deviations and maximum and 
minimum values) were used to examine continuous variables. Stem-and-leaf plots, 
histograms and box plots were used to do visual checks and examine the symmetry, 
center, spread and outliers for continuous variables. Outliers were first checked using box 
plots and more formally with “lv” function in STATA [103]. Values above or below the 
inner fences are considered to be mild outliers and values above or below the outer fences 
are considered to be severe outliers [103]. Severe outliers were further examined and 
replaced where they appeared to be the result of error. In addition, dot plot showing 
facility mean and 95% confidence interval was constructed for each item to examine 
spread of facility means in relation to the grand mean (mean for the overall sample). This 
provided a sense of the variation in facility means.  
 
Following the exploratory data analysis, selected characteristics of the sample were 
examined by treatment allocation. Means and standard deviations were estimated for 
continuous variables, while for binary and categorical variables estimates of proportions 
were used.  Data were weighted to account for unequal probability of selection at the 




characteristics [143]. Test statistics were adjusted for multi-stage stratified cluster 
sampling using Taylor-linearized variance estimation using the survey commands in Stata 
[105]. Strata with single sampling unit were centered at overall mean. These steps were 
done to help in identifying potential confounders by examining the sample variations. 
Similar analysis was performed for compliers and non-compliers as defined by the 
Compliance variable (see previous section). Examining key characteristics of the sample 
in this way was important for identifying good predictors for the compliance status used 
in CACE modeling later.  
 
After these exploratory analyses, structural equation modeling approach for complex 
survey data was used to estimate the effect of treatment on motivation factors. According 
to Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal and Pickles [144], structural equation models are generally 
required with latent variables as they are measured through several observed indicators 
(scale items) resulting in multiple responses. Given that our primary interest is the 
association between the latent variable (motivation) and its predictors (RBF treatment), 
we have two parts to our model: (i) measurement part which measures the association 
between the observed indicators and the latent construct, and (ii) structural part which 
measures the association between the latent construct and its predictors. There are three 
alternative approaches to measuring these two parts [145]:  
1. Treat each response variable, i.e. latent variable indicator, individually. This will 
require fitting m regressions that describe individually the association between the 
predictor variable and each response variable, Y. The main weakness of this 




to different conclusions for each of the indicator but will not be able to come to 
infer any association between our latent variable of interest and predictors.  
2. Summarize multiple responses first and then test the association between the 
response and the predictors. In this approach we are basically treating what is an 
imperfectly measured latent variable as an observed variable. This summary 
variable is an “imperfect” measure of our latent construct with reliability less than 
1. In general, this leads to overestimating the variance of our outcome (Var 
T(x)<Var(X) where T(x) is our true outcome and X is what we are able to 
measure). The consequence of overestimating the variance is increased standard 
errors of our regression coefficients, leading to increased Type II error, where we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis when the alternative is true. As per Bollen [146], 
in multiple regressions the consequences of measurement error are unknown and 
can lead to coefficients that are higher, lower or the same as true coefficients.  
3. Summarize and analyze simultaneously using structural equation models (SEM).  
The strength of SEM is that both measurement and structural parts are fit 
simultaneously in one step. Thus, it does not assume that the latent variable is a 
simple summary of observed indicators and it is known. This acknowledges the 
measurement error inherent in measurement of latent constructs through observed 
indicators.  
 
The study used two approaches to the analysis: (a) intention-to-treat, and (b) complier 
average causal effect. Intention-to-treat approach is the “gold standard” in the analysis of 




on the initial random assignment of treatment. In this way, it tries to preserve the original 
intent of random allocation, where all participants have equal chance of receiving a 
treatment and therefore, there are no systematic differences between the groups allocated 
to different treatments with regard to known or unknown characteristics. If everyone 
allocated to a particular treatment group followed her assignment and there was no 
missing data, using ITT approach would give results reflecting the principle of 
randomization[149].  
 
However, as it was the case with the current study, many randomized trials suffer from 
treatment non-compliance or intervention non-adherence. In this case, ITT approach may 
result in decreased power to detect the effect of the treatment. In fact, ITT will always 
give more attenuated effect than an approach that accounts for non-adherence [149, 150]. 
As Little and Yau put it, “this estimates the causal effect of treatment assignment rather 
than the effect of the treatment for participants who actually received it” [151]. However, 
the ITT provides the estimate of the effectiveness of the program, as in real life situation 
there will always be compliers and non-compliers and if one is to evaluate whether the 
program works overall, ITT is the most appropriate estimate[149]. Thus, we used ITT 
approach first.  
 
Given the limitations of the ITT approach described above and the interest in effect of 
performance-based payments on health worker motivation beyond programmatic effects, 





 CACE is the method of analysis where, in simple terms, the effect of intervention is 
estimated based on those who were assigned to and actually received the treatment. It is 
best illustrated with a simple example of smoking cessation program where a group of 
individuals has been randomized into two groups: group one will receive a week-long 
training and group two will receive “treatment as usual”, i.e. no special services. At the 
end of the training program, those who completed all sessions in group one will receive 
certificates. Assuming that in group one a large proportion of individuals fails to 
complete the training, comparing group one with group two will give attenuated results 
on the effect of the training on smoking cessation. It is easy to agree that those who 
completed the training differ from those who failed to do so. For example, they could 
have been more motivated to quit smoking or less addicted to it. Thus, to have a true 
counterfactual, one needs to identify similar types of participants in the control group. 
Comparing those who completed the training in the treatment arm to the same types of 
participants, i.e. those who would have completed the training had they been assigned to 
group one, gives the complier-average causal effect.  It differs fundamentally from the as-
treated approach, because the latter violates randomization and ignores the fact that 
compliers in the treatment group are self-selected group of individuals and they often 
differ from the rest.  CACE method offers comparison of observed compliers in treatment 
group versus potential compliers in the control group. Thus, it estimates effect of 
treatment based on two comparable groups that were randomly assigned to treatment and 





There are five key assumptions underlying CACE approach [151]: (1) Stable unit 
treatment value assumption (SUTVA) – potential outcomes for individual i do not depend 
on the treatment status of others, i.e. causal effects are defined for individuals, and 
everyone receives the same treatment; (2) Outcome exclusion restriction – given the 
treatment received, treatment assignment does not affect outcome; (3) Monotonicity – 
there are no “defiers” (those who do the opposite, i.e. Ti(1)=0 and Ti(0)=1); (4) Non-zero 
denominator – there are always some compliers; and (5) Randomization – treatment 
assignment is based on randomization.    
 
The most questionable assumption among these five assumptions is the second 
assumption. It would not be unlikely that participants who were randomized into 
treatment, i.e. facilities that were supposed to receive RBF, but who did not comply, 
meaning they did not receive performance-based payments or at least did not know that 
they did, would be demoralized by it [153]. The same health workers would not be 
demoralized or less so, had they been randomized into control, i.e. facilities that did not 
receive RBF, because they would not feel left out for example. This assumption is one of 
the five assumptions that are made implicitly or explicitly in most studies using the 
CACE approach, although in many cases there is a reason to believe that it could be 
violated [154]. In this study, sensitivity analysis was conducted to test how well the 
assumption held up and whether it changed the fundamental conclusions regarding the 
treatment effect of PBP on motivation factors. The sensitivity analysis was performed 




assumption of additive effect of treatment while relaxing the assumption of exclusion 
restriction. The additivity assumption is necessary to ensure model identification.  
 
The third assumption holds because those assigned to control were not allowed to receive 
treatment, thus, they could not defy their treatment allocation. The fourth assumption 
holds as there are health workers in the treatment group who did actually receive the 
payments (see section on variables construction). The fifth assumption holds because 
treatment assignment was randomized. A potential limitation of the CACE method in 
comparison with ITT is how to define compliers [148, 149, 154]. Effects can differ 
depending on the definition of compliance.    
 
The main equation for the measurement model is summarized below. The subscripts for 
facility and health worker are not shown in the measurement model. Thus, the equation is 
for health worker at a facility level: 
           (1) 
                                                                     and   ε  uncorrelated with 
η        
where y is the 15 x 1 vector of observed components Y1, Y2  …  Y15, Λ is a 15x4 matrix of 
indicator-construct loadings, η is a 4 x 1 vector of latent motivation factors, and ε is 15 x 
1 vector of error terms of the observed scores in y. It is assumed that measurement errors 
are uncorrelated with the latent variables or factors [146]. The mean of measurement 
errors is zero. In addition, it is assumed that factors are correlated, which is in accordance 




so    matrix is diagonal. This assumption, also referred to as local independence 
assumption, implies that no two endogenous variables share a common omitted cause.  It 
is the main assumption in EFA, but could be relaxed in CFA. It could be violated if 
indicators coming from the same source share a common response bias [146]. Errors are 
assumed to be homoscedastic. They are also assumed to be nonautocorrelated within 
facility.  
 
The main equation for the structural model using ITT approach is described below: 
                        (2) 
where ηijk is a motivation factor i (i=1, 2, 3, 4) for an average health worker k in the 
facility j,       is the effect of treatment allocation (xj = 1 treatment), which is a facility 
level variable, on factor i,    is a vector of coefficients for covariates at a health worker 
level (xjk), and  ijk is a residual term. A constant (intercept) is absent from the equation 
because the variables are deviated from their means. 
 
The two main equations for the structural model using CACE approach for factor i are 
summarized below: 
       
 
    
 
    




 is the expected difference in the outcome for a complier as compared to a non-
complier in a facility j in control arm;    
 
  is complier-average causal effect, i.e. the 
effect of treatment xj on compliers (the effect of treatment assignment on non-compliers 
is zero under the exclusion restriction assumption listed earlier but which will be allowed 




health worker level; and     is the error term.  To test the fundamental assumption of 
exclusion restriction, the additive effect of treatment assignment was assumed, and thus 
the equation above does not contain a term for interaction effect of treatment assignment 
with covariates.  
 
Logistic regression model predicting compliance based on facility- and health worker-
level variables is shown below: 
                                     (4) 
where      denotes the probability of being a complier,    is a logit intercept,    is a 
vector of logit coefficients for the facility level variables (  ) predicting compliance, and 
   is a vector of logit coefficients for the individual level variables (   ) predicting 
compliance.  
 
All data were analyzed using STATA 12 [105] and MPlus v7 [104]. Test of 
multicollinearity using the variance inflation factor estimation method for complex 
survey data was implemented for variables selected as potential predictors for ITT and 
CACE models [155].  
 
ITT analysis was implemented using weighted least squares function for complex survey 
data with categorical outcomes. Standard error computations used a sandwich estimator 
in order to account for non-independence of observations due to cluster sampling by 





CACE analysis was implemented using mixture modeling with cross-sectional data in 
MPlus by specifying TYPE=MIXTURE in the ANALYSIS command of the input file. 
Mixture modeling is used with categorical latent variables with unknown sub-population 
membership, but which is inferred from the data. Maximum likelihood estimation 
approach robust to non-normality and non-independence of data  (MLR) was used in 
estimating the CACE, following the method described by Jo et al that use CACE in the 
analysis of the data from the Johns Hopkins School Intervention Study[156]. Maximum 
likelihood method is generally considered to be more efficient than the instrumental 
variable approach for estimating CACE [150, 156].  
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Study population 
A total of 805 health workers from 256 facilities (clusters) in 11 RBF pilot provinces 
were surveyed in this study. Of the 805 health workers, 430 (53.4%) were from 138 
facilities allocated to the treatment arm, and 375 (46.6%) were from 118 facilities that 
were part of the control arm (Table 4.1). Overall, there were no significant differences in 
facility characteristics (p-value>0.05). In treatment arm there was a higher proportion of 
CHCs (45.3% compared to 36.2%), while in control arm there was a higher proportion of 
BHCs (54.6% compared to 43.8%). But these differences were not statistically 
significant. Distribution by management type was similar between the two arms of the 
study. There were also no significant differences between the two groups in facility 





Distribution by type of health worker as well as other health worker characteristics was 
also similar in two groups, with the exception of supervisor visit within the past 30 days. 
In both groups males were more than 50% of health workers, reflecting the situation with 
women’s employment in Afghanistan. Vaccinators made the single largest group (27.3% 
and 29.4% in treatment and control group, respectively), although they were closely 
followed by nurses and midwives, including community midwives. Mean number of 
technical training days outside of one’s health facility was practically the same in both 
arms. Also, they both were characterized by large spread as evidenced by standard 
deviation estimates in the number of training days over the past year. The only significant 
difference identified in this analysis was variation in supervisor’s visit, which was higher 
in treatment group (90.1%) as compared to control (83.5%). However, there was no 
adjustment for this variable in the regression analysis as it was not considered to be a 
confounding variable. There are three conditions that must be met for a variable to be a 
confounder [157]. It must: 
1. Cause the outcome, i.e. association cannot be chance only, 
2. Be associated with exposure, and 
3. Not be affected by exposure. 
While the supervisor’s visit was associated with exposure, there was no proven clear 
causal link between work motivation and frequency of supervisor’s visit, because the 
variable did not show frequency or purpose of the visit but only whether there was a 
recent visit from a supervisor for any reason. More importantly, higher frequency of 
supervisory visits was partly due to RBF as it did involve more monitoring on behalf of 




4.4.2 Characteristics by compliance status  
As expected, there were several important differences between the group of compliers 
(n=190), i.e. those who reported having received PBP, and the group of non-compliers 
(n=237), i.e. those who did not report having received PBP (Table 4.2). First of all, there 
were significant differences among compliers and non-compliers by type of facility. 
Compliers came mostly from CHCs (55.0%), while non-compliers came mostly from 
BHCs (53.2%). Thus, it seemed that either staff of CHC facilities was more informed 
about their bonus payments or these larger facilities were more likely to have received 
PBP. There was also a very important and clear difference between compliers and non-
compliers by type of management. Among compliers, 46.2% worked in facilities 
managed by NGOs only, while among the non-compliers only 27.9% came from facilities 
managed by NGOs. At the same time, less than 1% of compliers worked in MOPH only 
facilities, while 6.3% of non-compliers came from these facilities.  
 
As for health worker characteristics, it seemed that among compliers the majority were 
females (53.6%), while among the non-compliers there were only 41.1% of female health 
workers (Table 4.2). There were also differences by type of health worker. As expected, 
based in part on the type of performance indicators, among compliers 35% of health 
workers were midwives or community midwives, while among the non-compliers there 
were only 23.9% of midwives or community midwives. There were also more doctors 
among compliers than non-compliers (14.7% as compared to 8.7%, respectively). 
Surprisingly, there was a higher proportion of vaccinators (32.6%) among non-compliers 




indicators for BPHS facilities [68]. Although in both groups it was very high, proportion 
of health workers reporting a recent visit from a supervisor was statistically significantly 
higher among the compliers (p-value<0.05). These variables, with the exception of 
supervisor’s visit, were tested as predictors of compliance and several of them were 
selected for the CACE models described further below. Supervisor’s visit was affected by 
exposure [158] as there was more intense supervision of RBF treatment facilities by 
implementing NGOs and MoPH. Thus, it was not a pretreatment covariate.  
 
4.4.3 Outcome by treatment group 
Based on the distribution of individual items of the work motivation scale, it appeared 
that there were very few observable differences between treatment and control groups 
(Appendix B, Table 8.1). In both groups, there was a very low frequency of endorsement 
(<10%) of negative responses (“Strongly disagree” and “Disagree”) for the identified 
regulation factor items. Although there was a considerably less skewed distribution of the 
items in the introjected motivation factor, there were no significant differences between 
the two arms. For amotivation factor, a higher proportion of health workers in control 
facilities as compared to treatment facilities expressed strong agreement. For example, 
7.2% strongly agreed with the statement, “I sometimes feel my work is meaningless”, in 
the treatment group as compared to 13.8% in control group. However, these differences 
were not statistically significant (p-value >0.05).  
 
Unlike the three factors discussed above, there were significant differences in three out of 




arm as compared to 52.6% in the control arm (p-value<0.05) expressed strong agreement 
with the statement that they worked in a given facility because of opportunities for 
promotion. A significantly higher proportion of health workers in control arm strongly 
endorsed the statement that they were working in a given facility because of opportunities 
to use their skills (57% as compared to 48.1%, p-value<0.05).  
 
4.4.4 Intention-to-treat analysis 
A structural equation model using a weighted least squares function was fit to examine 
the primary relationship of interest, the effect of intervention on motivation factors 
(Figure 4.2). The model fit statistics were satisfactory and suggested that the model had 
an acceptable fit to the data, although improvements could be made (Table 4.3). The 
standardized loading coefficients were all above 0.40 and were statistically significant (p-
value<0.05) (Table 4.4). Importantly, they had the exact same magnitude as in the 
measurement only model, signifying measurement invariance, which is a prerequisite for 
examining the effect of treatment (see Chapter 3). The structural model coefficients were 
near zero (Table 4.5). None of them were statistically significant (p-value>0.05).  
 
Based on the results of the exploratory data analysis, it appeared that gender and health 
worker type were associated with different motivation factors. The models containing 
these variables were fit next. Fit indices for the model with health worker gender (Model 
B) only were similar to those of Model A, the model with treatment only. While there 




that external and introjected motivation factors were significantly higher among females 
as compared to males (p-value<0.05).   
 
The model with health worker type as a predictor of motivation factors (Model C) 
seemed to have similar fit indices as the previous two models, although it had slightly 
lower RMSEA. Health worker type was found to be a significant predictor of external 
and introjected regulation factors. Midwives appeared to have significantly higher 
external (β=0.26, p-value<0.05) and introjected (β=0.40, p-value<0.05) motivation. At 
the same time, they appeared to be more amotivated than doctors (β=0.29, p-value<0.05). 
Community midwives had significantly higher external (0.44, p-value<0.05) and 
introjected (0.39, p-value<0.05) regulations as compared to doctors. Both vaccinators and 
CHW supervisors also had higher external and introjected motivation when compared to 
doctors (p-value<0.05). Similar to midwives, CHW supervisors were also significantly 
more amotivated than doctors (p-value<0.05). Thus, while there were very few 
differences in identified regulation (autonomous motivation type) among different types 
of health workers, health workers with lower levels of training and position had higher 
controlled types of motivation and in some cases, amotivation.  
 
In Model D, facility type was tested as a predictor of motivation factors. None of the 
coefficients were statistically significant. In Model E, type of management of the facility 
was tested as a predictor of motivation factors. Similar to Model D, this variable did not 





Model F, combining health worker type and gender as predictors of motivation, appeared 
to have similar fit indices as the more parsimonious models (Table 4.3). In this model, the 
coefficient for gender did not appear as a significant predictor for any of the factors, 
except the external motivation factor (Table 4.5). Females seemed to have higher external 
motivation (p-value=0.05) in this combined model, holding the type of health worker 
constant. Unlike in Model B, gender was no longer significant (p-value<0.05) for 
introjected motivation factor, although the magnitude of the coefficient was similar to the 
estimate in gender only model.  
 
Health worker type did not appear to be a significant predictor of identified motivation. It 
was, however, a strong predictor of external motivation (p-value<0.05), holding gender 
constant. It was also an important predictor for introjected motivation. For amotivation 
factor, the coefficient for CHW supervisor remained significant (p-value<0.05) and of the 
same magnitude as in health worker type only model. For midwife, while the magnitude 
of the coefficient changed only slightly, it was no longer statistically significant (Table 
4.5). This is not surprising as regular and community midwives are all females in 
Afghanistan, and thus, gender and health worker type in this case are strongly correlated. 
However, the variance inflation factor showed that overall, there was no collinearity 









4.4.5 Complier-average causal effect analysis 
As described in the variable construction section, observed compliance was defined as a 
positive response to the question on whether a health worker personally received PBP. 
According to this definition, 50.8% of all health workers working in facilities allocated to 
treatment arm was defined as compliers. Thus, almost half of health workers either did 
not receive treatment or were not aware of it.  These were defined as non-compliers. 
Given that compliance status could only be observed in treatment group, the observed 
compliance status was missing for the control group.  
 
As the first step, a model with three comparison groups: (i) controls, (ii) non-compliers in 
treatment arm, and (iii) compliers in treatment arm. It was implemented using multiple 
group analysis where a reference category was the compliers group in treatment arm 
whose intercepts were fixed at zero. Health workers in the control group had positive 
factor means for identified, external and introjected regulations (p-value<0.05) when 
compared to health workers classified as compliers.  Also, we observed smaller but 
positive factor means (p-value<0.05) for identified and external regulation factors for 
non-compliers when compared to compliers. It appeared that non-compliers in treatment 
arm had higher identified and external motivation.  
 
Next, a model without any pretreatment covariates was fit to the data (Table 4.6). The 
results of the CACE model with treatment as the predictor and motivation factors as the 
outcome are provided in Table 4.6. Maximum likelihood estimator with robust standard 




normality and non-independence of observations [104].  There is no chi-square goodness 
of fit test in mixture models. Instead, several models must be fit in order to compare their 
log-likelihoods and information criteria. Entropy (0.89) approaching one provided 
evidence that there was a clear delineation of classes. Based on the results of this model it 
appeared that when comparing compliers in treatment groups with compliers in control 
group, PBP as implemented in Afghanistan had statistically significant negative effect on 
identified, external and introjected motivation (p-value<0.05).  
 
A series of models with various pretreatment covariates – facility type, management type, 
health worker gender, and type of health worker – selected based on the results of 
exploratory data analysis were added one at a time to the initial model with only 
treatment and compliance. It appeared that facility type and management type were not 
significantly associated with motivation factors, although they predicted compliance 
status. Gender was not associated with any of the motivation factors, except external 
regulation and this became insignificant once health worker type was added to the model, 
although the direction of the association was similar with males on average being less 
externally motivated than females. Likelihood-ratio test and the Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC) adjusted for sample size were used to select the best fitting model [159]. 
The results of the final CACE model are provided in Table 4.7 - Table 4.8. 
 
Similar to results of the ITT analysis, health worker type was not a significant predictor 
of identified regulation, although the coefficient for midwives was large (λ=-0.60) it was 
not significant at 5% level. Community midwives (λ=0.43, p-value<0.05), vaccinators 




have a higher mean external motivation as compared to doctors, holding treatment 
constant.  Midwives (λ=0.63, p-value<0.05), community midwives (λ=0.60, p-
value<0.05), vaccinators (λ=0.47, p-value<0.05), and CHW supervisors (λ=0.57, p-
value<0.05) were estimated to have a higher mean introjected motivation as compared to 
doctors, holding treatment constant. For amotivation factor, structural coefficients for 
midwives and CHW supervisors were positive and significant (λ=0.57 and λ=0.46, p-
value<0.05, respectively), indicating that these types of health workers were expected to 
be more amotivated than doctors, holding treatment constant.  
 
Importantly, the magnitude and significance of coefficients for treatment effect changed 
very little when other covariates were added to the model. As Table 4.7 shows, it 
appeared that PBP were negatively associated with identified, external and introjected 
motivation. The estimated complier-average causal effects for these three factors were 
negative and highly statistically significant (γ=-2.52, p-value<0.01, γ=-1.29, p-
value<0.01, γ=-1.30, p-value<0.01).  
 
Based on the exploratory data analysis, it appeared that type of management, facility 
type, health worker type or position, and gender were potential predictors of compliance 
status.  Using the observed compliance status as an outcome, a series of bivariate and 
multivariate logistic regression models based on the generalized estimating equations 
(GEE) with robust standard errors were fit to the data. Management type and facility type 
appeared to be significant predictors of compliance status. However, it is recommended 




covariates as the outcome model. Also, it is advisable that at least some of the covariates 
in two models overlap [160]. Thus, gender and health worker type were also included in 
the compliance status model (Table 4.8).  
 
As described earlier, the results of this analysis depend fundamentally on the assumption 
that non-compliers assigned to the treatment group were not affected by this assignment. 
While it was reasonable to assume that to be affected by the intervention one had to 
actually participate in it [154], the study tested this assumption. Importantly, testing of 
this assumption requires covariates that predict outcome and compliance. The 
coefficient(s) of the covariate(s) predicting compliance status cannot be zero, and the 
model must contain covariates that are significantly associated with compliance. As 
Table 4.8 shows, the model predicting compliance status met these two requirements. 
Management type was statistically significantly associated with compliance status. The 
odds of compliance were five times higher in facilities that were managed by MoPH with 
support of an international agency as compared to MOPH only facilities (OR=5.5, p-
value<0.01). The odds of compliance were even higher for facilities managed by NGOs 
only (OR=6.6, p-value<0.01). Furthermore, we must assume the additive effect of 
treatment assignment. Thus, the model with pretreatment covariates described above was 
modified to allow the main effect of treatment to be non-zero for non-compliers.  
 
The model with relaxed exclusion restriction assumption showed that there were 
statistically significant differences in the effects of treatment between compliers and non-




assumption was perhaps not realistic in this study, assuming the additive effect of 
treatment assignment holds (Appendix B, Table 8.3).  However, more importantly, this 
alternative specification of the model did not change the fundamental results of the study. 
While the magnitudes of CACE estimates were slightly smaller in this model as 
compared to the model with exclusion restriction, the direction of the coefficients did not 
change (Appendix B, Table 8.3).  
 
Health workers in treatment group who received treatment had statistically significantly 
lower identified motivation when compared to their colleagues in control group who 
would have received it had they been allowed to do it (γ=-2.02, p-value<0.05). External 
motivation was also lower among health workers assigned to treatment group and who 
actually received the treatment as compared to their colleagues assigned to control group 
who would have received it had they been assigned to it (γ=-1.09, p-value<0.05). 
Complier-average causal effect estimate was also negative for introjected motivation (γ=-
0.85, p-value<0.05).  Although the direction of the effect of treatment on amotivation did 
not change once the exclusion restriction assumption was relaxed, it became significant 
unlike in the model with the OER assumption (γ=0.56, p-value<0.05).  
 
It should be noted that based on information criteria, it appeared that the model with no 
exclusion restriction assumption fit the data slightly better than a model based on this 
assumption. Likelihood ratio test also showed that it was a statistically significantly better 
model than the model based on the traditional CACE assumption (LR=167, 4 d.f.). This 




treatment coefficients on non-compliers must be interpreted with caution [153], it 
appeared that non-compliers in treatment arm had statistically significantly higher 
identified and external motivation when compared to non-compliers in control arm. This 
suggests that those health workers working in treatment arm who reported not receiving 
PBP had higher identified and external motivation as compared to those who said they 
received such payments.  
 
4.5 Discussion 
Performance-based financing programs have become increasingly popular for addressing 
gaps in health system performance. As discussed in the introduction to this paper, 
external rewards, particularly financial incentives, are seen as key mechanisms for 
improving health worker motivation. However, this assumption has been questioned by 
theories such as SDT [19, 51]. Also, as several studies, including systematic reviews, 
have shown there is insufficient evidence supporting this link between external rewards 
contingent on performance and work motivation [41, 43, 137, 161].  
 
The results of this study suggest that financial incentives in the form of pay-for-
performance do not necessarily improve health worker motivation. At the programmatic 
level, as the results of the intention-to-treat analysis demonstrate, the pay-for-
performance project in Afghanistan had no effect on health worker motivation. While 
other variables, such as gender and health worker type, were shown to be important 
predictors of different dimensions of motivation, the RBF intervention did not appear to 




the findings of the recent evaluation conducted by the Johns Hopkins School of Public 
Health [75]. The evaluation did not find significant improvements in most of the 
indicators of health facility performance as measured by the Balanced Scorecard, 
including provider satisfaction [75].  
 
However, in cases with a high proportion of non-compliers, i.e. those who did not receive 
the treatment, the ITT analysis results are often attenuated. Moreover, they reflect the 
programmatic effect of the intervention, i.e. effect of the program on the outcome in 
realistic context where some participants receive treatment while others do not. Efficacy 
of the intervention itself is more accurately assessed through methods of causal inference 
such as CACE.  Given that a large proportion of health workers in this study reported that 
they did not receive pay-for-performance, it seemed reasonable to conduct analysis using 
the CACE method. The study did not distinguish between those who actually did not 
receive PBP and those who did receive them but were not aware of them being PBP, 
because for motivation, a health worker’s perception or awareness seemed to matter more 
than the actual fact of receiving such payments. Also, it was not feasible to distinguish 
between the two.   
 
Based on the results of the CACE analysis, it seems that PBP can, in fact, have a 
detrimental effect on identified, external and introjected dimensions of motivation. The 
negative effect of PBP on identified motivation supports the hypothesis of the study 




effect on external motivation at worst were surprising. Yet, there are several design issues 
of the RBF program in Afghanistan that may help explain these unexpected results.  
 
First of all, it is possible that the program did not meet the heightened expectations of 
health workers. The project was widely publicized at its start and health workers were 
likely to have expected higher rewards than what they received in reality. Approximately 
one year into the implementation of the RBF program, in the last quarter of 2011, there 
was a revision of payments for most of the indicators [69]. The payments per indicator 
had to be substantially increased because MOPH and implementing NGO monitoring 
activities showed that health workers were not satisfied with the rewards.  
 
Related to the first point, it appears that prior to this revision, PBP as a proportion of base 
salary (not considering other mandatory allowances) ranged from 5.8% for doctors to 
11% for assistant nurses (Table 4.9). However, it is worth emphasizing that this 
estimation is only in proportion to base salary. In addition to base salary, health workers 
in Afghanistan, particularly female health workers, are entitled to a number of allowances 
as described in the National Salary Policy [142]. Thus, male health workers serving in 
rural areas (which are most of the BPHS facilities) are automatically entitled to 50% 
increase to their base salary, while their female colleagues are entitled to 100% increase. 
The hardship allowance is increased further for areas that are considered to be rural 
(100% and 200% for males and females, respectively) and isolated (125% and 250% for 





Although after the revision of per unit payments, the average amount of PBP became 
higher in proportion to base salary (Table 4.9), it was still small in proportion to the 
overall monthly salary (base salary plus the mandatory allowances). As Table 4.10 
shows, for a midwife it ranged from 16.5% to 4.3%, depending on the location. It is also 
important to note here that only one province, Balkh, in the current study was from the 
grade 1 group of provinces. The majority came from grades two and three. Moreover, 
facilities in the study were overwhelmingly from semi-urban, rural and remote areas. 
Thus, the overall guaranteed salary for health workers from these facilities was high 
relative to what PBP provided. In Rwanda, the average increase in staff salaries 
amounted to 38%  as the result of PFP [32]. Health workers who were externally 
motivated and were thus expected to have higher motivation might have been very well 
disappointed as their extra efforts did not pay off.  
 
Thirdly, it does not appear that there was much transparency among health workers or 
oversight by MOPH of how payments were distributed within facilities. In Burundi for 
example, there was a so called “motivation contract” between the health facility 
management and the employee that described clearly the tasks of a health worker and the 
“bonus budget” allocated by the health facility for the health worker if she achieved the 
set targets [163]. Moreover, the payments were made on a monthly basis. Even more 
importantly, a clear tool was used to share the “bonus budget” among the health workers 
[163], and thus, there was transparency and clear understanding by health workers of 




likely to support intrinsic as well as extrinsic types of motivation. This was not the case 
with the PBP in Afghanistan [164].  
 
Related to the third point, according to the MOPH Health Economics and Financing 
Directorate, the within-facility distribution was to be determined by implementing NGOs 
together with facility management. Thus, there were three types of within-facility 
distribution schemes in Afghanistan: (1) in proportion to existing salary, (2) based on the 
contribution to performance indicators, and (3) equal amount to all facility staff.  Based 
on MOPH administrative data, it was estimated that 34.8% of health workers in this study 
sample came from facilities where within-facility distribution was related to performance 
[71]. At the same time, there were no clear formulas for estimating performance and 
contribution of individual staff members and health workers definitely did not have 
“motivation contracts”. Moreover, a number of NGOs changed their distribution schemes 
during the implementation of the project, making it difficult to measure the modification 
effect of these widely differing distribution schemes.  
 
Eldridge and Palmer in their review of the literature on PBP in developing countries [41] 
made an important observation regarding the premises of such programs and why they 
may not result in improved performance or motivation. According to principles of PBP 
programs, failure to meet performance indicators results in penalty such as lack of bonus 
payments. This implies that achievement of these indicators is within the control of the 
provider [41]. To put it differently, it seems that one of the main reasons for low quality 




performance are often not within the control of health facilities, and especially their 
individual staff members. Consequently, PBP may put health workers in a situation 
where they are expected to achieve targets that are affected by factors beyond their 
control, and thus, result in lowered motivation, including the external type.  
 
In Rwanda, where the PBP program seemed to be successful not only in improving 
quality of health services but also to a certain extent successful in increasing health 
worker motivation [161], an average of 23% of PBP funds  were allocated for overall 
facility-level investments such as infrastructure and medical supplies [32]. A study of the 
PBP experience in Rwanda by Kalk et al [161] based on 69 semi-structured interview 
found that one of the reasons for the positive effects of the program was the fact that part 
of the funds were used for infrastructure and equipment, thus addressing a major 
constraint to performance. This finding is also supported by the preliminary findings of a 
qualitative study of an RBF pilot in Nigeria [165]. According to this study, one of the key 
factors mentioned by health workers regarding the benefits of the PBP program was the 
overall improvements in facility infrastructure. These improvements in the working 
environment were seen to be at least as important as the increases in their individual 
salaries due to PBP [165]. In Afghanistan, all PBP were spent on individual staff salaries 
and no additional funds were provided for addressing facility-level performance 
constraints, such as lack of medical supplies or poor infrastructure.  
 
A fifth point that could also partly explain the negative effect of the PBP program on 




findings in Rwanda. One of the negative effects of PBP cited by health staff interviewed 
in Rwanda was increased workload. With a significant shortage of staff in health facilities 
the PBP program was often perceived as straining an already overstretched system as 
health workers complained of being overworked and tired [161]. Similar to Rwanda, in 
Afghanistan, implementing NGOs and health facility managers who felt pressure to 
achieve targets were likely to put pressure on their staff to increase the number of ANC 
or PNC visits in relation to baseline (as bonus payments were calculated in relation to 
each facility’s performance) without an increase in staffing levels or other inputs. While a 
more detailed study is required, facility records of the total number of new patients do 
suggest that the average workload of each health worker (defined as the number of new 
patient visits divided by the total number of staff per day) has increased in treatment 
facilities as compared to control (p-value<0.10).  
 
Last but not least, as was the case in Rwanda, there were delays in payments that 
undermined the “mental link” between the performance and the rewards [161, 166]. In 
Afghanistan, facilities were supposed to receive bonus payments on a quarterly basis, 
which may have weakened the direct link between performance in a particular month and 
financial rewards received in the form of a salary and other allowances. In addition, 
however, in Afghanistan there were up to two month delays, and in some cases longer, 
between the end of the quarter and the time that health workers actually received their 
payments [166]. All these reasons might explain the surprising findings of this study 
where on average health workers who were assigned to treatment and complied with it, 




their colleagues in the control group who would have complied with treatment had they 
been assigned to it.  
 
Findings of a negative effect of PBP on identified motivation are less surprising and 
support the study hypothesis. However, as it was noted in the introduction to this study, 
according to SDT the effect of external rewards does not always have to be negative [19]. 
The process of the program design and its implementation as well as existing 
organizational factors appear to be important in determining the effect of PBP on health 
worker motivation. Based on the studies in Rwanda and Burundi as well as the literature 
on work motivation, it appears that the process through which the indicators are chosen 
and the degree to which the rules of payment distributions are understood and accepted 
by all health workers determine how successful  the PBP programs are in improving staff 
motivation [54, 161, 163] .   
 
For example, in Burundi, as described earlier, there were clear rules for calculating the 
bonus due to each health worker and these were known and, more importantly, spelled 
out in individual health worker contracts [163]. As described in Chapter 3, staff 
participation influences the way external rewards effect autonomous motivation.  In 
Rwanda, one of the main “themes” that came out of interviews regarding the weaknesses 
of the PBP was the feeling among health workers that indicators were imposed from 
outside without understanding of local needs and constraints [161]. Thus, they were 




undermines the feelings of autonomy and has a negative impact on identified motivation 
[19]. It also partly explains the results of this study.  
 
An important factor to also consider when examining these results is the perception of the 
medical profession in countries such as Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi or Afghanistan, 
which may differ from the way it is perceived in countries such as the USA or Canada. In 
these countries, the respect of community and family members that the health profession 
brings is extremely important [43, 48, 92, 161].  In Tanzania, it seemed that even 
financial rewards were closely connected to the perception of social status because a 
good salary conferred recognition of the importance of their work [48]. The impact of a 
widely publicized PBP program on community’s perception of health workers and the 
services they render would be an important factor in understanding the effect of such 
programs on different dimension of work motivation, particularly the introjected 
regulation. Unfortunately, this requires additional qualitative research that was not 
feasible in this study.  
 
The study has several limitations. First of all, it is based on a cross-sectional survey and 
thus, any causal inferences are tenuous and should be done with caution. Moreover, as 
there were variations on a quarterly basis in the total amount of PBP each facility would 
have received, a longitudinal study might have reflected effect of financial incentives on 
external motivation more accurately.  A second limitation is related to measurement of 
the outcome. Although the work motivation scale demonstrated good psychometric 




specifically on financial rewards or income. It contained items on promotion, job 
security, and working conditions.  The item on income  
(“I only work here to get paid”) turned out to be a weak item that did not load 
consistently on any of the factors and therefore, was dropped from the final scale as 
described in Chapter 3. This item was originally borrowed from a study in Kenya [86]. 
As it appeared to be a weak item in pretesting of the scale in 2011, it was slightly 
reworded for the final scale. As a recent qualitative study in Burkina Faso, Ghana and 
Tanzania demonstrated, this item did not seem to perform well and was also excluded 
from the final work motivation scale [85].  
 
It may be that financial rewards differ from general extrinsic rewards such as promotion 
or job security, and that was why this item did not load with other external regulation 
items.  However, the Pearson chi-squared statistic corrected for the survey design showed 
no statistically significant difference between the two treatment arms in external 
motivation based on this item focusing specifically on pay (p-value=0.54). This provides 
some evidence that even when external regulation is interpreted as motivation based on 
explicitly financial incentives, the effect of treatment was not significant.  
 
There are also limitations related to the analysis method, specifically to CACE. As 
described in the section on data analysis, there are several key assumptions that make the 
identification of CACE models possible [153]. However, while they are widely used they 
are assumptions that can be violated. Unfortunately, methods for testing these 




violation of the exclusion restriction assumption, one of the assumptions that appeared to 
be most often violated in practice, was tested. However, the model testing this 
assumption also had to rely on other assumptions, such as the additive effect of treatment. 
Still, the fact that the coefficients in both models were in the same direction and of 
similar magnitude provides some confidence in the conclusions of this study. 
 
PBP are growing in popularity as a mechanism to address challenges related to human 
resources in health in developing countries. It is assumed that these types of financial 
incentive programs will improve health worker motivation, which in turn will contribute 
to better performance. This study focused on the first part of this question, i.e. effect of 
PBP on work motivation. It hypothesized that motivation was a multi-dimensional 
construct consisting of four different dimensions. In line with most theories in 
organizational psychology, it was expected that financial rewards will have a positive 
effect on external motivation. However, comparing health workers assigned to the 
treatment arm to those assigned to the control arm, the PBP program in Afghanistan did 
not have significant effect on external motivation. Several design and implementation 
issues, some of which are discussed above, offer explanation for these surprising 
findings. This study contributes to research on Results-Based Financing projects 
examining specifically the association between PBP and health worker motivation in 







Table 4.1 Selected characteristics by treatment group 
 
 
Note: The overall sample size is 805 observations. Data are mean (SD) or proportions, unless otherwise 
indicated.  All estimates are based on weighted data. Test statistics are adjusted for multi-stage stratified 









By type of facility
Sub-Centers 10.8 9.2 72
BHC 43.8 54.6 491
CHC 45.3 36.2 242
By managing agency 
MOPH, without support 3.4 2.8 38
MOPH, with support 59.7 58.9 488
NGO only 36.9 38.4 279
Health worker level
Gender (male) 52.5 57.1 464 0.18
Health worker type
Doctor 11.9 10.0 78
Nurse 23.4 25.1 197
Midwife 12.4 8.7 80
Community midwife 17.2 16.9 134
Vaccinator 27.3 29.4 231
CHW Supervisor 7.8 9.9 85
Duration of work in this facility
One year or less 32.3 26.3 237
2-3 yrs 27.4 31.7 242
4-5 yrs 12.9 15.7 115
6-10 yrs 23.0 19.9 172
More than 10 yrs 4.4 6.3 38
Modifiable characteristics
Facility level
Equipment functionality 84.0 (15.5) 83.9 (10.3) 805 0.34
Pharmaceuticals & vaccines availability 82.5 (14.4) 82.5 (14.4) 805 0.94
Infrastructure index 56.5 (26.0) 53.7 (28.6) 805 0.48
Health worker level
Supervisor visit within the past 30 days 90.1 83.5 699 0.04
Employee assessment in the past 12 months 79.5 84.2 658 0.20
Salary payment up-to-date 60.8 64.8 499 0.51
Salary increase in the past 12 months 35.0 32.1 279 0.56








Table 4.2 Selected characteristics by observed compliance group  
  
 
Note: The overall sample size is 427 observations as these estimates are restricted to treatment group only. 
Data are mean (SD) or proportions, unless otherwise indicated.  All estimates are based on weighted data. 
Test statistics are adjusted for multi-stage stratified cluster sampling using Taylor-linearized variance 









By type of facility
Sub-Centers 10.0 11.2 43
BHC 35.0 53.2 243
CHC 55.0 35.6 141
By managing agency 
MOPH, without support 0.6 6.3 22
MOPH, with support 53.2 65.8 256
NGO only 46.2 27.9 149
Health worker level
Gender (male) 46.4 58.9 244 0.03
Health worker type
Doctor 14.7 8.7 43
Nurse 22.0 25.2 104
Midwife 15.6 8.7 47
Community midwife 19.4 15.2 73
Vaccinator 22.5 32.6 116
CHW Supervisor 5.8 9.7 44
Duration of work in this facility
One year or less 34.2 30.2 134
2-3 yrs 22.4 32.6 121
4-5 yrs 13.3 12.6 56
6-10 yrs 26.4 19.9 98
More than 10 yrs 3.9 4.7 18
Modifiable characteristics
Facility level
Equipment functionality (mean, SD) 86.2 (10.5) 81.8 (19.8) 427 0.24
Pharmaceuticals & vaccines availability (mean, SD) 83.4 (11.2) 81.7 (17.5) 427 0.85
Infrastructure index (mean, SD) 54.3 (26.1) 58.5 (25.2) 427 0.35
Health worker level
Supervisor visit within the past 30 days 94.7 85.2 385 0.01
Employee assessment in the past 12 months 80.3 78.4 348 0.74
Salary payment up-to-date 59.0 63.3 263 0.55
Salary increase in the past 12 months 35.7 34.7 150 0.88








Table 4.3 Model fit statistics, ITT 
 
 
Note: The overall sample size for the models is 803 observations due to one observation missing values on 








Model Chi-sq df CFI TLI RMSEA RMSEA C.I.
Model A (trx) 274 95 0.93 0.91 0.05 [0.04, 0.06]
Model B (gender) 272 95 0.93 0.91 0.05 [0.04, 0.06]
Model C (type of health worker) 298 139 0.93 0.90 0.04 [0.03, 0.04]
Model D (facility type) 282 106 0.93 0.91 0.05 [0.04, 0.05]
Model E (management type) 277 106 0.93 0.90 0.05 [0.04, 0.05]




I work in this job because I have a chance to help 
other people through my work
0.66 0.04
intr3
I feel I should personally take the credit or blame for 
the results of my work on this job
0.58 0.04
intr7
I feel a very high degree of personal responsibility for 
the work I do on this job
0.68 0.05
intrj4 I work in this job to gain God’s grace 0.69 0.06
External regulation
extrg2 I work here because of opportunities for promotion 0.49 0.04
extrg3
I work in this facility because it has sufficient 
resources I need to do my job (medicine, equipment, 
infrastructure)
0.67 0.03
extrg4 I work here because it is located in a safe area 0.47 0.03
extrg6
I work here because it provides long term security for 
me
0.54 0.04
intr5 I work in this job because it allows me to use my skills 0.67 0.03
Introjected regulation
intrj1 I work here because it makes me feel important 0.73 0.04
intrj2








amot1 I frequently think of quitting this job 0.63 0.04
amot2 I sometimes feel my work here is meaningless 0.81 0.03









Identified regulation 0.01 0.08 0.92
External regulation 0.03 0.07 0.71
Introjected regulation -0.06 0.07 0.38
Amotivation -0.07 0.07 0.34
Coeff S.E. p-value
Identified regulation
Nurse -0.05 0.13 0.72
Midwife -0.24 0.17 0.16
Community MW 0.16 0.17 0.36
Vaccinators -0.16 0.13 0.21
CHW Supervisor -0.09 0.14 0.51
Male 0.09 0.10 0.36
External regulation
Nurse 0.24 0.10 0.02
Midwife 0.11 0.16 0.49
Community MW 0.28 0.14 0.04
Vaccinators 0.28 0.11 0.01
CHW Supervisor 0.34 0.12 0.01
Male -0.18 0.10 0.05
Introjected regulation
Nurse 0.17 0.11 0.12
Midwife 0.28 0.16 0.08
Community MW 0.28 0.14 0.04
Vaccinators 0.27 0.11 0.01
CHW Supervisor 0.35 0.13 0.01
Male -0.13 0.09 0.16
Amotivation
Nurse 0.10 0.11 0.37
Midwife 0.22 0.15 0.13
Community MW -0.08 0.14 0.54
Vaccinators 0.14 0.11 0.20
CHW Supervisor 0.27 0.12 0.02
Male -0.08 0.08 0.36
Model A (Treatment)




Table 4.6 CACE model with treatment and compliance only 
 
 
Note:  NC – non-compliers, reference class, their intercepts are fixed at 0.   
** statistical significance at 5% level. 
 
 
Table 4.7 CACE model with pretreatment covariates 
 
 
Note:  NC – non-compliers is reference class, their intercepts are fixed at 0.  






Identified External Introjected Amotivation 
Treatment -2.63** -1.40** -1.37** 0.39
Intercepts 2.71** 1.54** 1.59** -0.62








Identified External Introjected Amotivation 
Treatment -2.52** -1.29** -1.30** 0.45
Nurse -0.09 0.23 0.28 0.16
Midwife -0.60 0.27 0.63** 0.57**
Community MW 0.09 0.43** 0.60** -0.11
Vaccinator -0.32 0.31** 0.47** 0.28
CHW Supervisor -0.14 0.37** 0.57** 0.46**
Intercepts 2.60** 1.44** 1.51** -0.68
Final class proportions based on estimated 
posterior probabilities 







Table 4.8 Predictors of compliance status, CACE 
 
 
Table 4.9 Base salary levels and average PFP by type of health worker, 2011-2012 
 
Source:  MOPH, 2005; MOPH, 2011; MOPH administrative data. 
Note: In NSP 2005 salaries were expressed in US dollars. Conversion rate is 50 Afs=1 USD. 
 
 
Table 4.10 Base salary, allowances and the average PFP for midwives, 2012 
 
 
Source:  NSP 2011; MOPH administrative data. 
 
Beta S.E. OR p-value
BHC facility 0.04 0.41 1.04 0.93
CHC facility 0.63 0.41 1.88 0.12
MOPH with support 1.70 0.57 5.47 0.00
NGO only 1.89 0.59 6.59 0.00
Male -0.10 0.24 0.91 0.69
Nurse -0.22 0.29 0.80 0.44
Midwife 0.20 0.38 1.22 0.60
Community MW 0.08 0.36 1.08 0.83
Vaccinator -0.10 0.29 0.91 0.73
CHW Supervisor -0.18 0.35 0.84 0.61
Intercept C1 -2.24 0.70 0.00
Base salary Average PBP
% of base 
salary
Base salary Average PBP
% of base 
salary
Doctor 8,500 494 5.8 10,700 1,465 13.7
Nurse 5,500 494 9.0 6,900 1,465 21.2
Assistant nurse 4,500 494 11.0 5,700 1,465 25.7
Midwife 7,000 494 7.1 8,900 1,465 16.5
Community MW 6,250 494 7.9 6,300 1,465 23.3
Vaccinator 5,000 494 9.9 5,200 1,465 28.2










Base salary 8,900 13,350 17,800 26,700 31,150
Grade 1 province 8,900 13,350 17,800 26,700 31,150
Grade 2 province 9,782 14,232 18,682 27,582 32,032
Grade 3 province 10,663 15,113 19,563 28,463 32,913
Grade 4 province 11,545 15,995 20,445 29,345 33,795
PFP as % of salary
Grade 1 province 16.5 11.0 8.2 5.5 4.7
Grade 2 province 15.0 10.3 7.8 5.3 4.6
Grade 3 province 13.7 9.7 7.5 5.1 4.5




Figure 4.1 NHSPA 2012-2013 sampling for health worker questionnaires  
 
Note: * In provinces with less than 25 facilities, all facilities have been surveyed.  In Kandahar, where only 
eight facilities were selected for RBF pilot, only eight facilities were included in RBF sample. In the 
following RBF pilot provinces – Parwan, Takhar, Kunduz & Saripul – more than 25 facilities per province 










5 Chapter 5: Impact of performance-based payments on quality of 
care in Afghanistan (Paper 3) 
 
Abstract 
Background: Progress towards achieving Millennium Development Goals on maternal 
and child health has been slow.   Performance-based payments for health care providers 
showed promise as a strategy for increasing utilization and quality of health services for 
women and children. This study examines the effect of performance-based payments on 
quality of care in Afghanistan.  
 
Method: In 11 provinces of Afghanistan, 442 facilities were randomly assigned to an 
intervention or a comparison arm. Because of the study design, masking of the 
participants was not feasible. The study is based on a cross-sectional survey of 2,180 
patients and 255 health workers from 233 facilities conducted 23 months after the start of 
the intervention. The outcome, quality of care, was measured using a standardized 
checklist. The list consisted of 16 items designed to measure four areas of clinical quality 
of care:  patient history, physical examination, patient counseling, and time spent with 
patient. The main approach to the analysis of the data was a linear mixed effects model 
using maximum likelihood estimator. In addition to model-based standard errors, robust 
standard errors using the sandwich estimator were obtained as part of the process of 






Results: Based on the likelihood ratio test, it was determined that there was insufficient 
evidence to justify a three-level model, thus a two-level model with a random intercept 
for each health worker was fit to the data.   The model with no covariates showed that 
55% of total variation in quality of care was attributable to differences across health 
workers, while 45% of the variation in the outcome was due to within health worker 
differences. Comparing patients in the treatment group to patients in the control group, 
the expected change in z-score for quality of care was 0.23 (p-value<0.05). The decrease 
in level-2 variance provided further evidence that treatment explained some of the 
variation in the outcome observed between health workers. Other covariates were added 
to the model. Together, they explained 15% of the total variance in quality of care, while 
the proportion of level-2 variance explained by the covariates was 26%.   
 
Conclusion:  The study demonstrated that the PBP program had a significant positive 
effect on quality of care. Moreover, it explained some of the observed heterogeneity in 
quality of care between health workers. At the same time, the study showed that good 
management practices such as paying salaries on time and ensuring presence of proper 
equipment are important predictors of quality of care. Moreover, they explain a higher 
proportion of total variance in observed quality of care than PBP. Also, the study found a 
significant positive association between identified motivation and quality of care, holding 
treatment constant. However, further research linking specific organizational factors that 
promote identified motivation such as ability of staff to voice their opinions and 




between external motivation and quality of care found in this study needs to be explored 






Despite significant amounts of development assistance for health and education provided 
to Afghanistan over the past decade, it still has some of the world’s highest maternal 
mortality ratios and child mortality rates. According to The State of the World’s Children 
2012 report [7], among 193 countries ranked from highest to lowest, Afghanistan is 
ranked number eleven in under-five mortality rate. It was estimated that in 2010 it had 
149 deaths among children less than 5 years of age per 1000 live births compared to 
Iceland that had 2 [7]. According to the systematic analysis of progress towards 
Millennium Development Goal 5 (MDG 5) by Hogan et al [3], in 2008, Afghanistan had 
the highest maternal mortality ratio (MMR) of 1,575 maternal deaths per 100 000 live 
births (uncertainty interval 594–3396), which was about 394 times higher than Italy, the 
country with the lowest MMR of 4 (3–5).  It was also one of the countries with the 
slowest yearly rate of decline in MMR [3]. Thus, the government and development 
partners were in search of new interventions to improve access and quality of maternal 
and child health services in Afghanistan.  
 
In the summer of 2010, Afghanistan launched an RBF project in purposefully selected 11 
of its 34 provinces (for details on RBF design see Chapter 1 and [68]). The project aimed 
"to impact MDGs 4 and 5 by improving coverage of maternal and child health services 
within the existing health system and without creating unnecessary parallel processes" 
[10]. Its primary objective was "to increase key maternal and child health outputs, to 
improve quality of health services and to ensure higher patient satisfaction with health 




of pay-for-performance would improve health worker motivation and satisfaction, which 
in turn would lead to better performance. 
 
Performance-based payments for health care providers showed promise as growing 
evidence from countries such as Rwanda and Haiti seemed to suggest its effectiveness in 
increasing utilization and quality of health services for women and children [8, 9]. 
Moreover, this approach seemed to be supported by theory. According to the World Bank 
Development Report, Making Services Work for Poor People, weak incentives for 
performance were viewed as one of the key reasons why health services failed the poor. 
PBP were thought to be one of the mechanisms of increasing provider accountability to 
their patients or rather clients, and thus, improving quality of health care services for 
them [2]. According to Fritsche and Vergeer [163], “Performance-based financing is a 
health systems approach with an orientation on results defined as quantity and quality of 
service outputs. This approach entails making health facilities autonomous agencies that 
work for the benefit of health related goals and their staff.” This view of PBP as a 
mechanism for improving responsiveness of health providers to the needs of their clients, 
creating greater accountability for results, and empowering consumers is also described 
in Meessen et al [8]. 
 
However, a review of the literature by Eldridge and Palmer [41] did not find strong 
evidence base for the success of PBP programs in developing countries. This view is 
supported by a more recent review by the Cochrane Collaboration of PBP in low- and 




of PBP and findings vary in direction as well as magnitude of change [62].   The aim of 
this paper therefore, is to assess quality of care in health facilities allocated to 
performance-based payments as compared to health facilities allocated to control in 
Afghanistan. 
 
5.1.1 Research questions 
The study aims to answer the following research questions: 
3. What is the effect of PBP on clinical quality of care?  
a. Is there substantial heterogeneity in quality of care between facilities and 
health workers that is unexplained by treatment?  
b. Do facility and health worker characteristics other than PBP explain part 
of the observed variation in quality of care across facilities and health 
workers?  
c. Is there evidence of effect modification of the effect of treatment by 
facility and health worker characteristics?  
4. Do motivation types have an effect on quality of care and explain part of the 
observed variation between health workers, after accounting for treatment effect?  
5. Do patient level characteristics explain some of the observed variation in quality 







5.2.1 Data source 
The data for this study was derived from the cross-sectional health facility survey for the 
annual National Health Services Performance Assessment (NHSPA) implemented in 
Afghanistan over the period of nine months between 2012 and 2013.  The survey was 
based on a multi-stage stratified probability sampling approach where primary sampling 
unit was a health facility (Figure 5.1):  
1. Stratification by province, 
2. Stratification by type of health facility within each province, 
3. Selection of facilities,  
4. Selection of individual health workers and selection of patients.  
 
Individual health workers and patients were secondary sampling units. Within each 
facility four health workers classified as clinical staff (doctors, nurses, assistant doctors, 
midwives, community midwives, and vaccinators) present at the day of the survey were 
randomly selected for the survey. If fewer than four clinical staff were present at the 
facility, then other facility staff members, including community health supervisors, 
pharmacists, cleaners and others, were interviewed for the survey.  However, all non-






Patients were selected independently of health workers. Within each sampled facility, 
patients were stratified by age group (less than five years of age and five years of age or 
older) and selected based on a systematic random sampling approach as described below:  
 If less than 10 new patients were expected in a day in each age stratum, then each 
eligible patient was selected until 5 observations of consultations involving 
patients in that age stratum were completed; 
 If 11 to 15 new patients were expected in a day in each age stratum, then every 
second eligible patient was selected; 
 If 16 to 20 new patients were expected in a day in each age stratum, then every 
third eligible patient was selected; 
 If more than 20 new patients were expected in a day in each age stratum, then 
every fourth eligible patient was selected. 
 
This resulted in a sample of 233 health facilities with 255 health workers, and 2,180 
patients. On average, there are 1.1 health workers per facility, 8.5 patients per health 






5.2.2 Variables construction 
Outcome variables 
Quality of care 
A composite index of quality of care was developed using 16 items designed to measure 
four areas of clinical quality of care:  (i) Patient history, (ii) Physical examination, (iii) 
Patient counseling or communication, and (iv) Time spent with patient. The items reflect 
the MOPH standards of care as outlined in the Guidelines for the Basic Package of 
Health Services (BPHS) [66].  They have been used as part of the NHSPA since 2004 
[40]. Moreover, this index was used in the study by Hansen et al assessing quality of care 
in Afghanistan [35], although several items have been revised in 2011 at the request of 
the MOPH as part of the general revision of the NHSPA instruments (see [40] for more 
details). 
 
The items were measured through observations of patient-provider interactions by a 
trained observer with a medical degree (forms F1 and F2). Observers were given a 
standardized checklist with responses coded as “Yes” if a health worker performed a 
particular action and “No” otherwise. Time spent with patient was estimated as the 
difference between the time (in hours and minutes) the consultation started and the time it 
ended. The observer was also asked to record separately the duration of the consultation 
and this was used as a check for the estimated time.  
 
The items were grouped into three sub-components, measuring (a) patient history and 




items, and (c) time spent with patient consisting of one item. Time spent with patient was 
made into a binary variable. It was coded as 1 if the provider spent 10 minutes or more 
with the patient and 0 otherwise. This cut-off was estimated as the minimum time needed 
to complete a history, physical examination, diagnosis and provide counseling for a child 
with a common respiratory or gastrointestinal complaints [167]. These sub-components 
are used to estimate separate indicators in the Balanced Scorecards (BSC) for 
performance of health facilities in Afghanistan [40]. Following Hansen [35], the 
composite index of quality of care was constructed by averaging the scores on these three 
sub-components with each sub-component given an equal weight. The composite index 
was standardized at grand mean to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one 
(z-score).  
 
Predictor variables  
Treatment  
This is the main predictor variable that is measured at a cluster (facility) level. It is a 
binary variable based on a random allocation of facilities to either treatment or control at 
the start of the RBF program. Facilities were assigned to either treatment (coded as 1) or 
control (coded as 0) based on the administrative data provided by MOPH.  
 
Facility type 
Different types of facilities differ in staffing norms, infrastructure, services that they are 
mandated to perform and size of the catchment population [32]. Thus, this is a good 




type of health facility included in RBF. Each SC serves about 3,000 – 7,000 people. It 
should have 1 male nurse and 1 female community midwife [32]. BHC has a catchment 
area of 15,000 – 30,000 people and has the following staffing norms: 1 community health 
supervisor, 2 vaccinators, 1 male nurse, 1 community midwife, 1 general physician, 
preferably female [32]. CHC has a catchment area of 30,000 – 60,000 people and has the 
following staffing norms: 1 community health supervisor, 2 vaccinators, 1 male nurse, 1 
female nurse, 2 community midwives, 1 male general physician, 1 female general 
physician, 1 laboratory technician, 1 pharmacy technician, and one (male or female) 
psychosocial counselor [32]. CHC provides specialized outpatient care and basic 
inpatient care. Based on the original categorical variable, dummy variables were created 
for the analysis where SC was used as a reference group.  This variable came from the 
facility form F7. 
 
Management type 
There are three main types of management of health facilities in Afghanistan: (1) MOPH 
only, (2) MOPH with institutional support, and (3) NGOs only. The latter is further sub-
divided by type of contracting which is not one of the study variables here. Facilities run 
by MOPH only, MOPH with support, and NGOs only differ in management structure, 
source of funding, and its levels [33].  While there are varying degrees of managerial 
autonomy within the third group, facilities in this group have the highest level of 
independence when compared to the other two groups [34]. Thus, it is an important 
variable containing information on many aspects of facility management – such as 




things like staffing, system of rewards, infrastructure – that were not otherwise measured 
through this survey. This variable came from the facility form F7. 
 
Other health facility characteristics  
The equipment functionality index consists of 20 items for BHCs and SCs and 23 items 
for CHCs.  It includes items such as children’s scales, sterilizer, stethoscope and others 
that are mandated by the BPHS Guidelines[66]. The composition of the index was based 
on the methodology provided in the BSC used in Afghanistan for evaluation of health 
system performance since 2004 [40]. An item is rated as 1 if it is available and is in 
working condition, and 0 otherwise. Following this, the scores for each item were added 
together and divided by the total number of items (20 for BHCs and SCs and 23 for 
CHCs). The variable was standardized as a z-score at a grand mean. Due to its highly 
negatively skewed distribution it was transformed (original^3) prior to testing of 
differences in means between the two treatment groups [103].  The index was measured 
at the facility level. 
 
The vaccines and pharmaceuticals availability index consists of 31 items that are 
considered to be the essential medicines and vaccine that must be available at all BPHS 
facilities. Similar to the equipment functionality index it was based on the methodology 
provided in the BSC revised by the national technical working group led by MOPH [40]. 
The item is rated as 1 if it has been continuously available for the past 30 days, and 0 
otherwise. The variable was standardized as a z-score at grand mean. Due to its highly 




differences in means between the two treatment groups [103].  The index was measured 
at the facility level.  
 
This index consists of nine items that describe presence and condition of basic 
infrastructure in the facility, such as heat, electricity, water source, windows etc.  The 
original index used in the BSC [40]  was composed of ten items. However, following the 
same methodology as in the previous Chapter presence and condition of exterior walls 
was removed from the index. This particular item seemed to indicate less about the 
quality of services at facilities than items such as reliable electricity and water supply, or 
presence of interior walls and windows, and it had high proportion of missing values [4]. 
The item is rated as 1 if is present and few or no repairs are needed, and 0 otherwise. The 
variable was standardized as a z-score at a grand mean.  It was approximately normally 
distributed. 
 
Health worker type and gender 
A self-administered health worker questionnaire contained questions on basic health 
worker characteristics (form F5), including gender and type of health worker. Gender is a 
binary variable, where 1 means male. Health worker type is a categorical variable. Health 
workers were asked to mark one of the following categories: doctor, nurse, midwife, 
community midwife, CHW supervisor, vaccinator, or other. The last category included 
administrator, laboratory technicians, pharmacists, guards, cleaners, and other non-
clinical staff. These were excluded from the current study. The categorical variable was 




Health worker motivation types 
Health worker motivation types are measured through four factor scores reflecting multi-
dimensional nature of motivation. As a latent variable, motivation was measured through 
a self-administered 15-item scale (form F5). As described in Chapter 3 in detail, using 
exploratory factor analysis followed by the confirmatory factor analysis, the factorial 
structure of the scale was identified. The four factors of the scale are: (1) identified 
motivation consisting of four items, (2) external regulation consisting of five items, (3) 
introjected regulation consisting of three items, and (4) amotivation consisting of three 
items (see Chapter 3 for definitions of these factors and details of the scale). Given that 
responses were measured on ordinal scale, the model was fit to a polychoric correlation 
matrix using the method of robust weighted least squares [104].  As recommended by 
Skrondal [168] and using the procedures described in MPlus Guide [104, 169] for 
categorical variables with the weighted least squares estimator, factor scores were 
estimated as the maximum of the posterior distribution of the factor, or the Maximum A 
Posteriori (MAP) method (see [168, 170, 171] for discussion of different methods for 
estimating factor scores and their use in further analysis in regression models). The 
estimated factor scores are measured on a continuous scale. To help with interpretation of 
the slope and given that the primary relationship of interest in this paper is between level-
2 variable (treatment) and level-1 (outcome) [172], the factor scores, similar to other 






Other health worker level variables 
Three other health worker level variables were tested as predictors of the quality of care. 
These are (i) salary payment up-to-date, (ii) knowledge score, (iii) number of training 
days outside of the facility. These variables are considered to be modifiable in that they 
could have been influenced by PBP program (treatment variable) and hence, theoretically 
should not act as confounding variables. However, the design of this particular study did 
not include increased training for health workers or particular actions targeting regular 
salary payment processes.  
 
Health workers were asked whether their salary payments were up-to-date (form F5). The 
answers were coded as “Yes” and “No”. Based on the response to this question a binary 
variable was created where one means “Yes”, i.e. there were no delays in salary 
payments. Health worker knowledge score was based on a knowledge test questions 
designed as part of the NHSPA for the BSC [40]. The number of questions and their level 
of difficulty depended on health worker type and ranged from thirty six for doctors and 
nurses to twelve for CHW supervisors. As part of the health worker questionnaire, health 
workers were also asked about technical training they received over the past 12 months 
outside of the health facility. The response was a continuous variable reflecting the total 
number of training days. It had high positive skew and was transformed through the 






Patient age and gender 
As the performance indicators under the RBF scheme targeted services for women and 
children under five years of age, it seemed reasonable to assume that quality of care may 
depend on patient’s age and gender. Both variables were recorded during the patient-
provider observations. Gender is a binary variable, where one means male. Patient’s age 
was a continuous variable that was transformed into a binary variable where one means 
five years of age or older. It was recorded only for those patients whose age was asked by 
the provider. Thus, there were 85 observations with missing age variable. However, since 
two different forms (F1 and F3) were used for patients less than five and those five years 
of age and older, it was assumed that patients whose observations were recorded in F1 
were less than five years of age and those whose observations were recorded in F3 were 
five years of age or older. In addition, age was checked against the information given by 
patients and their caretakers in exit interviews recorded in forms F2 and F4.   
 
5.3 Analysis 
5.3.1 Missing data 
With the exception of the knowledge score questions, there were very few missing values 
for the variables used in the study (<5%). None of the 16 items in the quality of care 
index had more than 1.7% of missing values. Proportion of missing values in any of the 
items of the index was 3.4%. Given the small proportion of missingness no imputations 





For health worker knowledge score, out of 75 doctors, nine had a missing value on at 
least one of the 36 questions. Out of 153 nurses, 29 had a missing value on at least one of 
the 36 questions. Out of twelve midwives, two had a missing value on at least one of the 
twenty seven questions. Out thirteen community midwives, two had a missing value on at 
least one of the twenty seven questions. While overall there were few missing values for 
each item, because the score consisted of the average of a large set of items (ranging from 
thirty six for doctors and nurses to twelve for CHW supervisors), a missing value on even 
one question would result in listwise deletion of all the other responses. This would lead 
to a high proportion of missing values for the score as a whole. Thus, if a health worker 
did not respond to a particular question, it was assumed that she did not know the answer 
and it was coded as zero. As the answer choices did not have “Don’t know” option, it 
seemed reasonable to assume that health workers who skipped particular questions could 
not respond to them.  
 
However, as part of the sensitivity analysis, two additional methods were used for 
estimating models with the knowledge test score: (i) multiple imputation technique, 
accounting for clustering of the data and using procedures described in Hamilton [103], 
and (ii) complete case analysis, i.e. using only those observations that had no missing 
values for any of the items of the knowledge test. Complete case analysis was likely to 
provide biased results as it appeared that missingness was related to health worker type 
(Table 5.1). Also, it seemed to be unequally distributed between males and females 
(13.6% and 27.4%, respectively). Thus it was not missing completely at random 




5.3.2 Analysis approach 
The main approach to the analysis of the data was a linear mixed effects model using 
maximum likelihood estimator.  Restricted ML (REML) estimator was used to get 
unbiased variance estimates, which were compared to MLE results. As expected with 
large samples, MLE and REML provided very similar estimates. In addition to model-
based standard errors robust standard errors using the sandwich estimator were obtained 
as part of the process of residual diagnostics. As described earlier, the data had three 
levels: facility (level-3), health worker (level-2), and patient (level-1). However, there 
were only 1.1 health workers per facility. Thus, it was likely that clustering at the facility 
level was insignificant, which would reduce the three-level data to a two-level data. This 
was tested using likelihood ratio test, as described in detail further in the section. The 
equations for the models summarized below assume a two-level data where j denotes 
level-2 observations (health worker or facility) and i denotes level-1 observations 
(patients):  
 
                                                                                (1) 
Where        is the expected quality of care z-score for patient i in a facility j,     is the 
random deviation of a facility j’s mean measurement from the overall mean  , which is 
also an average z-score for quality of care for a typical facility, and     is level-1 residual. 
 
                                                                      (2) 
Where    is the expected z-score for quality of care for patients from a typical facility 




is the expected change in z-score for quality of care for patients in treatment arm as 
compared to patients in the control arm, and     is the level-1 residual.  
 
                                                          (3) 
Where    is the expected z-score for quality of care for female patients from a typical 
facility (i.e. facility with    =0) from the control arm,      is the expected change in z-
score for quality of care for patients in treatment arm as compared to patients in the 
control arm, controlling for other covariates,     is a vector of level-2 potential 
confounding variables, and           vector of level-1 potential confounding variables, 
including gender (where male=1). Continuous level-1 covariates are centered at the grand 
mean as the main question of interest is the effect of a level-2 dummy variable 
(treatment), controlling for individual differences on level-1 covariates [172].  
 
Key model assumptions: 
1.                 
This assumption implies that level-1 residuals have a mean of zero, given the 
covariates and the random intercept (level-1 exogeneity).  
2.            
This assumption implies that there is no correlation between covariates and the 
random intercept (level-2 exogeneity).  
3.                                   
It is assumed that variances of level-1 residuals and random intercepts are 




In general in randomized controlled trials there is no problem of endogeneity due to 
omitted covariates [159].  Assumption 2 where endogeneity at cluster-level could be due 
to covariates that have different within-effects as compared to the between-effects was 
examined using Hausman’s endogeneity test as described further below. Assumption 3 
was examined using residual diagnostics tools the details of which are described further 
in this section.  
 
First, all study variables were checked for consistency. Dataset containing information on 
patient-provider observations were merged on facility ID and unique health worker 
tracking number. Health worker gender and type (e.g. doctor) were compared between 
two datasets to ensure that health workers that merged based on their tracking numbers 
were indeed the same health workers. Where there were differences in either gender or 
health worker type variable between the two datasets, even though they merged based on 
health worker tracking number, further investigation was conducted by for example, 
comparing this information to facility records (form F7) that provides a list of its 
registered staff by type and gender. Health worker gender values were corrected based on 
health worker type – all midwives and community midwives were coded as females 
because according to BPHS Guidelines these positions must be filled by female staff 
[66]. After these corrections, only those health workers that merged, had the same gender 
and were coded as the same type were kept in the final dataset. 
 
All categorical variables were examined using frequency distribution tables and bar 




and minimum values) were used to examine continuous variables. Stem-and-leaf plots, 
histograms and box plots were used to do visual checks and examine the symmetry, 
center, spread and outliers for continuous variables. Outliers were first checked using box 
plots and more formally with “lv” function in STATA [103]. Values above or below the 
inner fences are considered to be mild outliers and values above or below the outer fences 
are considered to be severe outliers [103]. 
 
Histograms, box plots and scatter plots were used to examine distribution of quality of 
care index by the following variables: (a) treatment group, (b) type of facility, (c) 
management type, (d) three facility-level indices of structural quality (equipment, 
pharmaceuticals and vaccine availability, and infrastructure), (e) health worker gender, 
(f) health worker type, (g) number of training days, (h) knowledge score, (i) up-to-date 
salary payment, and (j) four factor scores of motivation.  A graph of cluster means and 
their corresponding 95% CI was used to examine the heterogeneity in quality of care 
index (QoC) across clusters as compared to within clusters.  
 
Following the exploratory data analysis, selected characteristics of the sample were 
examined by treatment allocation. Means and standard deviations were estimated for 
continuous variables, while for binary and categorical variables estimates of proportions 
were used.  All estimates were weighted to account for unequal probability of selection as 
it is recommended for descriptive analysis of population characteristics [143]. Weights 




stage stratified cluster sampling using Taylor-linearized variance estimation using the 
survey commands in STATA [105].  
 
These variables were divided into two parts: structural or fixed and modifiable 
characteristics. The so called fixed characteristics were unlikely to be affected by PBP, 
while variables classified as modifiable could have changed as the result of treatment. If 
that was the case, controlling for them could incorrectly diminish the effect of treatment. 
For example, if facilities allocated to treatment invested more into training their health 
workers or used part of the funds for improving availability of drugs, including them in 
the model with treatment would be incorrect. However, it appeared that there were no 
systematic efforts on the part of facilities in PBP group to increase training of their staff, 
and the design of the project did not envision the use of PBP for facility-level 
expenditures.  
 
Motivation factors, unlike other modifiable characteristics, were targeted by the 
intervention: It was hypothesized that PBP would increase health worker motivation. 
However, as described in the previous chapter, based on the results of the intention-to-
treat analysis it appeared that treatment had a very small and statistically not significant 
effect on motivation factors. Also, as Table 5.2 shows, the estimated mean factor scores 
between the two treatment groups were practically identical. Thus, these variables were 
explored to see if they could explain the observed heterogeneity in the outcome that 





A three-level intercept only model was fit with health facility as level-3, health worker as 
level-2, and outcome as level-1variables. However, given the small number of health 
workers per facility (range 1 to 2, average 1.1) it seemed that a two-level model could be 
more appropriate with clustering at either a facility or a health worker level only. Thus, a 
two-level intercept only model was fit with facility as level-2 and outcome as level-1 
variables. Next, a two-level intercept only model was fit with health worker as level-2 
and outcome as level-1 variables. Each two-level model was compared to the three-level 
model using the likelihood ratio test [159]. In addition, based on the results of a three-
level model the variance at level-3 was compared with variance at level-2.  
 
Following this, treatment variable was added to the null model. Magnitude of the 
coefficient and its statistical significance (p<0.05) were examined. Also, coefficient of 
determination (R
2
) was estimated to determine if the treatment variable contributed to the 
proportional reduction in prediction error variance [159]. Other variables were added 
separately to the model to determine whether the effect of treatment on quality of care 
was confounded by other variables. A final full model that included all statistically 
significant variables from previous smaller models was fit to the data. Likelihood ratio 
tests were conducted to compare it with smaller models. Coefficient of determination was 
estimated comparing the full model to the model containing only the treatment variable.   
 
Residual diagnostics of the fitted models was conducted to check on the normality 
assumption for the random intercept and level-1 residuals. According to Rabe-Hesketh 




problems, severe skewness and outliers signal model misspecification. In cases where 
histograms of predicted standardized level-1 and level-2 residuals did not appear to be 
approximately normal, additional check of the model results was done using the 
sandwich estimator to obtain robust standard errors [159]. Finally, Durbin-Wu-
Hausman’s test or Hausman’s endogeneity test was used to compare random-intercept 
model with the fixed effects model to see if there was strong evidence for model 
misspecification, such as correlation of the random intercept with any of the covariates 
(level-2 endogeneity) [159, 173].  
 
5.4 Results  
5.4.1 Study population 
A total of 2,180 patients that were seen by 255 health workers from 233 facilities 
(clusters) in 11 RBF pilot provinces were observed in this study. Of the 2,180 patients, 
1,143 (52.4%) were from 123 facilities allocated to the treatment arm, and 1,037 patients 
(47.6%) were from 110 facilities that were part of the control arm (Table 5.2). Overall, 
there were no significant differences in facility characteristics (p-value>0.05). In 
treatment arm there was a higher proportion of CHCs (24.0% compared to 20.8%), while 
in control arm there was a higher proportion of BHCs (58.2% compared to 49.1%). But 
these differences were not statistically significant. Distribution by management type was 
similar between the two arms of the study. There were also no significant differences 
between the two groups in facility equipment, infrastructure and drug availability indices 





Distribution by type of health worker as well as other health worker characteristics was 
also similar in two groups. In both groups, most of the patients were seen by male health 
workers (87.4% and 90.1% in treatment and control group respectively), reflecting the 
fact that most patients in the sample were seen either by a doctor or a nurse who are 
typically male in Afghanistan. As Table 5.2 shows in both treatment and control group, 
more than 90% of observations came from either a doctor or a nurse. There were no 
differences between treatment and control group in mean factor scores for the four factors 
representing four types of motivation. Mean number of technical training days outside of 
one’s health facility and the knowledge score were practically the same in both arms. 
Also, there were no significant differences in proportion of health workers whose salaries 
were paid up-to-date and who had a salary increase in the past 12 months. Proportion of 
patients less than 5 years of age was similar between the two groups, which was to be 
expected given the sampling scheme. However, there was a significant difference in 
gender distribution among patients (p-value<0.10). There was a slightly higher proportion 
of male patients seen in the control group (47.5%) as compared to the treatment group 
(43.1%).  
 
5.4.2 Exploratory data analysis of the outcome 
The data was unbalanced: the number of patients per facility ranged from 1 to 11 with an 
average of 9 patients. Given that the number of health workers per facility was 1.1 on 
average, number of patients within each health worker also ranged from 1 to 11 patients 
with an average of 8.5. As Figure 5.2 shows based on cluster-level average scores for 




(QoC) as compared to facilities in the control arm.  Figure 9.1 (Appendix C) suggests that 
there is substantial between- as well as within-facility heterogeneity of treatment effect 
on QoC score. As histograms in Figure 5.3 show, it appeared that outcome was 
approximately normally distributed. The box plots appeared to suggest that there could be 
some outliers, particularly in the control group (Appendix C, Figure 9.2). The formal 
check using “lv” function in STATA showed there were 43 that were considered to be 
severe outliers (2.0%). They came from 19 facilities and were approximately equally 
distributed between treatment and control arm.  
 
Next, outcome was examined by different facility, patient and health worker 
characteristics. As Figure 9.3 (Appendix C) shows, based on cluster-level average scores 
for QoC, it appeared that facility type affects quality of care: SCs appeared to have the 
lowest quality of care while CHCs appeared to have the highest, although the difference 
between BHCs and CHCs did not appear to be large. It also seemed that type of 
management may affect QoC (Appendix C, Figure 9.4): Facilities managed by MOPH 
only seemed to have higher quality of care among the three groups. There appeared to be 
positive association between the equipment functionality index and QoC (Appendix C, 
Figure 9.5). However, these are based on cluster-level means where the number of 
observations per cluster is not accounted for.  
 
It appeared that being a male health worker was positively associated with QoC 
(Appendix C, Figure 9.6). Also, doctors as compared to other types of providers appeared 




among the doctors. It should be noted here that there are only two CHW supervisors in 
this sample with 20 patient observations (Appendix C, Figure 9.7). Health worker 
knowledge score and number of training days did not appear to be associated with quality 
of care (Appendix C, Figure 9.8).  
 
Based on the scatter plots, it appeared that identified motivation had a positive 
association with QoC, perhaps somewhat curvilinear (Appendix C, Figure 9.9). As 
expected, it also seemed that amotivation had a negative association with QoC. There 
were less clear patterns of relationship between (i) QoC and external regulation, and (ii) 
QoC and introjected regulation. Given that the factor scores appeared to be highly 
linearly related (Appendix C, Figure 9.9), they could result in multicollinearity, which 
would make the regression model estimates unstable and lead to inflation of the standard 
errors [155]. The test for multicollinearity using ‘vif’ command in STATA resulted in 
high VIF and tolerance (1/VIF) values, where identified and introjected motivation types 
had the highest values.   
 
Based on average score for facility quality of care, being a female patient seemed to be 
associated with slightly higher QoC. However, as Figure 9.10 (Appendix C) shows there 
was a large variation within facilities for both male and female patients in quality of care, 






5.4.3 Null and treatment only model 
The results of the two null models are provided in Table 5.3. The first model is a three-
level model that reflects the original structure of the data where facilities are level-3, 
health workers are level-2 and patients are level-1 observations. As the Table shows the 
proportion of total variation in QoC that is attributable to differences across facilities 
relative to differences across health workers and patients within facilities is 9.0% only. 
Proportion of total variation in the outcome that is attributable to differences across 
health workers is 46%. Together they account for 55% of the variation in QoC, which 
means that 45% of the variation is due to within facility and health worker differences.  
 
Following this, two different two-level models were fit to the data. First facilities were 
treated as level-2 observations (not shown in here), next health workers were treated as 
level-2 observations while nesting within facilities was ignored (Table 5.3). Comparing 
via likelihood ratio test the three-level model to the two-level model with a random 
intercept for facility, there was sufficient evidence to indicate that the variance in QoC 
among health workers in the same facility was significantly different from zero. 
Comparing the three-level model to the two-level model with a random intercept for a 
health worker, there was insufficient evidence in favor of positive variance in QoC 
among health facilities.  Thus, adding ψ(3) did not result in improved model fit once the 
clustering at health worker level was taken into account. Given these results, for the 
subsequent analyses a two-level model was used with health workers at level-2 and 





The treatment variable (level-2) was added to the model. As Table 5.4 shows, among 
patients in control arm facilities QoC z-scores would fall within +/- 2*√0.57 of the mean, 
i.e. between -1.59 and 1.44. Comparing patients in treatment group to patients in the 
control the expected change in z-score for QoC was 0.23 (p-value<0.05). The decrease in 
level-2 variance provided further evidence that treatment explained some of the variation 
in QoC observed between health workers. However, a large portion of between health 
worker variance was left unexplained. Thus, models with other covariates that could 
explain further the observed variance in quality between as well as within health workers 
were explored. 
 
5.4.4 Other explanatory variables 
Additional explanatory variables were selected based on the results of the EDA described 
earlier. Adding a health worker type changed the magnitude of treatment coefficient very 
little (0.21 as compared to 0.23), indicating that there was no confounding by type of 
health worker of the treatment-quality of care association, which would be expected 
given randomization. However, type of health worker appeared to have statistically 
significant and strong association with QoC, controlling for treatment. Compared to 
doctors, other types of health workers (nurses, midwives and community midwives) were 
associated with a lower quality of care (p-value<0.05). The finding confirms the 
observation made during the EDA where cluster-level quality of care scores appeared to 
be observably higher among doctors as compared to other health worker types. Also, the 




variance. Adding this variable to the treatment only model resulted in decrease of the 
level-2 variance from 0.57 to 0.51.  
 
Controlling for treatment, health worker gender did not seem to have a strong association 
with QoC as indicated by the small statistically insignificant coefficient. Also, there was 
no change in level-2 variance between the model with treatment only and a model 
containing gender, in addition to treatment, as a predictor. Having up-to-date salary 
payment appeared to be a strong and significant predictor of QoC, controlling for 
treatment. Comparing patients of health workers who reported timely payment of salaries 
to patients of health workers who reported delays in their salaries, the expected change in 
z-score for QoC was 0.49 (p-value<0.05), which is more than twice the size of the effect 
of treatment. There was practically no change in the treatment coefficient (0.24 as 
compared to 0.23). Timely payment of salaries also seemed to explain part of the 
observed level-2 variance in the outcome, which decreased from 0.57 from treatment-
only model to 0.52. Timely payment of salaries may be an indicator of the overall quality 
of facility management. There was no statistically significant association between 
knowledge score and quality of care. These results were held with different methods of 
handling the missingness in knowledge test items (Table 5.5).  
 
Controlling for treatment, it appeared that factor score for identified regulation (factor 1) 
was statistically significantly associated with quality of care (Table 5.4). The expected 
increase in QoC z-score was 0.14 per standard deviation increase in identified motivation 




slightly, in this model as compared to the model with treatment only (0.57 as compared to 
0.55). As expected, the coefficient on treatment remained unchanged, indicating that 
QoC-treatment association was not confounded by motivation. Holding treatment 
constant, amotivation had a small but significant negative association with QoC (β=-0.16, 
p-value<0.05). Given the high correlation between the two motivation factor scores, they 
became statistically not significant once both of them were added to the same model. 
Moreover, this larger model neither had a significantly better fit nor explained more 
variance in the outcome. There was no association between external regulation and 
quality of care, holding treatment constant. The same applied to introjected regulation. 
 
Controlling for treatment, type of health facility, specifically comparing patients in SCs 
to patients in CHCs, seemed to be a strong and significant predictor of quality of care 
(β=0.55, p-value<0.05). There was also some decrease in ψ estimate (0.54), suggesting 
further that type of health facility explained some of the observed variance in quality of 
care. Unlike type of facility, management type did not appear to be a significant predictor 
of quality of care. There was statistically significant association between equipment 
functionality index and quality of care (β=0.23, p-value<0.05). Equipment functionality 
index also seemed to explain part of the observed level-2 variance in the outcome, which 
decreased from 0.57 from treatment-only model to 0.52. 
 
A model with treatment, controlling for type of health facility, equipment functionality 
index, identified motivation, up-to-date salary payment, and health worker type is shown 




model. Also, the coefficient for identified motivation decreased and became marginally 
significant (p-value=0.05). Comparing the two-level null model with this model, the 
between health worker variance declined from 0.58 to 0.43. The level-1 variance 
remained at the same level (0.47). Together these covariates explained 15% of the total 
variance in quality of care, while the proportion of level-2 variance explained by the 
covariates was 26%.   
 
Next, level-1 covariates on patient age and gender were added separately to the model 
above. As expected there was small but significant effect of patient’s age on quality of 
care.  There was a negative association between a binary variable for age and quality of 
care z-score (β= -0.10, p-value<0.05), suggesting that controlling for other variables, 
health workers provided better care for those less than five years of age which was one of 
the target groups for PBP. There was also a small but significant association between 
gender and quality of care. Comparing male to female patients, the expected change in z-
score for quality of care was 0.09 (p-value<0.05), holding treatment and other facility and 
health worker variables constant. Although based on the likelihood ratio test the model 
with patient level covariates fit the data significantly better than the model with only 
facility and health worker characteristics, the total variance in quality of care explained 
by the model remained at 15%. 
 
The final model (Model L) showed that there was no confounding of the effect of 
treatment on quality of care by facility, health worker or patient characteristics (Table 




up-to-date salary payment, health worker type, patient age and gender, comparing 
patients in treatment group to patients the control the expected change in z-score for 
quality of care was 0.22 (p-value<0.05). When comparing with the null model, the 
observed between health worker variance decreased from 0.58 to 0.43, while the within 
health worker variance remained virtually unchanged. A number of interaction terms 
were tested for evidence of treatment effect modification. However, there was no strong 
evidence that the effect of PBP was modified by facility or health worker characteristics.  
 
Next, the full model (Model L) was tested for endogeneity at cluster-level that could be 
due to covariates having different within effects as compared to the between effects. The 
results of the Hausman’s endogeneity test (Hausman’s test statistic=11.4 with 2 d.f. 
signifying the number of covariates with both between- and within- cluster variation, p-
value<0.05) indicated that there was evidence of misspecification of the model, 
specifically related to patient age and gender. However, as suggested by Rabe-Hesketh 
and Skrondal [159] if the estimated difference in the effects is small, using random-
effects estimator would still be preferable to the fixed-effects estimator because overall, it 
has a smaller mean squared error. Histograms of predicted level-1 and level-2 residuals 
were examined for normal sampling distributions (Figure 5.4). While level-1 residuals 
from the full model appeared to have normal distribution, level-2 residuals appeared to 
have slight skew with thicker tails than what would be expected in normal distribution. 
Thus, the results were checked using the sandwich estimator that does not rely on correct 
model specification. The magnitude and significance of treatment coefficient remained 





5.4.5 Sensitivity analysis for the outcome variable 
To ensure that association between treatment and quality of care was not sensitive to 
outliers, the model with treatment as the predictor of quality of care was re-fit after 
removing the 43 observations identified as severe outliers (raw quality of care score 
above 0.86 or z-score>2.91). As it could be expected, removing severe outliers, even if 
they made up only 2% of the sample, reduced the observed between- as well as within- 
health worker variance in quality of care. The level-2 variance in the two-level null 
model was reduced from 0.58 to 0.45, while the level-1 variance was reduced from 0.47 
to 0.42. However, the magnitude of the treatment coefficient changed only slightly from 
0.23 to 0.21. Moreover, it remained statistically significant at 5% level.  
 
A final check was completed by removing moderate outliers as defined in Hamilton 
[103]: 220 out of 2,106 non-missing values (10.5%) were below (n=20) or above (n=200) 
the inner fences (raw quality of care score 0.11 – 0.66). After removing these 
observations from the dataset and re-fitting the null model, the level-2 variance was 
reduced to 0.20 while the level-1 variance was reduced to 0.22. It was clear that 
particularly high performers were removed from the sample where the highest quality of 
care score became 65.5%. Treatment coefficient became close to zero (β=.08, p-
value>0.05).  These results were determined to be biased, as the top 9.5% of observations 
were removed, making the mean quality of care score unreasonably low (36.3%) when 






PBP or supply-side incentive programs have been gaining popularity in many developed 
and developing countries over the past few years. There are 30 countries where RBF in 
health projects were recently completed, are currently implemented or under preparation 
[95]. While RBF projects include demand- and supply-side incentives, this provides some 
indication of the large amount of resources that are spent on improving health system 
performance through changes in provider incentives. Thus, the question of the effect of 
PBP on quality of care is of high policy relevance.  
 
According to the results of an RBF evaluation in Rwanda [32], PBP are expected to have 
the largest effect on those services that need the least amount of effort from health 
workers but at the same time provide highest financial rewards. While providers in 
Afghanistan were not paid directly for aspects measured in the QoC index as defined in 
this study, the clinical processes of care that form the index can be viewed as services 
that require the least effort on the part of health workers. Also, health workers have more 
immediate control over clinical processes of care than quality of care measured through 
outcomes, including changes in health status, behavior and satisfaction of the population 
[174].  Based on the experience from Rwanda, it is expected that the most visible effect 
of RBF will be on services over which providers have the greatest control and which 
require the least effort [32]. The results of this study are consistent with this hypothesis. 
 
The overall conclusion of this study is consistent with the results of the recent evaluation 




Afghanistan had a significant association with clinical processes of care, specifically 
those measured by the Client Background and Physical Assessment Index, Client 
Counseling Index, and Time Spent with Client. These indices are sub-components of the 
QoC index used in this study [75].  However, by using multi-level modeling methods, 
this study provides a deeper understanding of the effect of the PBP program in 
Afghanistan, complementing the evaluation. It examines heterogeneity in QoC between- 
and within- health workers and estimates the proportion of variance that is explained by 
the assigned treatment.  By examining other variables that contributed to reduction in the 
observed variance in the outcome, this study will hopefully help to improve the design of 
the RBF program in Afghanistan as well as other countries. Specifically, as described 
below, it appears that investments in equipment as part of PBP may further improve 
clinical processes of care.   
 
While PBP appeared to be a significant predictor of QoC, there was substantial 
heterogeneity between facilities and health workers that was unexplained by the 
treatment. This is an important finding because it shows that while programs such as PBP 
can lead to higher quality of care, there are important facility and health worker 
characteristics that need to be taken into account which can help explain variation in the 
observed outcome. In an attempt to do so, this study first conducted exploratory data 
analysis looking at the relationship between QoC index and variables such as facility 
type, infrastructure, management type, health worker gender, type of health worker, 
health worker motivation, health worker knowledge score, patient age, patient gender and 




were tested, revealing important variables that influence clinical processes of care, 
holding treatment constant. These models suggested that differences in clinical processes 
of care were attributable to many facility, health worker and patient characteristics. Thus, 
PBP is only one of many potential instruments for improving quality of care at the 
facilities [121], and it may not be the most effective approach as organizational aspects 
such as timeliness of salary payments can have an even larger effect on quality.  
 
The findings of the study also point to ways of improving the design of programs such as 
PBP. According to a study on PBP and quality improvement in the USA, “the mere 
creation of financial incentives will not close the quality chasm; organizations must 
concurrently develop supporting infrastructure and develop new capabilities for 
continuous quality improvement” [175]. Limited success of traditional PBP programs in 
the USA is attributed in part to the fact that these programs are rarely paired with other 
complementary quality improvement activities such as training, infrastructure 
investments etc [175]. The significant effect of equipment on quality of care, controlling 
for treatment assignment, suggests that in addition to providing financial incentives to 
individual health workers, the program should make investments in improving facility 
infrastructure. This is also supported by evidence from PBP programs in other developing 
countries. In Rwanda, where the PBP program seemed to be successful in improving 
utilization and quality of health services, on average 23% of funds earned through the 
program were allocated for overall facility-level investments such as infrastructure and 





There was a significant difference in expected QoC between CHCs and SCs, holding 
treatment constant. SCs are the lowest level of BPHS facilities included in the program. 
They are typically located in more rural remote areas of the country as compared to 
higher level facilities. Thus, the observed difference in expected QoC between the CHCs 
and SCs may be indicative of other factors that play an important role in QoC. SCs are 
much smaller than either BHCs or CHCs, often staffed with only one health worker, 
although in theory they should have one male nurse and one female community midwife 
[32]. Interestingly, once health worker characteristics were added to the model, type of 
facility was no longer statistically significant, which may imply that the initially observed 
effect of CHCs on quality of care was largely due to the presence of staff with higher 
qualifications, specifically doctors. Still, these results point to the importance of further 
investments in health posts and SC, as they are the first point of contact with health 
services for most of the population.  
 
Similar to the finding of this study, a previous study in Afghanistan [39] shows no 
association between health worker gender and observed quality of care. It differs from the 
findings of the study by Das and Hammer [37] that found a positive association between 
female providers and higher quality of care. This could be due to the fact that Das and 
Hammer were comparing quality of care among doctors and had a large sample of female 
providers, while in this study 88.7% of observations comes from male providers. 
Moreover, 88.5% of observations made among doctors were among male doctors and 





Doctors were associated with higher level of quality as compared to other types of 
providers, holding treatment and other variables constant. This may reflect higher levels 
of training and knowledge that doctors have, although the variable on the knowledge test 
score and number of technical training days in the past 12 months did not appear to be 
associated with quality of care. This finding of positive association between being a 
doctor and providing better quality of care is consistent with previous findings in 
Afghanistan [39].  
 
The lack of association between health worker knowledge score and QoC index was 
surprising. According to Das and Hammer [37], differences in doctors’ competence or 
differences in doctors’ incentives account for the variance in quality of care. Comparing 
doctors in public sector, whose salaries were fixed, with those in the private sector, who 
worked on the basis of fee-for-service, in Delhi, Das and Hammer noted that doctors who 
knew more also did more, if they were provided with right incentives, mainly in the form 
of financial rewards.  At the same time, they found that less qualified private doctors 
seemed to provide higher quality of care than their better qualified colleagues working in 
public facilities because, as the authors of the study explain, they had incentives to do so 
[37]. Thus, controlling for incentives through the treatment variable, health worker 
competence, as measured by the score in the knowledge test, was expected to have a 
positive association with QoC. This was not the case in this study. Partly, it may be due 
to differences in samples between this study and the study in India. Das and Hammer [37] 
examined differences in quality of care and competence among doctors only, whereas 




addition, however, this may be due to how competence was measured in this study as 
compared to studies by Leonard et al [176] and Das and Hammer [37], which used 
vignettes that closely reflected competencies that were assessed during direct patient-
provider observations. In this study, the knowledge score was based on a general test 
covering a wide range of technical knowledge such as infection prevention at facility 
level, general knowledge related to HIV transmission, TB diagnosis and treatment, 
storage of vaccines, newborn care, and family planning methods.  
 
This study found a small but significant association between motivation, specifically 
identified regulation, and QoC. According to studies of quality of care in [36, 37, 177], it 
appears that there is a large gap between health worker competence and performance. 
These studies suggest that there is a positive association between QoC and health worker 
motivation. In the overview of variations in QoC in five low income countries, Das and 
Gertler [177] found that decreased effort or motivation can offset additional competence. 
The study by Leonard and Masatu [77]  that specifically examines intrinsic motivation 
among health workers in Tanzania concludes that faced with the same types of 
incentives, certain types of health workers continue providing higher quality of care than 
their peers because they are driven by intrinsic motivation. These types of health workers 
seem to provide high QoC in a variety of organizational settings, many of which do not 
have mechanisms or culture that rewards additional effort. Serneels et al. [178] found that 
intrinsic motivation was one of the key variables explaining heterogeneity in the 





As described in the previous chapter, in Afghanistan there was no association between 
PBP and motivation factors, including identified regulation, when comparing health 
workers assigned to the treatment group and health workers assigned to the control group. 
Also, the current study did not find significant association between external motivation 
and observed QoC. At the same time, there was small but significant association between 
identified motivation and QoC after controlling for treatment, i.e. assignment to PBP 
program. Thus, it seems that similar to the results in Tanzania [77], on average 
intrinsically motivated health workers provide higher quality of care regardless of the 
presence of external financial incentives.  
 
This suggests that interventions that focus on improving identified motivation need more 
attention, including changes in organizational factors that encourage staff to voice their 
opinions and participate in decision-making, provide opportunities for professional 
growth, ensure good communication between the management and staff, and promote fair 
policies. Horizontal enlargement, which involves expanding jobs so they include more 
activities and have task configurations that are interesting for employees, and vertical 
enlargement, which expands jobs to give employees greater say over their duties, are 
recommended as key policies in enhancing identified motivation [19]. However, as 
Gagne and Deci acknowledge, [19] there is a need for further research on what specific 
organizational factors promote identified motivation. 
 
There are certain limitations in this study. Firstly, the study focused only on one of the 




Improvements in the health status and behavior of the population are the ultimate aims of 
the RBF project in Afghanistan and other countries. Whether changes in clinical 
processes of care translate into changes in utilization of health services or health status of 
the population depends on a large set of factors that are beyond the control of individual 
health workers. Thus, they are less amenable to interventions such as bonus payments to 
individual health workers, which is the essence of the intervention described here. 
Secondly, due to the design of the RBF intervention in Afghanistan that, unlike the 
program in Rwanda, did not provide additional funds to the control arm facilities, it is 
impossible to separate the effect of increased “salaries” due to bonuses from the effect of 
payments based on performance [32]. Thirdly, the remaining large variance in the QoC 
index between- as well as within-health workers suggests that there are other important 
factors that were not measured in the study. Das and Gertler [177] in their multi-country 
overview of the variations in quality of care found that patient characteristics such as 
socio-demographic status were important predictors of QoC. This study, however, had 
only two patient-level variables and did not account for important characteristics such as 
SES at patient level. Fourthly, due to the small number of health workers observed per 
facility it was difficult to estimate between-facility as compared to between-health-
worker variance. Lastly, using factor scores and treating motivation factors as observed 
variables gives biased results that are typically attenuated. Treating motivation factors as 
latent variables and using structural equation modeling would provide stronger evidence 





According to two recent Cochrane reviews of the effect of PBP on quality of health care 
services [61, 62], there is limited evidence of the effect of PBP programs on quality of 
care. This is due to weaknesses in study designs of many of these interventions. Studies 
of PBP programs included in these reviews were often based on non-experimental 
designs and failed to account for potential confounders. This study is based on data from 
cluster randomized trial and has a large probability-based sample. It examined the effect 
of PBP and explored other potential covariates that may contribute to improved quality of 
care. It also tested for treatment effect modification by key facility and health worker 
characteristics, providing further understanding of the process through which PBP may 
impact QoC. Taking advantage of multi-level modeling methods, it explored the relative 
contribution of different predictors of QoC in explaining the observed variation between 
as well as within health workers. While assessment of quality of care encompasses three 
distinct categories of structure, process and outcome and the effectiveness of the PBP 
program will differ for each of them, this paper provides evidence on the positive and 





Table 5.1 Missing responses for at least one question in the knowledge test by type 
of health worker and treatment group 
 
  
Type of health worker
Treatment 
(n=1,143)





Doctor 5.8 0.0 66 3.0
Nurse 11.2 10.6 238 10.9
Midwife 0.0 1.8 19 0.9
Community midwife 1.0 0.0 11 0.5
CHW supervisor 0.0 0.0 0 0.0




Table 5.2  Selected characteristics by treatment group  
 
 
Note: The overall sample size is 2,180 observations. Sample sizes by treatment arm are given in columns. 
Data are mean (SD) or proportions, unless otherwise indicated.  Means and proportions are based on 
weighted data. Test statistics are adjusted for multi-stage stratified cluster sampling using Taylor-linearized 
variance estimation. Strata with single sampling unit centered at overall mean. Sample characteristics are 









By type of facility
Sub-Centers 26.9 21.0 322
BHC 49.1 58.2 1317
CHC 24.0 20.8 541
By managing agency 
MOPH, without support 5.9 2.9 122
MOPH, with support 54.7 55.0 1315
NGO only 39.4 42.0 743
Health worker level
Gender (male) 87.4 90.1 1914 0.51
Health worker type
Doctor 26.6 26.5 608
Nurse 65.1 66.7 1380
Midwife 2.7 4.4 92
Community midwife 4.9 1.7 80
CHW Supervisor 0.7 0.8 20
Patient level
Gender (male) 43.1 47.5 979 0.09
Age (<5 years of age) 48.4 49.3 1064 0.24
Modifiable characteristics
Facility level
Equipment functionality 78.87 (18.60) 82.77 (10.73) 2180 0.45
Pharmaceuticals & vaccines availability 76.11 (17.22) 78.24 (16.35) 2180 0.45
Infrastructure index 51.14 (28.43) 51.79 (30.06) 2180 0.90
Health worker level
Health worker motivation factor scores
Identified regulation -0.11 (0.71) -0.14 (0.71) 2171 0.74
External regulation  -0.26 (0.80) -0.23 (0.76) 2171 0.75
Introjected regulation -0.27 (0.76) -0.22 (0.74) 2171 0.70
Amotivation 0.00 (0.71) 0.00 (0.73) 2171 0.99
Salary payment up-to-date 61.2 64.5 1353 0.64
Salary increase in the past 12 months 34.3 29.4 774 0.46
Training outside of the facility in the past 12 months (days) 5.61 (5.90) 5.70 (6.06) 2150 0.91







Table 5.3 Null model for the Quality of Care Index (z-scores) 
 





Parameter Est p-value Est p-value 
Fixed part
β0 [_cons] 0.04 0.44 -0.06 0.14 0.05 0.32 -0.05 0.15
Random part
ψ(3) 0.10 0.02 0.59
ψ(2) 0.49 0.32 0.73 0.58 0.48 0.71
θ 0.47 0.44 0.51 0.47 0.44 0.51
Derived estimates
rho (3) 0.09
rho (2) 0.46 0.55
Log likelihood -2491.3 -2491.8
Three-level model Two-level model




Table 5.4 Maximum likelihood estimates for Quality of Care Index (z-score) 
 
 
Note: Tables shows all the variables that were tested in smaller models. Model F is displayed as it is one of the main research questions. Model I is the model 
containing all covariates at cluster-level that were shown to be significant, prior to adding level-1 covariates. Model L is the final model.    
    
The results are based on 2,097 observations at level-1 and 254 clusters. Given that all items on motivation score were missing for one health worker (one cluster, 
i.e. health worker and nine patients) were dropped from the original sample.   
For health worker type, the reference category is doctors; for type of facility, the reference category is SC; for type of management, the reference category is 
MOPH only.   
R-sq shows additional variance explained by the covariates in the model in comparison with the null model. 
Parameter Est p-value Est p-value Est p-value Est p-value
Fixed part
β0 [_cons] -0.07 0.31 -0.22 0.07 -0.07 0.32 -0.22 0.07 -0.12 0.51 -0.48 0.24 -0.10 0.59 -0.46 0.26
β1 [treatment] 0.23 0.02 0.03 0.43 0.22 0.03 0.03 0.41 0.22 0.01 0.04 0.40 0.22 0.01 0.05 0.40
β2 [nurse] -0.40 0.00 -0.61 -0.18 -0.41 0.00 -0.63 -0.19
β3 [midwife] -0.50 0.04 -0.97 -0.02 -0.49 0.04 -0.97 -0.02
β4 [cm midwife] -0.17 0.47 -0.63 0.29 -0.14 0.55 -0.60 0.32
β5 [chws] -0.36 0.48 -1.35 0.63 -0.37 0.47 -1.35 0.62
β6 [hw male]
β7 [salary up-to-date] 0.39 0.00 0.20 0.57 0.39 0.00 0.21 0.58
β8 [bhc] 0.09 0.51 -0.17 0.35 0.08 0.54 -0.18 0.35
β9 [chc] 0.11 0.51 -0.22 0.44 0.10 0.54 -0.22 0.43
β10 [moph_support]
β11 [ngo]
β12 [equipment] 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.24 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.24
β13 [knowledge]
β14 [fscore1] 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.24 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.18 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.18
β15 [patient age 5+] -0.10 0.00 -0.16 -0.04
β16 [patient male] 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.15
Random part
ψ 0.57 0.47 0.70 0.55 0.45 0.67 0.43 0.35 0.53 0.43 0.35 0.53
θ 0.47 0.44 0.51 0.47 0.44 0.51 0.47 0.44 0.51 0.47 0.44 0.50
Derived estimates
R-sq 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.15
Log likelihood -2489.3 -2485.4 -2458.1 -2447.9
Model L
95% CI
Model A Model F Model I 





Table 5.5  Results for knowledge score effect with 3 different methods for missing 
data 
 
             
  
Parameter Est p-value Est p-value Est p-value
Fixed part
β0 [_cons] -0.08 0.29 -0.23 0.07 -0.07 0.36 -0.21 0.08 -0.07 0.38 -0.21 0.08
β1 [treatment] 0.11 0.31 -0.10 0.31 0.22 0.03 0.03 0.42 0.23 0.02 0.03 0.42
β13 [knowledge] 0.09 0.12 -0.02 0.21 0.04 0.33 -0.04 0.12 0.05 0.34 -0.05 0.15
Random part
ψ 0.51 0.41 0.63 0.75 0.68 0.83 0.57 0.47 0.70
θ 0.47 0.44 0.50 0.69 0.67 0.71 0.48 0.45 0.51
95% CI 95% CI 95% CI
Complete case analysis (n=1,785) Multiple imputation (n=2,106)





Figure 5.1 NHSPA 2012-2013 sampling for patient observations 
 
Note: * In provinces with less than 25 facilities, all facilities have been surveyed.  In Kandahar, where only 
eight facilities were selected for RBF pilot, only eight facilities were included in RBF sample. In the 
following RBF pilot provinces – Parwan, Takhar, Kunduz & Saripul – more than 25 facilities per province 
were selected to ensure inclusion of matched pair facilities surveyed at baseline in 2010-2011.  





Figure 5.2 Quality of care by treatment arm 
 
 













































































6 Chapter 6: Conclusions 
6.1 Summary of the findings 
This thesis provides an in-depth analysis of the effects of performance-based payments 
(PBP) on health worker motivation and quality of care in Afghanistan. In Paper 1, a 
multidimensional work motivation scale based on a clear theoretical framework was 
developed and validated. The scale is short with only 15 items, but at the same time, 
provides a nuanced understanding of motivation that is important in designing human 
resource policies. The Dari-language scale demonstrated good psychometric properties. 
Moreover, the results of the measurement invariance test provided sufficient evidence 
that the scale could be applied to Pashto speakers as well. This is an important finding 
given that Pashto is the second official language after Dari, and Pashtuns make up the 
largest ethnic group in the country.  
 
Paper 2 examined the effects of performance-based payments on different dimensions of 
health worker motivation. Based on the intention-to-treat analysis, it appeared that 
financial incentives in the form of performance-based payments did not have an effect on 
health worker motivation in Afghanistan. While other variables, such as gender and 
health worker type, were shown to be important predictors of different dimensions of 
motivation, the PBP intervention did not appear to have a significant association with any 
of the motivation factors. However, in cases with high proportions of non-compliers, i.e. 
those who did not receive the treatment, the ITT analysis results are often attenuated. 
Moreover, the results reflect the programmatic effect of the intervention, i.e. effect of the 




while others do not. Efficacy of the intervention itself is more accurately assessed 
through methods such as complier-average causal effect (CACE).  Given that a large 
proportion of health workers in this study reported that they did not receive pay-for-
performance, it seemed reasonable to conduct analysis using the CACE method. The 
estimated complier-average causal effects for identified, external, and introjected 
motivation factors were negative (p-value<0.05). It appeared that PBP were negatively 
associated with motivation, with the largest negative effect observed for identified 
regulation. 
 
Paper 3 examined the effect of performance-based payments program on quality of care 
defined as actions taken by the provider in making a diagnosis or treating the patient. It 
was measured using a standardized checklist that consisted of 16 items covering four 
areas of clinical quality of care:  patient history, physical examination, patient counseling 
or communication, and time spent with patient. Based on the likelihood ratio test, it was 
determined that there was insufficient evidence in favor of a three-level model, and a 
two-level model with a random intercept for a health worker was fit to the data.   The 
model with no covariates (“null model”) showed that 55% of total variation in quality of 
care was attributable to differences across health workers, while 45% of the variation in 
quality of care was due to within health worker differences.  
 
Comparing patients in the treatment group to patients in the control group, the expected 
change in z-score for quality of care was 0.23 (p-value<0.05). The decrease in level-2 




outcome observed between health workers. Other covariates that were found to be 
significant predictors of quality of care were the following: equipment functionality 
index, motivation, up-to-date salary payment, and health worker type. Together, these 
covariates explained 15% of the total variance in quality of care, and 26% of the level-2 
variance. In addition, patient age and gender had small but significant effects on quality 
of care. A number of interaction terms were tested for evidence of treatment effect 
modification. However, there was no strong evidence that the effect of PBP was modified 
by facility or health worker characteristics. 
 
Together these three papers suggest that while PBP have a significant positive effect on 
measures of quality, this effect is not due to increased motivation. At the same time, 
holding treatment constant, it appeared that identified regulation (autonomous motivation 
type, close to intrinsic motivation) was statistically significantly associated with quality 
of (p-value<0.05). Thus, it appears that health workers who are more intrinsically 
motivated do provide higher quality of care, but their motivation is not affected by PBP. 
Moreover, while the treatment, i.e. PBP program, appeared to be a significant predictor of 
quality of care, it explained only a small portion of variation observed in quality of care 
between as well as within health workers. Health worker type, presence of functioning 
equipment, and timely payment of salaries seem to be more important predictors of 
quality of care, explaining a larger proportion of total variance in quality of care between 





6.2 Study limitations and future research considerations 
In addition to the specific limitations put forth in each paper, three general limitations 
apply to this dissertation. First of all, the study is based on a cross-sectional survey data 
thus limiting any causal inferences that can be made about the effects of PBP on 
motivation factors and quality of care. This also warns against drawing any definite 
conclusions regarding the effect of motivation on quality of care as the conceptual 
framework provided at the beginning of this study (Figure 1.3) shows how health worker 
performance feeds back to motivation via the consequences of worker performance. 
Thus, motivation at time t affects performance at time t, which has varying consequences 
at time t+1, including the amount of performance-based payments that a health worker 
receives for her efforts. This, in turn, has an effect on motivation at time t+1. As 
payments were made on a quarterly basis for the period of nearly two years, longitudinal 
data would have provided a more accurate understanding of the effect of performance-
based payments on motivation and of motivation on quality of care.  
 
Secondly, the aggregate data from MOPH shows there was a wide variation in the total 
amount of PBP earned by each facility. Some of the variation is due to the size of the 
facility. However, it is likely that, even among facilities of the same size as measured by 
the number of staff, there was a large variation in the amount of earned bonuses at the 
facility level. Moreover, it is likely that there was a large within facility variation of the 
amount that each health worker received. This study does not account for the variation in 




that they had an effect on both motivation and quality of care. It also does not account for 
the variation in intra-facility distribution types.  
 
A more in-depth qualitative study would provide a richer understanding of the findings of 
this dissertation. The negative effect of PBP on external motivation found when 
comparing compliers in the treatment group, i.e. those who were assigned to PBP arm 
and reported to have actually received the payments, with compliers in the control group 
was surprising. Some explanation could be found in the data available on the design and 
implementation of the project through general MOPH documents and personal 
communication with the Ministry staff responsible for the project. However, a qualitative 
study including focus group discussions and interviews with NGOs running the facilities, 
the facility management, and health workers would provide a deeper understanding of 
reasons behind such surprising finding. The same applies to the findings regarding 
quality of care. Large unexplained variance observed between health workers as well as 
within health workers could be due to organizational structural and cultural factors that 
would be best explored through a qualitative study.  
 
6.3 Policy implications 
Access to health services depends to a large extent on availability of health workforce. 
On the one hand, there is evidence suggesting that low motivation contributes to 
shortages and low performance of individual health workers, weakening entire health 
systems. On the other hand, it seems that intrinsically motivated health workers can make 




resource-constraints. Health sector initiatives, such as Results-Based Financing in Health 
(RBF), are gaining popularity as governments and development partners try to address 
the complex challenges related to shortage of human resources in health, health worker 
performance and quality of health services.  It is often assumed that improved financial 
incentives in the form of PBP improve health worker motivation and satisfaction. This, in 
turn, would lead to better health system performance, including quality of care. At the 
same time, there has been some difficulty in producing strong evidence on the impact of 
PBP programs on motivation and quality of care. There is even less evidence on the 
impact of motivation on health worker performance.  
 
This is the first study on work motivation based on a large probability-based sample 
covering the entire country. It provides the first instrument on motivation that has been 
validated in Dari and is generalizable to Pashto language. Given the acute shortage and 
high turnover of health workers in Afghanistan and other countries in Central Asia, there 
is a high level of interest in improving health worker motivation among governments and 
international development partners in this region. An instrument that allows policy-
makers to understand the nuanced multi-dimensional nature of motivation and to 
accurately measure it will hopefully contribute to the development of better informed 
policies based on evidence.   
 
The study also showed that there are several design issues of the RBF program in 
Afghanistan that should be taken into account when designing the new phase of the 




from health workers about the RBF project is welcome, it is necessary to ensure that there 
are no unrealistic expectations as to the size of the bonus payments. Secondly, while 
verification of data provided by facilities for the payment purposes maybe necessary, 
especially in countries with weakly developed health management information systems 
(HMIS), delays in payments must be avoided.  
 
Thirdly, health workers must be made aware of the precise formula and mechanism of 
distribution of payments within their facilities. The experience of Burundi may be a 
useful start. Fourthly, while facility autonomy should be encouraged and it may seem 
reasonable to allow facilities to decide the mechanisms for within-facility distribution of 
PBP, some basic rules based on the experience and lessons learned so far appear to be 
necessary.  
 
In Afghanistan, a large portion of facilities chose to distribute PBP earned by the facility 
in proportion to existing salaries, which meant that the most senior staff or staff with 
highest salary levels received the largest portion of PBP and not the staff most directly 
responsible for the achievement of the performance indicators, such as midwives and 
vaccinators. This is likely to have a negative effect on the external motivation of 
midwives and vaccinators.  Also, in many developing country settings it is the “can do” 
component that is missing, not the “will do” component, as health workers are forced to 
provide care when they do not have basic infrastructure such as access to clean water, 




effectiveness of PBP it seems necessary to ensure that part of the PBP earned by the 
facility is directed towards facility level expenditures.  
 
Fourthly, as results of the third paper showed management issues such as timely payment 
of salaries and availability of functioning equipment are more important predictors of 
quality of care. While there is a widespread enthusiasm in international donor community 
about RBF in general and PBP specifically, the findings of this study imply that perhaps 
reforms targeting issues related to the overall public financial reforms and  management 
of facilities may provide the same gains as PBP projects. This finding is especially 
important to consider when implementing PBP programs in countries with weak HMIS 
where large resources are spent on verification of data prior to making the payments, as 
the costs of the program may outweigh its benefits. 
 
The third and fourth points above are related and indicate the ways in which PBP can be 
improved in the future. According to a study on PBP and quality improvement in the 
USA, “the mere creation of financial incentives will not close the quality chasm; 
organizations must concurrently develop supporting infrastructure and develop new 
capabilities for continuous improvement” [175]. Limited success of traditional PBP 
programs in the USA is attributed in part to the fact that these programs are rarely paired 
with other complementary quality improvement activities such as training, infrastructure 





The significant effect of presence of functioning equipment on quality of care, controlling 
for treatment assignment, suggests that in addition to providing financial incentives to 
individual health workers the program should make investments in improving facility 
infrastructure. This is also supported by the evidence from PBP programs in other 
countries, such as Rwanda. Implementation of quality improvement activities and 
changes in management practices alongside increased financial incentives to health 




7 Appendix A: Supplementary tables for Chapter 3 
 
Table 7.1 Original 20-item scale 
Please read carefully and circle one of the answers for each question, according to how you personally feel 
about the statement made. The answers range from 1 naan, which means you strongly disagree with the 
statement, to 4 naan, which means you strongly agree with the statement. There is no right or wrong 
answer, so please, do not spend long time thinking about each question, simply try to circle the answer that 
best describes your feelings. 
4 NAAN = “STRONGLY AGREE”                                                             3 NAAN = “AGREE” 
2 NAAN = “DISAGREE”                                                        1 NAAN = “STRONGLY DISAGREE”  
Example 1:  The statement says, “I really like winter”. So, if you like winter but it is not your favorite time of 
the year, you will choose 3 Naan. It means you agree with the statement but not that strongly, since you like 
it but not as much as maybe spring.  
   
















250 I work in this job because it  is  part of the way in 
which I have chosen to live my life 
1 2 3 4 
251 I am glad that I work in this facility rather than other 
facilities in the country 
1 2 3 4 
252 I work here because it makes me feel important 1 2 3 4 
253 I only work here so that I get paid at the end of the 
month 
1 2 3 4 
254 I frequently think of quitting this job 1 2 3 4 
255 I feel I should personally take the credit or blame for 
the results of my work on this job 
1 2 3 4 
256 I do this job because my family would be 
disappointed if I quit 
1 2 3 4 
257 I work here because of opportunities for promotion 1 2 3 4 
258 I sometimes feel my work here is meaningless 1 2 3 4 
259 I work in this job because it allows me to decide how 
my work is organized 
1 2 3 4 
260 I work in this facility because it has sufficient 
resources I need to do my job (medicine, equipment, 
infrastructure) 
1 2 3 4 
261 I work in this job because it allows me to use my 
skills 
1 2 3 4 
262 I do this job because it gives me respect in the 
community 
1 2 3 4 
263 I work here because it is located in a safe area 1 2 3 4 
264 I work here because of good benefits  I receive 
(Note: all benefits – housing, transportation, 
anything else you receive – think overall) 
1 2 3 4 
265 It is hard for me to care very much about whether or 
not the work gets done right 
1 2 3 4 
266 I work in this job because I can accomplish 
something worthwhile in this job 
1 2 3 4 
267 I work here because it provides long term security 
for me 
1 2 3 4 
268 Since I've heard about opportunities to receive 
performance-based payments I've been working 
harder than before 
1 2 3 4 
269 I feel a very high degree of personal responsibility 
for the work I do on this job 






Table 7.2 Guide for the focus group discussion 
Guide to the focus group discussions 
These questions are developed in order to understand the meaning of motivation and 
motivating factors for Afghan health workers. This is particularly important as Dari and 
Pashtu languages appear to often use the same word for motivation and encouragement.  
 
The focus group discussions are to be conducted with two separate groups of 7-10 
participants representing different types of EPHS (hospital) health workers.  
 
1. What are things that come to your mind when someone says motivation?  
NOTE: Just let people shout out nouns, verbs, phrases and record them. Do 
not interrupt or correct. 
2. What does being motivated mean to you? 
3. Can you give an example of the situation when you felt motivated at work? 
4. List aspects/factors that encourage a person to do his/her work well, in 
general, not specific to you or this work. 
5. Why do you work here? NOTE: Ask both (4) and (5) because that way we can 
see if they understand (5) in the same way we do. 
6. What made you choose to become a nurse/doctor? 
7. Put in order of PRIORITY factors (so, have to RANK them) that affect your 
decision to work in your current job. 
8. Which of these factors would make you want to change the job? 
 
Factors that may affect your decision to work in your current job 
Original ordered list  
Healing patients  
Salary  
Recognition and respect by community  
Recognition by the family  
Supportive supervisor  
Training opportunities  
Doing something positive for the country  
Future promotion  
Desire to do something useful   
Guilt  
Co-workers  
Ability to make my own decisions  
Benefits  
Job security  
Sympathy for those who are sick  
Ability to use my skills  






Table 7.3 Distribution of work motivation scale items and overall motivation 
  












I work in this job because I have a chance to help other 
people through my work
431 1.2 1.4 25.5 71.9 3.68 0.56
2
I w ork in this facility because it plays an important role in the 
community
431 1.6 1.6 20.0 76.8 3.72 0.58
3
I feel I should personally take the credit or blame for the 
results of my work on this job
429 1.2 2.8 35.0 61.1 3.56 0.61
4
I w ork in this job because it allow s me to decide how  my w ork is 
organized
431 1.6 3.5 45.7 49.2 3.42 0.64
5 I work in this job because it allows me to use my skills 431 1.9 2.3 40.8 55.0 3.49 0.64
6
I w ork in this job because I can accomplish something w orthw hile 
in this job
431 0.5 0.9 20.7 78.0 3.76 0.48
7
I feel a very high degree of personal responsibility for the 
work I do on this job
430 0.2 0.2 15.8 83.7 3.83 0.40
8 I work here because it makes me feel important 431 7.9 7.9 33.4 50.8 3.27 0.91
9
I do this job because my family would be disappointed if I 
quit
431 14.9 19.3 34.6 31.3 2.82 1.03
10 I do this job because it gives me respect in the community 431 9.5 14.4 34.3 41.8 3.08 0.97
11 I work in this job to gain God’s grace 431 0.0 0.0 8.1 91.9 3.92 0.27
12 I only w ork here to get so that I can get paid 431 28.1 27.6 30.2 14.2 2.30 1.03
13 I work here because of opportunities for promotion 431 4.2 2.8 43.2 49.9 3.39 0.74
14
I work in this facility because it has sufficient resources I 
need to do my job (medicine, equipment, infrastructure)
430 6.7 17.7 40.2 35.4 3.04 0.89
15 I work here because it is located in a safe area 431 6.3 16.0 33.9 43.9 3.15 0.91
16
I w ork here because of good benefits  I receive (Note: all benefits – 
housing, transportation, anything else you receive – think overall)
430 30.7 36.7 24.9 7.7 2.10 0.93
17 I work here because it provides long term security for me 431 3.0 8.4 37.6 51.0 3.37 0.76
18 I frequently think of quitting this job 430 53.0 28.6 12.1 6.3 1.72 0.91
19 I sometimes feel my work here is meaningless 429 68.1 20.1 6.3 5.6 1.49 0.84
20 I don’t care much about the quality of work here 431 68.9 19.3 6.3 5.6 1.48 0.84
21 I w ork here because I have no other choice 429 11.0 15.4 36.6 37.1 3.00 0.98
Overall, I feel very motivated to do my job 419 0.7 0.2 26.3 72.8 3.71 0.50


























439 1.8 1.6 24.6 72.0 3.67 0.60 804 3.1 3.2 26.9 66.8 3.57 0.70
439 0.9 2.3 21.2 75.6 3.72 0.55 803 1.4 4.6 26.5 67.5 3.60 0.64
438 0.7 3.2 34.3 61.9 3.57 0.59 802 3.1 4.7 36.8 55.4 3.44 0.73
438 0.5 4.1 45.7 49.8 3.45 0.60 804 2.1 5.4 46.8 45.8 3.36 0.68
439 0.9 2.5 35.1 61.5 3.57 0.59 802 2.0 6.0 41.7 50.4 3.40 0.69
438 0.2 0.7 21.5 77.6 3.76 0.46 801 1.1 2.3 24.3 72.3 3.68 0.58
438 0.0 0.5 15.3 84.3 3.84 0.38 804 0.6 1.1 16.7 81.6 3.79 0.47
439 5.5 9.3 35.8 49.4 3.29 0.85 804 9.0 12.1 32.3 46.6 3.17 0.96
439 13.2 21.2 35.8 29.8 2.82 1.00 803 19.6 22.0 31.4 27.0 2.66 1.08
439 6.8 14.1 38.3 40.8 3.13 0.90 804 14.6 17.3 31.6 36.6 2.90 1.05
438 0.0 0.7 10.7 88.6 3.88 0.35 803 0.3 0.5 8.3 90.9 3.90 0.34
439 23.9 32.4 31.4 12.3 2.32 0.97 802 28.6 30.6 29.4 11.5 2.24 0.99
439 2.3 5.0 42.8 49.9 3.40 0.69 804 3.9 7.7 42.3 46.1 3.31 0.77
439 6.4 19.8 40.8 33.0 3.00 0.89 804 10.8 20.5 37.3 31.3 2.89 0.97
439 5.9 13.7 35.1 45.3 3.20 0.89 804 6.6 15.1 33.7 44.7 3.16 0.91
439 28.0 40.3 24.2 7.5 2.11 0.90 803 35.2 32.5 25.3 7.0 2.04 0.94
438 3.2 5.9 41.1 49.8 3.37 0.74 803 6.6 11.6 38.2 43.6 3.19 0.88
439 49.0 28.9 16.4 5.7 1.79 0.92 799 41.9 30.2 18.7 9.3 1.95 0.99
439 65.2 23.9 5.2 5.7 1.51 0.84 804 56.5 22.1 11.0 10.5 1.75 1.02
438 69.9 19.4 8.2 2.5 1.43 0.75 802 65.6 18.0 9.5 7.0 1.58 0.92
438 9.4 15.5 36.8 38.4 3.04 0.96 802 12.7 18.6 35.2 33.5 2.90 1.01
419 0.0 0.2 26.0 73.8 3.73 0.46 797 0.9 1.3 24.7 73.2 3.70 0.54




8 Appendix B: Supplementary tables and graphs for Chapter 4 
 
Table 8.1 Distribution of motivation scale items by treatment arm 
 
 














I work in this job because I have a chance to help 
other people through my work
4.6 2.5 28.2 64.6 2.8 4.5 21.3 71.4 804 0.15
intr3
I feel I should personally take the credit or blame for 
the results of my work on this job
3.3 3.5 36.7 56.6 3.8 5.0 37.6 53.6 802 0.77
intr7
I feel a very high degree of personal responsibility for 
the work I do on this job
0.2 1.5 18.0 80.3 1.2 0.9 16.9 81.0 804 0.39
intrj4 I work in this job to gain God’s grace 0.2 0.6 9.1 90.1 0.2 0.3 7.3 92.3 803 0.76
External regulation
extrg2 I work here because of opportunities for promotion 4.0 10.8 42.4 42.8 4.7 4.9 37.8 52.6 804 0.03
extrg3
I work in this facility because it has sufficient 
resources I need to do my job (medicine, equipment, 
infrastructure)
8.7 23.6 37.6 30.2 13.7 17.1 38.6 30.6 804 0.12
extrg4 I work here because it is located in a safe area 5.7 14.0 34.4 45.9 6.4 16.8 33.8 43.0 804 0.80
extrg6
I work here because it provides long term security for 
me
4.0 14.0 35.9 46.0 9.3 10.1 39.7 40.9 803 0.02
intr5
I work in this job because it allows me to use my 
skills
1.1 6.8 44.0 48.1 3.8 4.9 34.3 57.0 802 0.02
Introjected regulation
intrj1 I work here because it makes me feel important 10.2 14.7 33.0 42.0 8.5 10.1 33.3 48.1 804 0.24
intrj2
I do this job because my family would be 
disappointed if I quit
20.1 23.9 29.0 27.0 19.6 21.6 30.7 28.1 803 0.91
intrj3
I do this job because it gives me respect in the 
community
13.4 19.8 33.1 33.8 16.1 17.3 30.2 36.4 804 0.63
Amotivation
amot1 I frequently think of quitting this job 43.0 32.8 16.9 7.3 44.7 26.1 18.3 10.9 799 0.26
amot2 I sometimes feel my work here is meaningless 56.5 26.1 10.3 7.2 57.6 18.0 10.7 13.8 804 0.03
amot3 I don’t care much about the quality of work here 62.1 21.9 9.7 6.3 68.5 14.8 8.9 7.8 802 0.18








Table 8.3 CACE model with pretreatment covariates (without OER) 
 
 
Note:  NC – non-compliers is reference class, their intercepts are at 0.    
** statistical significance at 5% level.   
Beta S.E. OR p-value
BHC facility -0.18 0.36 0.84 0.62
CHC facility 0.45 0.38 1.56 0.23
MOPH with support 1.63 0.51 5.10 0.00
NGO only 1.86 0.53 6.39 0.00
Male -0.07 0.24 0.93 0.77
Nurse -0.13 0.29 0.88 0.65
Midwife 0.16 0.38 1.18 0.67
Community MW 0.09 0.36 1.09 0.80
Vaccinator -0.06 0.29 0.94 0.83
CHW Supervisor -0.05 0.35 0.95 0.88
Intercept C1 -1.84 0.63 0.00
Compliers Non-compliers
0.44 0.56
Identified External Introjected Amotivation 
Treatment 
    Compliers -2.02** -1.09** -0.85** 0.56**
    Non-compliers 0.95** 0.72** 0.32 -0.52
Nurse -0.16   0.22 0.23 0.17
Midwife -0.68** 0.29 0.60** 0.59**
Community MW 0.10 0.46** 0.57** -0.11
Vaccinator -0.37 0.34** 0.46** 0.29
CHW Supervisor -0.24 0.37** 0.53** 0.49**
Intercepts 2.65** 1.67** 1.21** -1.14**
Final class proportions based on estimated 
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Figure 9.5 Quality of care, equipment functionality, pharmaceuticals and vaccines 





































































































Figure 9.8 Quality of care, knowledge and training 
 
 
Figure 9.9Motivation factor scores and quality of care  
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 Provided support to project implementation units during procurement process, including 
developing terms of references, evaluating technical and financial proposals, reviewing 
and following up on progress reports 
 Assisted the World Bank and DFID senior financial management specialists in 
development and follow-up of the fiduciary risks mitigations measures under the Health 
SWAp  





World Bank Institute, Washington, DC                                  05.2003 – 04.2004 
Evaluation Consultant, Evaluation Group 
 Conducted statistical analyses of survey data and wrote a chapter for the impact 
evaluation report on the World Bank Institute programs in the Russian Federation 
 Conducted interviews with field staff and edited the regional impact evaluation 
study of WBI programs in East Asia and the Pacific 
             
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS AND CONFERENCES 
 
European Conference on Health Economics, Helsinki, Finland                                       01.2010      
Review and scoring of 30 abstracts 
 
Stortingsvalget 2009, Oslo, Norway                                                                                    09.2009 
Translator for international election observers  
 
European Conference on Health Economics, Rome, Italy                                                01.2008      




 World Congress on Health Economics, Copenhagen, Denmark                                  07.2007 
Presented a paper on “Evaluating Effects of Health Care Reforms on Coverage in the Kyrgyz 
Republic 1991-2006” 
 
International Health Economics Association                                                   03.2007 – 03.2008 
Member 
 
Harvard International Development Conference, Cambridge, MA                01.2002 – 04.2002 
Member of the Conference Steering Committee responsible for technical content of the Human 
Development Panel and fundraising for the Conference  
 
PROFESSIONAL TRAINING  
 
Poverty, Equity and Health Systems                                                        10.2006      
The World Bank Institute, Hungary  
 
Accelerating Progress Towards the Health MDGs                                                      03.2006 
The World Bank Institute, Washington, DC 
 
World Bank Procurement Workshop                                                                                02.2006 
The World Bank, Kyrgyzstan   
 
Public Health Leadership Programme                                                                              07.2005 
Imperial College London 
